This Conference assessed what today we rightly or wrongly perceive as historically unprecedented changes from the perspectives of politics and history, sociology, biology, information science, and technological innovation. There is a large body of scientific work that supports the notion that human societies are complex adaptive systems with emergent properties that contain core commonalities, but the actions of which cannot be predicted with certainty. Given the properties of human cognition and social behavior, the question remains: How might nations and societies best position themselves to prepare for and manage the risks associated with rapid change under conditions of fundamental uncertainty? The conference speakers and panelists addressed these issues relevant to key domains and dimensions of global security.

Planners require context in order to achieve their goals. While planners understand that colder or more elevated locations have implications for an operation, the capacity to similarly adapt plans and operations based on differences in the population’s cultural or cognitive attributes has not been as readily integrated. The purpose of this SMA White Paper is to synthesize ideas across cognitive science and applied social science and translate their application for use in operations and planning within the span of a single document. The contributors each look at distinct cognitive functions that merit attention. By translating or operationalizing the research and discussing it in terms of real-world scenarios, this paper illustrates how the addition of cultural cognitive diversity research will enable more effective, quick, less violent, and less expensive operations.

Evaluating strategic risk in the Eurasia region over the next two to three decades is a complex challenge that is vital for USEUCOM planning and mission success. The depth of our understanding of the diverse set of political, economic, and social actors in the region will determine how effectively we respond to emerging opportunities and threats to US interests. A better understanding of Russia’s priorities and interests, and their implications, both regionally and globally, will help planners and policy makers both anticipate and respond to future developments.

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary discourse analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia?

Integrating effectively has always provided a strategic edge, from the ancient world to the present day. Integration is a central theme of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Here we ask: Why is the United States seeking to integrate now—and how can it integrate better? Now, for the first time since winning the Cold War, the United States must respond to a competitor strong across all levers of power—and so if it wants to compete it must integrate for the character of our new era of competition. This report traces integration as a strategic edge from the 1500s to the present, to identify key themes for the success (or failure) of US integration in the 2020s and 2030s. Three overarching sets of issues emerge: integration militarily; integration across multiple sources of power; and civil-military integration within the state. Integrating with allies and integrating technology will also be key for the United States. All are complex, so to help make them more tractable for practitioners we introduce simple concepts to deal with complex environments (e.g. the “adjacent possible”). We also introduce a powerful new field of cognitive science (metacognition or “thinking about thinking”) that can give the United States an edge for developing the humans, and human-machine teams, that will always lie at the heart of integrated US power.

It is not an exaggeration to state that China is and will remain a significant challenge to the US on all aspects of national power for the foreseeable future. This situation has been in the making for quite some time. This SMA Perspectives paper will not delve into the historical roots of why the US got to where it is, however. Nor will it dwell on the purely military aspects of the conflict. These are important considerations that are amply discussed elsewhere in numerous scholarly publications. This SMA Perspectives paper is focused on the following question: “How should the US manage the US-China relations so that they stay below the level of conflict and destructive competition?” In this context, the paper distinguishes “constructive competition” from “destructive competition.”

The basic cognitive nature of how human brains process information hasn’t changed for millennia, including how we use information in strategy. Information is crucial for strategy aimed at others, whether that is outwitting adversaries or cooperating with allies. And even a superb strategy must be conveyed to one’s own people.

Treating information as a form of maneuver can provide powerful advantages to commanders and political leaders responsible for US and partner national security. The components of successful maneuver first proposed by van Creveld, Canby, & Brower in 1994—positioning, tempo, Schwerpunkt, surprise and deception, cross-domain synergy, flexibility, unity of effort, and opportunism—can also serve as elements of a framework to anticipate an adversary’s integrated use of information to undermine US and partner interests.

