Ensuring an Agile and Strong USG

Question (LR5): Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050?

Author | Editor: Holliday, R. (National Defense University).

The contributors to question LR 5 diverge widely on their recommendations for ensuring that the USG prevails in future conflicts, while also preserving the US constitutional system. The divergence is attributable to the breadth of the question, as well as the diversity of the contributors’ backgrounds.

The most common areas for improvement that arose from the contributions are:

• Refinement of the USG and military strategy making processes
• Emphasis on strategic communication to multiple audiences and through multiple channels
• Improvement of civilian and military operations prior to and during conflict
• Enhancement of capabilities for understanding varied operational environments
• Creation of new authorities and organizations to deal with fluid events as they develop
• Development of resource channels and education opportunities that empower decentralized action

The contributors’ recommendations are arranged in this report based on the original question’s categories of inquiry, which were: changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, and education; with the addition of two categories, risk calculation and strategy formation.

Due to the broad scope of the question, multiple contributors also encourage further exploration of the topics through deliberate networking and research in order to develop additional solutions.

The Projected Future Operational Environment

Among the contributors there is a general expectation that future military operations will increase in complexity, with a commiserate increase in requirements for information on the environment. Among the risks seen are the impacts of climate change, which as one contributor states, “will present more, more frequent, and more severe instances for the US to respond (or NOT). ” “These events will include humanitarian responses to severe weather events, as well as global crisis and conflicts…spawned by the effects of this change and variability.”

The assumed result by commentators is that the Joint Force will increasingly be required to engage globally. One concern raised with the expansion of DoDs requirements is that a, “corresponding ‘militarization’ of foreign policy through the dominance of the military instrument of national power to address increasingly complex issues/problems/challenges, supplants the other departments/agencies constitutional and legal (i.e. FAA) roles and responsibilities.”

One contributor assumed that the creation of additional requirements is also likely to accompany an increase in the force being used to fill, “‘non-traditional’ roles due to our capacity and capabilities.” Another contributor believed that, “the increasing number of countries, cultures, and languages of interest,” in which DoD will be employed, will require the force to “focus on producing agile cultural generalists rather than stable long-term specialists.

Another contributor stated that the Joint Force will face resource limitations that impact its capacity to respond to events.6 This limitation was assumed to be partially offset by an increase in the US’s utilization of coalitions to achieve its desired end states for a range of different contingency scenarios.

One planning model was recommended in order to address these new challenges. The model states that future planning and engagement may be more fruitful if it is divided into Short, Medium, and Long-Term challenges. Short-term challenges consist of those that can be addressed between 2017 and 2021 under the current POM. Medium-term challenges consist of those between 2022 and 2030, which can be extrapolated based on current and newly identified trends. Long-term challenges are those between 2030 and 2050, which cannot be extrapolated based on current trends.8 This model was not incorporated into the current report, but may be useful as a stepping off point for future inquiries.

Contributors Recommendations

The contributors made several recommendations for improving the force’s ability to address the various aspects of Question LR 5.

Organization

One group of contributors asserted that increases in the complexity of problem sets, as well as greater demand for specialized subject matter expertise, can be partially mitigated by the creation of, “Standing Civilian-military teams or increased civilian-military teaming.” 9 Among the examples provided by the contributor was, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghan & Iraq); USSOF ‘teamed’ with FBI for sensitive site exploitation efforts; USSOF ‘teamed’ with USAID development representatives to assess local vulnerabilities and development (Afghanistan/Iraq); Conventional Force and Reserve elements ‘teamed’ with FBI and ISCTAP elements to support building partner law enforcement capabilities; and Conventional Force and Reserve elements ‘teamed’ with USDA elements to build agricultural capabilities in Afghanistan.”

Two other contributor strongly cautioned however that the future civilian-military teams must not be created from previous templates, without incorporating lessons learned from their past performance. Critiques on some of the above listed examples can be obtained through the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University.

Legislation

One contributors stated that, “alignment of DoD and DoS regional boundaries,” will also, “support agility and sustainability in ‘competition’, crisis, and conflict.” Their recommendation was, “aligning DoS Bureaus and desk areas of responsibility and GCC AORs to facilitate better opportunities to coordinate, align, synchronize and integrate programs, initiatives, activities, actions and operations in support of US interests, and discrete foreign policy objectives.”

The contributor went on to argue that interdepartmental conflicts may also be offset by the creation of, “Civilian-led JIATF (i.e. USAMB, POTUS Special Representative, other; ISO ‘competition short of armed conflict’) in order to support agility in engagement options.” In the contributors own words, the recommendation has not been, “fully analyzed and developed in terms of providing civilian leaders with traditional ‘command authority’ over military assets to address complex, multi-agency, and essentially non-military challenges, issues or threats over an extended period of time approximating an ‘integrated campaign’ effort.”

