USPACOM requested that the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct an “Examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends to identify where US interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests particularly in the East China Sea.” More specifically, USPACOM requested an examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identification of where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests, particularly in the East China Sea; and suggestions as to how USPACOM might best leverage opportunities when dealing with China in a “global context.” The project request also included a series of questions (see Appendix A) that, taken together represent two broad concerns.

In pregNSI participated in a large effort focused on identifying areas of strategic risk and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades. A rising China resides within a very dynamic Asia-Pacific region. A long list of Chinese influence and investment activities abroad together with an active military enhancement program indicate that China is positioning itself to pursue national security interests well beyond the Pacific Rim. As Chinese interests and policy objectives broaden to farther reaches of the globe there is greater likelihood that they will run up against key US international interests. The intersection of US and Chinese interests could represent either a source of conflict or opportunity for cooperation. The main question that US policy makers and planners must consider carefully is: Where and which Chinese interests are most likely to conflict with US global interests, and where may there be opportunities for cooperation? The current problem this project addressed is uncertainty about the likely trajectory of increasingly global Chinese national interests abroad and how these relate to key US interests. The primary objective was to provide decision-makers the tools to make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex environment in which they, and their competitors, operate in the Asia-Pacific region, and broaden the horizon of strategic thinking and inform planning.

Evaluating strategic risk in the Eurasia region over the next two to three decades is a complex challenge that is vital for USEUCOM planning and mission success. The depth of our understanding of the diverse set of political, economic, and social actors in the region will determine how effectively we respond to emerging opportunities and threats to US interests. A better understanding of Russia’s priorities and interests, and their implications, both regionally and globally, will help planners and policy makers both anticipate and respond to future developments.

This white paper covers topics related to the field of anticipating/forecasting specific categories of “rare events” such as acts of terror, use of a weapon of mass destruction, or other high profile attacks. It is primarily meant for the operational community in DoD, DHS, and other USG agencies. It addresses three interrelated facets of the problem set:

How can the US make global strategy in a world both vast and rich with cultural diversity? This matters: the US shaped the global system more than any other power since 1945, and that system hugely benefited the US and much of the globe. Whoever leads the global examine two aspects of this challenge.

Mr. Strong first outlined the differences between prediction versus anticipation. Individuals tend to defer to the obvious and not look toward the extreme possibilities of the future, according to Mr. Strong. Moreover, a “black swan” cannot be predicted—a black swan is an event that is unexpected and catches one off guard. A “dragon king,” however, is an event that can be predicted because it is based on measurable factors. The identification of both black swans and dragon kingsis a useful exercise in guiding one’s assumptions and predictions for the future, Mr. Strong stated. He then focused on a classic example of a black swan event: the Arab Spring (2010–2012). This series of protests and uprisings taught individuals about causes and effects. The Arab Spring as a whole could have been anticipated based on pre-existing conditions in the Middle East, but the trigger for the event could not have been predicted, according to Mr. Strong. Events like these, which are inherently anticipatable, are critical in studying trends and indicators. In the case of COVID-19, the world’s response was inadequate, suggesting that although many individuals may have predicted the pandemic, the number of and extent of the repercussions were not anticipated. Mr. Strong then described his current work. He stated that the aim of his work is to think about how various subject areas and regions may be affected by potential problems in the future in order to better predict and anticipate their effects. Some of these problems include various potential clashes, such as disputes over the China and India border. Others consist of an air travel crisis or the possibility that a certain incident, such as the pandemic, could diminish a number of airlines and air travel globally. To conclude, Mr. Strong stressed the importance of getting subject matter experts out of their stovepipes, giving them a chance to think about how their areas of focus may be impacted by certain problems, and allowing them a chance to exchange views with experts of different areas of focus about how scenarios may unfold and how various dynamics may affect each other. He stated that as a society, we seemed to have moved away from this process; however, he is determined to reignite it.

SMA hosted speaker session presented by LTC Thomas Pike (National Intelligence University) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. During part one of his two-part brief, LTC Pike focused on three findings from his dissertation: 1) The theoretical foundation (e.g., complex adaptive systems, complex systems, systems theory, complexity) of joint doctrine is strong; 2) The application of complex systems through the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) can be improved by shifting from categorical description to the discussion of interdependencies within the operating environment; and 3) Uniqueness is a key feature of complex systems, which means that centrally derived solutions can support but never replace local leaders. After briefly reviewing the basics of JIPOE, LTC Pike used different types of finches to illustrate the difference between categories and interdependencies. He also stated that categories provide descriptions, while interdependencies provide operational insights. Moreover, it is important to note that influencing the adaptive path of the system is difficult and could be dangerous. LTC Pike then used Inchon, South Korea as a landing point during World War I and Anzio, Italy as a landing point during World War II to illustrate how seizing an enemy’s interdependency can lead it to fundamentally change its calculus. He also compared the relationships between the US’s government and military with the relationships between Pakistan’s government and military in order to illustrate how interdependencies influence system behavior. LTC Pike highlighted a series of policy implications as well, indicating that the relative size of a winning coalition determines whether the government distributes public goods or private goods. He then used a simulation involving Libya to illustrate this point and cautioned that the US’s strength can undermine its attempts to establish a democracy. Furthermore, the US must understand the interdependencies it creates and alters within a foreign population. To conclude, LTC Pike provided a series of recommendations for upgrading JIPOE, highlighting the need for the joint force to manage the analysis of relevant actor interdependencies to better understand links between behavioral trends and outcomes.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by LTC Stephen Battle (US 8th Army at Camp Humphreys – Republic of Korea) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. LTC Battle’s presentation focused on his thesis, which studies historical social movements in order to “determine a prioritized set of processes and network-based nodal relationships that can be used by both strategists during the planning processes and tacticians during the execution phase of campaigns that seek to achieve strategic aims of the US government.” He also highlighted his work’s application to the current US-China-Russia competitive environment.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Sean Lawson (University of Utah) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Lawson presented a brief history of the ways in which ideas from nonlinear science have impacted US military thinking, doctrine, and strategy, while focusing on the post-World War II time period.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Chuck Ehlschlaeger (US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Construction Engineering Research Lab [CEERD-CERL]) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

Security and privacy aren’t dichotomous or conflicting concerns—the solution lies in developing and integrating advanced information technologies for counterterrorism along with privacy-protection technologies to safeguard civil liberties. Coordinated policies can help bind the two to their intended use.