The objective of the Integrating Information into Joint Operations (IIJO) project is to assess the ways in which the Joint Force can most effectively integrate information1 into its activities across the competition-conflict continuum. During the course of this project, we have spoken to many people familiar with both Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) efforts to integrate information and shape the information environment (IE); their overall assessment has been remarkably consistent.2 Namely, information is playing an increasingly important role in states’ ability to protect and further their national interests, but the United States is not currently equipped or positioned to counter the scope and scale of our adversaries’ information activities.

How can we defend the humans in the Joint Force—and its key support networks—from adversarial information operations in our digitizing world? Service personnel, their families and friends are human. Adversaries and other destabilizing forces threaten to sow disruption amongst these millions of humans, in order to degrade collective capabilities. “Deepfakes” illustrate how such threats’ character may evolve as part of “combined arms” information operations alongside other dual-use Artificial Intelligence (AI) tech. Success for the Joint Force is to react effectively, but within the democratic constraints of a free society.

The future operating environment will present US military leaders and planners with both familiar and unfamiliar problem sets that will test the DoD and partner nations’ ability to maintain strategic stability. These future challenges are anticipated to be significantly different from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are contested norms and persistent disorder. It is expected that adversaries will continue to pursue their national objectives by creatively combining conventional and non-conventional methods to operate below a threshold that they believe would invoke a direct military or other damaging response from the United States or its allies.

The Services and the Joint Staff provide both professional military education as well as academic education through the various schools, colleges and academies. These elements are currently working on developing courses and modifying curricula to address the guidance provided by the 15 May 2020 policy CJCSI 1800.01F. However, there is need for a short-term, temporary approach to inculcate rapidly the force across all levels on the challenges of operating in the information environment. Such an approach, based on a similar challenge faced by the USAF in the early 2000s, is outlined in a short paper.

In support of the USAF and the SMA, the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulations Office (M&SO) employed the Athena Simulation to assess a series of research questions posed by the Air Force, as well as to test a series of explorable insights (hypotheses) developed during the project’s Net Assessment and Subject Matter Expert (SME) engagements. A total of 35 explorable insights were identified during the Net Assessment from which four specific study topics were derived for analysis utilizing the Athena Simulation. These included:

We argue that the concept of escalation thresholds remains salient in national security and may be even more important than ever. However, the Cold War model is no longer useful given the multi-dimensional and complex nature of information in today’s world. We argue that escalation thresholds regarding information need to be conceived of in terms of complex systems. Qualitatively, analysts and decision makers must learn to intuit the dynamics of information in a complex world. Quantitatively, analysts must bring to bear complexity theory, and appropriate modeling and data collection. These changes have implications across the spectrum of activities that include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

The Islamic State’s complete loss of territorial control in Iraq and Syria in 2019 forced its central media unit to adapt in order to continue to produce the high-quality products for which it had become infamous. This paper evaluates this transformation, and measures both output, themes, and quality of product in the years since the collapse of the territorial caliphate. We distill some of the elements the group has used to successfully produce and disseminate products from strengthening affiliates abroad, and the impact the central media has had on these distant media cells. Through our research regarding non-state actor influence operations, a sense of the larger, comprehensive character of the ever-evolving information environment can be derived.

This paper seeks to answer the following question: What can we learn from the process of radicalization into extremism that can be applied to information operations to make them more successful? We contend that the 3 N model of radicalization applies more generally to the process whereby information is absorbed and is having impact. This process assumes that information absorption and impact are driven by motivation—that is, human needs. The 3 Ns refer to needs, narratives, and networks, which together help us understand why some individuals become radicalized. Radicalization, the internalization of an extremist narrative, is driven by exposure to an extremist narrative validated by a social network of trusted others who—through the narrative—provide a means to satisfy the crucial human need for significance

A recent Quick Look prepared as part of a Joint Staff and Air Force (A3)-sponsored effort to examine the effectiveness of Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) examines how cognitive biases can affect the communication process (Polansky & Rieger, 2020). During review of that analysis, a discussion arose regarding how cognitive biases can affect not only communication, but also decision-making, including more structured processes such as the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop analytical framework. To address those questions and concerns, in the present paper, we explore how some common types of cognitive bias can impact an OODA Loop analysis, potentially leading to a sub-optimal result.

