Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

This is Part 4 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

This is Part 3 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

Question (S2): In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.-led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the U.S. coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals?

What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?

Question (R2#12): How does the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict influence, affect, and relate to current conflicts in the region?

This briefing is the final part of a four-part study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. Part II describes the system and why it is critical to assess U.S. security interests and activities in the context of the entire system rather than just the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the U.S. is most interested. Part II describes the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actor over five of the eight conflicts. Part IV presents the results of the interest, resolve, capability assessment.

This report presents insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and PA sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank territories with Palestinian violence and cross-border attacks against Israeli citizens, as well as IDF/COGAT activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect those dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. Specifically, the loop analyses suggest that:

The origins of the Palestinian security sector can be traced to the 1993 Oslo I Accord, which established divisive security and policing responsibilities between the Palestinians and Israelis and the Oslo II agreement, which codified interim boundaries, including the division of the West Bank into a complex and fragmented patchwork of different jurisdictions. These divisions of land and security responsibilities remain in place to this day and have fostered a unique, complicated, and at times perplexing situation for both the Palestinian security sector and the civil society it serves to protect. The environment in the West Bank is replete with confusion over security sector authorities and responsibilities, frustration over barriers1 to the provision of security and justice, and fear and mistrust of the security sector forces. Moreover, the absence of publically available mission statements and codified legal documents, that clearly delineate the Palestinian security sector roles and responsibilities, adds to the complex situation.

At the request of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) the J-39 Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Branch undertook a Coordinator’s Mission Review in July 2014 and concluded it in February 2015. This SMA project resulted in an unprecedented collaborative effort among over one hundred subject-matter experts from numerous organizations across the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Departments and Intelligence Agencies, Academia, Think Tanks, and Private Industry. The work of these subject- matter experts is summarized in this white paper.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

It is highly unlikely that a single catalyst could lead to a civil war or revolt in Jordan. Significant regime crisis in Jordan would more likely require a ‘perfect storm’ of severe popular grievance aimed at the government (including the monarchy), multiple catalysts, and the failure of the regime’s considerable sources of resilience (i.e., buffers).

The political overtures made by Turkish President Erdogan to normalize relations with the Assad regime are reshaping the dynamics of the Syrian civil war.

Climate-related stressors present significant risks to future stability in countries worldwide, affecting all US Combatant Commands.

Wilayat Sinai (WS), formerly known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), is an Egyptian-based extremist group that is active in the Sinai Peninsula. The group seeks to influence the region’s politics and establish a state of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

India’s expanding political influence is altering the current geopolitical order in Asia, with India positioned at its center. India’s growing role in geopolitics will over time take away some of the geopolitical focus on the Asia-Pacific region and place it on the Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Soliman emphasized that India’s geographical position at the center of the economic corridor running between China and the Middle East, give it a political and economic advantage. India’s massive population gives it massive economic and industrial potential on its own. India is also in a unique position to build political ties throughout the Indo-Pacific region with its historic and cultural ties throughout the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. To further its geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific, India is not only relying on its economic potential, but also signing military and security deals with other nations in the region. India is increasing its dialogue with several significant actors in the Middle East: Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Mr. Soliman put forth that Shinzo Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, an India-centric strategy with a focus on bilateral security dialogue with Australia and the US, is now coming true.

According to Dr. Lustick, the current dispute over the West Bank and the disputed sovereignty of the Israeli government will not end in an ideal way for any group involved. He reasoned that the Palestinian government is not a viable authority and because of this the “two states” solution, which would divide Israel, is no longer viable. Instead, the Palestinian authorities are mostly used by citizens of Arab decent to interact with Israeli authorities. The Israeli government learned early on that it could not give anything to the Palestinians, which they would accept. However, they believed that they could negotiate with Palestinian moderates, and isolate extremists.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage (Georgia State University) as a part of its SMA DHS Speaker Series. Dr. Veilleux-Lepage began by stating that using vehicle ramming attacks (VRAs) is not a new tactic, nor is it limited to individuals of a single ideology.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ore Koren (Indiana University, Bloomington) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Koren focused on a “Victorious, Complementary, Agent” (VCA) approach to the reintegration of the Taliban in Afghanistan. His arguments were based on a combination of cross-national evidence from data on groups from Europe and the Caucasus from 1989-2014, evidence from a case study on Israel, and his ongoing research.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Paul spoke about how technological advances and threat use patterns have brought tremendous changes to the information environment (IE). He stated that the US Army must invest in new capabilities and practices in order to remain competitive, and we can learn from prior examples to better our future operations conducted in the IE. He reviewed his key findings, emphasizing that most gaps between the US Army baseline and “effective others” are conceptual and capacity gaps. He also presented a comparative analysis that displayed the degrees of capability of multiple states and non-state actors in various areas, in addition to common concepts and principles across the entities. To conclude, Dr. Paul provided recommendations and key takeaways for the US Army and outlined his observations of Russian efforts in and through the IE.

The Abraham Accords normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel and Bahrain, as well as a less robust agreement with Sudan, represent a historic turning point for Israel. Together with the Camp David Accords (Egypt) and the 1994 Peace Accord (Jordan), the Abraham Accords bring to five the number of Arab states that have officially recognized Israel’s right to exist—a claim that states in the Gulf and Near East have denied since Israel was founded.