Author | Editor: Wilkenfeld, J. ().
At the request of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) the J-39 Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Branch undertook a Coordinator’s Mission Review in July 2014 and concluded it in February 2015. This SMA project resulted in an unprecedented collaborative effort among over one hundred subject-matter experts from numerous organizations across the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Departments and Intelligence Agencies, Academia, Think Tanks, and Private Industry. The work of these subject- matter experts is summarized in this white paper.
The purpose of the review was to evaluate strategic risks and identify knowledge gaps in order to provide an increased understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. The SMA team focused on producing analyses and tools to address USSC’s questions, which were grouped into three broad categories: internal Palestinian security concerns; challenges to Israeli-Palestinian joint security; and the role of external actors in Israel-Palestinian security. The overall objective was to provide inputs to serve as ongoing planning and training resources for the Security Coordinator’s office. The following document presents a brief summary of the key takeaways from each of the resulting reports.
Chief among the issues that were of concern to USSC was security sector reform in the context of challenges and opportunities of sovereignty in a state of limited arms. Challenges were to be highlighted by addressing the potential impact on the legitimacy and authority of Palestinian security forces in the event of cross-border incursions by Israeli forces in such an environment. Related is the challenge of unity governance under conditions of non-contiguity. USSC was also vitally interested in the role of the international community in supporting the security needs of a functioning future Palestinian state, from the perspective of earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions, as well as examining the linkages between security, economy, and governance in such a state.
Among the key elements reflected in the white paper was a unique collaboration among teams of social scientists to develop and run a simulation exercise designed to identify the key flash points that might result from an increase in autonomy for the West Bank in light of differing security requirements. An international team of area experts, neuroscientists, and social media specialists collaborated with ICONS simulation designers to fashion a unique simulation exercise. USSC staff, along with subject matter experts from the region, took on roles in a fast-paced simulation that first explored areas in which confidence building could take place, followed by a phase of crisis management that put the confidence building to the test. Among the key findings were indications of differing preferences for bilateral versus multilateral talks, potentially constructive use of differing communications pathways in crisis situations, the role that international actors in general, and the US in particular, can play in enhancing security, and key challenges for legitimacy in the face of overwhelming differentials in power and authority.
This white paper outlines insights derived from third-party monitoring missions. The effort derived interesting insights with respect to Israeli-Palestinian joint security and minimum thresholds for security forces. The effort also shed light into insights on internal community investment. Also of interest are case studies the SMA team produced that looked into other states that do not have a significant army. While these case studies are informative and provide interesting insights, the case of the Palestinians is unique with its own set of unique challenges.
This research effort began during a time of considerable optimism that the mission of Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013-2014 would bear fruit at least in terms of the adoption of a framework for an eventual peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, ultimately leading to a two-state solution. Notwithstanding the ultimate collapse of those talks in April 2014 and the fact that the peace process has been in limbo ever since, the authors of this report point out that if and when this process is restarted, the issues addressed in the Coordinator’s Mission Review will again be front and center.
Taken together, the studies reported here can form the basis of effective security sector reform for the Palestinian Authority, and the carving out of a critical role for international actors in general, and the US in particular, in the event that peace talks are resumed and a framework agreement emerges.
This report evaluates strategic risks and identifies knowledge gaps in our understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. Work on this report began almost at the same time as the US-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace talks were launched by US President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry in July 2013. While those talks are now on hold, the questions dealt with in the report were geared toward issues that would need to be addressed in any framework agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Chief among the issues of concern was security sector reform in the context of challenges and opportunities of sovereignty in a state of limited arms, particularly when the stronger neighboring country demands an unspecified level of security. Challenges were to be highlighted by addressing the potential impact on the legitimacy and authority of Palestinian security forces in the event of cross-border incursions by Israeli forces in such an environment. Related is the challenge of unity governance under conditions of non-contiguity. We were also interested in the role of the international community in supporting the security needs of a functioning future Palestinian state, from the perspective of earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions, as well as examining the linkages between security, economy, and governance in such a state.
Notwithstanding the breakdown of the peace talks in April 2014, followed by the Gaza War and subsequent Israeli elections, there is the sense that sooner or later, these issues will need to be addressed in an inevitable future two state solution to this conflict, and that therefore it is important to lay out these issues and some of their mechanisms in anticipation of this eventuality. In the view of the researchers who put the following reports together, these are still the right questions.