In the current environment of contested norms, increasing great power competition, and rapid technological change, protecting and furthering US interests requires the ability to compete effectively in the information environment (IE). In recent years, the IE has seen the proliferation of actors, channels of communication, and messages. To compete in this crowded and contested environment, we must be able to communicate effectively. Yet, the IE is complicated, available information is often vast and imperfect, time is constrained, and additionally, we are limited by our own cognitive capacity.

How can the US make global strategy in a world both vast and rich with cultural diversity? This matters: the US shaped the global system more than any other power since 1945, and that system hugely benefited the US and much of the globe. Whoever leads the global examine two aspects of this challenge.

This paper reports a number of the top-level findings from the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project requested by the Joint Staff and USINDOPACOM. They are based on an integration of the results of the eleven different analytic efforts included in the project.

To cause intended effects—and avoid unintended effects—in the fiendishly complex regional environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, United States policymakers are required to understand both what motivates key actors and what type of strategic confrontation they face. To these ends, this report applies core insights from the cognition and neuroscience of decision-making, combined with data from historical and contemporary cases of decision-making such as the past 50 years of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) military-diplomatic campaigns. Two broad sets of conclusions emerge. The first arise from analysing core cognitive dimensions of what motivates the DPRK and key regional actors. These include:

To conduct deterrence operations, or manage escalation, requires anticipating how others will decide to respond to our actions. Anticipating your adversary is imperative for offense or defense. Thus, it is crucial to understand audiences’ decision-making. But how can you put yourself in the others’ shoes in space operations?

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Josh Kerbel (National Intelligence University) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Nicholas Wright (University College London, Georgetown University) and Dr. Peter W. Singer (New America), as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. Dr. Wright’s presentation focused on how the US can make global strategy in a world both vast and rich with cultural diversity. He first stated that ‘global strategy’ involves important activities and interests in all the continents that contain a significant fraction of the world’s population. He clarified that global strategy is not synonymous with grand strategy, and it is not just international strategy, as the global system differs from the sum of its nations. Dr. Wright explained that we can think about the global system through four different dimensions/lenses: a political lens (i.e., the ‘global order’), an economic lens (i.e., the ‘global economic order’), a social lens, and a cultural lens. Dr. Wright focused on the political lens as he discussed his examination of the history of ‘global confrontations’—conflicts that meaningfully involve all of the world’s continents on which significant fractions of the world’s population live. He presented four lessons learned from this examination: 1) Great power confrontations have been increasingly global, and that will likely continue; 2) Great power protagonists have been increasingly culturally non-European; 3) Global system effects matter, and the US must look out particularly for third parties that end up being the real winners of global confrontations; and 4) Whether or not a global dimension to strategy pays dividends depends on identifiable factors (e.g., third parties, self-restraint, loopholes in blockades). Ultimately, Dr. Wright determined that a nation can create a global strategy by 1) adopting a global mindset and 2) by using global system effects, not just actor-specific effects. Next, Dr. Wright discussed why strategy should consider global cultural diversity. He defined culture as the ideas, customs, and social behavior of a group of humans that reflects ‘how things are done around here.’ He then discussed the two deep dives that he conducted on culture, one of which examined culture in an individual’s mind and the other of which examined whether these cognitive differences relate to strategic thinking. To conclude, Dr. Wright stated that strategy should consider global cultural diversity by 1) applying a framework integrating cultural insights from multiple disciplines in order to anticipate competitors’ decision-making and how to influence the global swing states crucial to success in global grey zone competition; and 2) recognizing that cultural commonalties between the world’s humans greatly outweigh differences, but specific differences (e.g. context dependence) can provide operationalizable tools to cause intended, and avoid unintended, effects.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Krista Langeland (RAND) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.