This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.

Coming soon!

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.

After the Cold War, despite many warning symbols from Russia (e.g., President Vladimir Putin’s election in 1999, the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014), Germany and the rest of Europe entered a state of complacency regarding a potential Russian threat to Western security, energy, and hard power. Dr. Dorondo explained that successive German chancellors adopted a rosy vision of the nation’s future—a carbon-neutral Germany within a peaceful Europe. In the process, the nuclear power generation sector of Germany’s economy would be phased out, coal would no longer be used, and natural gas production would contribute to a new socioeconomic vision of the future. In part due to the lack of a perceived threat from Russia, German limited its military spending.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. David R. Dorondo (Western Carolina University) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Session.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Erik Herron (Eberly Family Distinguished Professor of Political Science, West Virginia University) with Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley (Professor of Sociology & Faculty Affiliate of the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and the European Studies Center, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University), Dr. Arnold Dupuy (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)), Dr. Ion Iftimie (Central European University, Vienna, Austria), Dr. Daniel Nussbaum (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Naval Postgraduate School), and Mr. Paul Michael Wihbey (Georgetown University and Institute on the Geopolitics of Energy), as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series, featuring Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University).Dr. Dorondo began his presentation by discussing the tumultuous time that nations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are experiencing, while highlighting the political evolutions occurring in the US, the EU, and NATO. In Germany, 2021 holds a number of important state elections and a national election in which a new chancellor will be elected. However, Dr. Dorondo argued that it is important to bear in mind that any doubt about nuclear sharing in Germany as we approach the 2021 electoral year is nothing new. That said, it is also imperative to consider the necessity for nuclear sharing in support of transatlantic cooperation. Germany and other Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) in NATO have a vested interest in what is sometimes called “nuclear decoupling” from the US. Theoretically speaking, the European states within NATO and the EU could achieve strategic autonomy logistically; however, there is not significant enough collective will to establish that strategic autonomy, Dr. Dorondo argued. He then stressed that the US and NATO must continue not only to deter but also assure and reassure in all domains.