The seven questions were grouped into three broad categories: challenges to Palestinian internal security; challenges to Israeli-Palestinian joint security; and the role of external actors in Israel- Palestinian security. In addition, the SMA research team provided an analysis of the socio-political and social-cultural dynamics of the region by analyzing regional social media activity in Arabic. Finally, an international team applied key insights from psychology and neuroscience to the research questions posed.
Q1. What are the critical areas of security sector reform required to make civil society work within the Palestinian Authority and across the territories versus the status quo?
An analysis was conducted by the NSI team to identify Palestinian security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. A two stage analytic method was used to facilitate the identification of impediments, or barriers, to the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces and in alignment with civil societies expectations. The methodology enabled identifying security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society. The analysis identified several areas of security sector reform measures and development: clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities of the Palestinian security sector, strengthen legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of Palestinian civil society and the population, and improve equipping and training of the security forces.
Q2. What are the challenges and opportunities for sovereignty in a state of limited arms?
While Palestinian leaders aspire to a fully sovereign state with defense capabilities, Israel insists on numerous restrictions to neutralize the threat potential. Decades of negotiations have sought common ground to bridge this considerable gap. In this study, ICONS Project researchers at the University of Maryland undertook an empirical analysis of states with limited arms, defined as states with little to no dedicated, external defense capacity. In practical terms, this translates to states without an established military (or only a symbolic force) and low or no military expenditures. Common challenges to sovereignty include a lack of capacity to maintain internal security or defend against non-state actors, dependence on international support, and an inability to cope with external threats. Common opportunities for sovereignty include having more resources to devote to crucial development needs, a more peaceful reputation that demonstrates to regional rivals that they are not a threat, and opportunities to more easily consolidate their independence and internal stability. Mechanisms to preserve sovereignty for limited arms states can be accomplished through the development of robust domestic security forces, international security guarantees and assistance, and international cooperation on defense. In some cases, states also gradually lift the arms limitations and remilitarize to better meet threats as conditions change.
Q3. What are the challenges of achieving unity government and maintaining effective security in non- contiguous states?
The challenges of non-contiguity are at the heart of the efforts to establish a viable Palestinian state. This report by the ICONS research team seeks to inform conversations about what challenges to anticipate and how they might be over come by applying a comparative case study approach. The study identified common challenges to and mechanisms for preserving sovereignty. States with exclaves often face enormous obstacles to ensuring effective governance and security. Some stem from the local population itself, for instance local grievances due to isolation and state neglect and a lack of national sense of belonging. Others emphasize the vulnerability of exclaves without official or easily securable borders, which open the door to conflict and criminality. Finally, relationships matter immensely. Without communication and compromise, differences in law and culture can complicate the rules under which an exclave operates. In more extreme instances, a lack of trust between home state, host state, and exclave populations – or even openly hostile relations – can badly damage the viability of an exclave altogether. But some solutions exist to many commonnon-contiguous state challenges. Many states rely, for instance, on ongoing processes of negotiation with the host state to ensure access to and the smooth functioning of its exclave. Officially demarcating borders, opening up pathways to integrate with the surrounding state, and focusing on policies to improve exclave residents’ welfare also help eliminate many sources of conflict before they emerge. In some cases, joint decision-making structures or enabling local problem-solving also mitigate the difficulties of administering territory from afar. Finally,the military solution is a common, though possibly not entirely desirable option to preserve sovereignty, especially in the face of domestic threats.
Q4. What are the minimum thresholds for indigenous security forces in protecting its citizens and guarding its borders, particularly when the neighbor country demands an unspecified level of security?
Competing security challenges naturally surface for Israelis and Palestinians as they maneuver to gain West Bank areas for their respective homes. While multiple factors contribute to Israeli- Palestinian tension, this study sought to understand the political positions and security interests of Palestinians and Israelis in order to find potential areas of compromise as well as true sticking points. To achieve that aim, the NSI team conducted thematic and discourse analyses on the speeches of leaders across the breadth of the Israeli and Palestinian political landscapes. The analyses suggest that there are important areas of mutual concern that may serve as starting points for negotiation as well as areas of diametric opposition. These include the need for coordinated policing, access to and protection of holy sites and public places, concern about refugees and displaced persons, and management of border areas and crossings. Competing concerns include blockade and embargo of Gaza, Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners, and IDF activities in Palestinian areas.
Q5. With respect to cross-border arrests, prosecutions, and targeted lethal action, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities to legitimacy and sovereignty between neighbors with competing security requirements?
