Population Dynamics and Radicalization in the CENTCOM AOR: Post-Brexit EU2 + 1 and the UN vs. a US-led Coalition of the Willing

Author | Editor: Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University)

Introduction

In 2020, the States of the European Union (EU), as well as NATO’s European members and those States not enjoying membership of one or both organizations (e.g. the United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland, and others), confront a serious multi-faceted challenge. This challenge takes the form of popular radicalization and mass migration (PRMM) of both refugees and non-refugee migrants originating in the portion of US Central Command’s Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) located in the Middle East and Central Asia and by extension into North Africa within the AFRICOM AOR.

This analysis examined specifically the concerns of the States of the EU2 + 1 (the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany) and the other States of German- speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE). The latter include German-speaking Austria and Switzerland but also Hungary, the Czech Republic/Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland.

In varying degrees, but nonetheless consistently, these States view PRMM as posing: 1) a serious potential (or actual) Islamist terrorist threat to their national security (despite the fact that not all refugees or migrants are Muslim), and 2) an increasing likelihood for generating potential (or actual) socio-political instability in their domestic affairs.

To the degree to which PRMM is exacerbated by Russia’s military action in support of Syria in the latter’s civil war (the term is used generically), PRMM may be viewed as fostering Russia’s larger geo-strategic objectives of causing the greatest possible weakening of both the EU and NATO. Further, to the degree to which current Russo-Turkish cooperation continues— and Turkish-EU/NATO estrangement lasts—Turkey may well continue to serve as the principal corridor through which PRMM may be “exported” into Europe via Greece and the Balkans.

Key Findings

• Historically conditioned attitudes in the EU2 + 1 and GS-ECE complicate effective and rapid responses, whether national or collective, to PRMM.
• Barring major “Black Swan” events, EU2 + 1 and GS-ECE will continue to stress the importance of an international rules-based, preferably UN-led, effort to mitigate PRMM insofar as it threatens Europe directly. This would include on-site de- radicalization efforts in MENA itself and anti-mass migration efforts both on the EU’s borders and within individual States.
• EU2 + 1 and GS-ECE participation in a US-led “coalition of the willing” to mitigate PRMM is unlikely. Of the States in question—based upon the examples of the Sahel, the Mediterranean, Iraq and Afghanistan—exceptions might be found in the United Kingdom, France, and Poland. German participation in any large-scale combat role or safe-zone protective function is unlikely given both the current “lame duck” status of Chancellor Angela Merkel in the run-up to national elections currently scheduled for 2021 and other domestic concerns.

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