Authorities

One contributor’s recommendation is to develop, “a shared DoS and DoD authority to proactively build resilience and resistance with threatened partners.” Their assertion is that such an authority will enable the, “integration of instruments of national power earlier and more proactively.” 15 Once implemented, the authority would, “support broader USG engagement with partners to build resilience and resistance capabilities and capacity to overt or clandestine threats from another state actor, proxy, or non-state actor,” as well as “identify opportunities, threats and challenges early.”

Resources

The resource issues identified by contributors focused on the impact that centrally controlled resource distributions strategies have on developing agile organizations. One author contended that a, “deliberate efforts need to be made to empower leaders and soldiers in edge organizations that can obtain the most rapid feedback from the operating environment.” It was also recommended that senior leaders ensure junior leaders have access to the resources and time necessary to pursue self- initiated projects.

The same contributor stated that, “improvements in collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence on sub-national and low-collection priority areas prior to conflict,” needs to take place. They also stated that based on current capabilities, new tradecraft must be developed that, “enable rapid in-depth understanding of populations, mobilization, and other human factors, using advanced analytic and data analysis methods.”

Infrastructure

One contributor argued that new organizational infrastructures must be developed with two goals in mind. First, “ensuring that whole-of-government and coalition participation supports a strategy as opposed to institutional equities and advancement within functional stovepipes,” and second, “managing continuity of effort over time.”

Another group of contributors recommended creating opportunities and incentives that are structured for specialists to, “develop and build long-term relationships with people in power, people coming into power, people who influence them, and people who may be able to advise and support the development of recommendations and Courses of Action (e.g., foreign partners, members of NGOs, etc.).”22 The contributor believe that these specialists should be developed to augment the current generalist mentality within DoD.

Education

One group of contributors stated that, “Defeating ISIL’s effective use of terrorism, media messaging, and inspiration and cooptation of lone wolf attacks, requires using modular means of national power – influence operations across diplomatic, economic, and social settings.” 23 Their recommended solution was the creation of “integrated, overlapping interagency working groups focused on core challenges and tasks in the Gray Zone.”

Another contributor recommended an alternate solution to terrorism messaging. Their assertion was that, “more nuanced audience analysis of different segments of target populations is necessary to determine how best to create and disseminate counter-messages to these different segments.” 25 This approach would allow for messaging to, “children in at-risk populations,” with the assumption that, “CENTCOM may have more success in stemming violent radicalization among that age group, thereby mitigating the possibility of ISIL-type ideologies from taking root in the young.”

Finally one contributor recommended that, “training and encouragement within the Joint Force to establish social networks prior to identification of tasks or missions, along with opportunities to mobilize social networks to achieve self-directed results,” will be important to developing a more agile force.

Other (Strategy)

One contributor recommended, “Improvements in the communication of strategic intent from principle level decision makers, to the Joint Force and interagency as a whole, in order to better empower subordinate organizations to plan and act in support of national objectives.”

Another contributor made specific recommendations on achieving that end state, stating the Joint Force needs to, “properly conceptualizing the nature of strategy,” “articulating a theory of change to guide strategy execution,” “developing a campaign specific strategy management office,” “clearly articulated goals and strategy that are agreed upon and understood by coalition partners.”

A final contributor stated that improving US strategy formation and communication needed to include: “increased coordination of mission specific pre-conflict authorities and authority requirements between the COCOMs, SECDEF, and the NSC; including identification, analysis, definition, and preparation for action along multiple contingencies.”

Other (Risk)

One contributor asserted that the Joint Force should, “realign its risk tolerances (balance of likelihood of failure, cost of failure, and benefits of success), in order to provide opportunities for breakthrough successes, at the cost more numerous failures.” The recommended approach was based on lessons learned in leadership from Silicon Valley. A group of contributors also recommended that, “anti-fragile” approaches can be used as alternative approaches to leadership, in order to encourage situation in which and people, “can more easily make small errors without failing.”

Contributing Authors

Braddock, K. (Pennsylvania State University), Bornmann, J. (MITRE-RAND), Collison, J. (SOCOM), Costa, B., MITRE-RAND, DeCamp, J. (MITRE-RAND), Holliday, R. (National Defense University), Meadows, S. (MITRE-RAND), Meredith, S. (National Defense University), Overton, M. (MITRE-RAND), White, N. (National Defense University), Williams, K. (MITRE-RAND)

 

Download Publication