Question 5 was addressed with two different methodologies. First, the NSI research team derived insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank with Palestinian violence and cross-border and Israeli Defense Forces/ Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (IDF/COGAT) activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect the dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. The loop analyses identify risks and suggest implications for international community activities. Key findings include:
In a separate analysis, the ICONS simulation group was charged with developing a simulation to address Question 5. The following objectives for the simulation were identified: (1) Gain insights on opportunities/challenges to effective confidence-building and crisis management when faced with competing security requirements; (2) Identify capabilities and contingencies which will be most useful for helping the PASF cope with legitimacy issues; and (3) Provide insights that can be brought to the inter-agency/broader USG stakeholders as deemed appropriate. The problem space for the simulation exercise focused on potential IDF incursions into Palestinian-controlled territories (Area A on the West Bank). The scenario comprised of two phases – confidence building and crisis management. Key findings were organized into the categories of communications dynamics, political/media dynamics, and key tensions for legitimacy. Key findings addressed communications dynamics (PA preference for multilateral, Israeli preference for bilateral), preferred communications pathways, differing perceptions of international and US responsiveness, and political and media dynamics. Key tensions for legitimacy included misperceptions, the IDF presence, disagreements over investigations, the role of the NSF, PA frustration over competing priorities for their security and political leaders, the role of Israeli public opinion, and strain for the PA viewed as normal by Israel. [See also Neuroscience/Psychology analysis]
Q6. What are best practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?
A third party monitoring mission could play a potentially significant role in guaranteeing a future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. This report by the ICONS team aims to inform conversations about the ideal design by engaging in a qualitative comparative case study analysis of past missions. The report starts with a brief overview of the literature on third party monitoring and a presentation of characteristics that are helpful for analyzing and comparing missions. Five historical cases were selected for in-depth analysis: the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines (IMT), the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (TMG/PMG), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Strategies from each of the missions were collected and synthesized into a list of best practices for future missions. For maintaining legitimacy: obtain parties’ consent and buy-in, establish clear expectations, demonstrate commitment and follow-through, allow for mission evolution, and develop exit strategy in conjunction with the parties. For earning trust: invest in pre-deployment training and diverse teams, exhibit impartiality through mission structure and action, serve as bridge between parties, foster good relations with locals, and work collaboratively with third parties and peace groups. For creating transparency: be visible and accessible, communicate regularly and publicly, develop clear structures and consistent operating procedures, explain when secrecy is required, and distinguish the mission from other actors. The report concludes with an appendix detailing the characteristics of a future Israeli-Palestinian third party monitoring mission focused on earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy.
Q7. With respect to the linkages between security, economy, and governance, and with recognition that each is needed to support a functioning state, where should the international community invest?
This report looks at the multiple factors that contribute to instability in the West Bank. Palestinians face escalating levels of economic, social, and governing instability that, in turn, serve to degrade the governing legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Using the NSI Stability Model (StaM) and Analysis, the NSI team identified key buffers and drivers of economic, social, and governing stability along with their second- and third-order effects. The report also identifies several considerations for analysts on where and how the international community can invest that may help to decrease instability while avoiding investing in channels that could lead to further instability. The key findings include the following: Political stalemate on the West Bank degrades perception of PA legitimacy while the PASF is feared and seen as working with the IDF and violating human rights. Declines in foreign aid and continue VAT withholdings are causing a cascading of impacts that are crushing the economy, preventing payroll payments, harming the environment, and impairing basic human rights and needs. High unemployment among youth and inappropriate job training coupled with a climate of conflict could lead to uprisings in this group. Increased limits on protests and speech further a growing discontent and risk retaliatory actions.
Mr. Ben Riley (OSD), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), Ms. Lauren Barr (ICONS), Ms. Belinda Bragg (NSI), Dr. Danette Brickman (NSI), Mr. Jose Miguel Cabezas (ICONS), Ms.
Abigail Desjardins (NSI), Mr. Devin Ellis (ICONS), Ms. Kimberly Key (NSI), Dr. Randy Kluver (Texas A&M University), Dr. Larry Kuznar (NSI), Dr. Jacquelyn Manly (Texas A&M University), Dr. Sabrina Pagano (NSI), Mr. George Popp (NSI), Dr. Robert Popp (NSI), Mr. David Prina (ICONS), Mr. Tom Rieger (NSI), Dr. Sara Savage (University of Cambridge and ICthinking), Dr. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (ICONS), Dr. Nicholas Wright (Carnegie), Ms. Mariah Yager (NSI)
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