Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in Japan were analyzed: 2008 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and Japanese income by occupation data from 2015.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.

The Indo-Pacific region is home to approximately 60% of the world’s population and contributes 60% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), making it one of the most significant regions to monitor.

Modern threats from developed nations like China are beginning to exceed US capabilities, partly because the US military was predominantly focused on regional adversaries such as Iraq during Desert Storm. Mr. Ochmanek categorized the US approach to military power projection during this period as expeditionary and sequential.

The US faces many tough dilemmas on how to build military deterrence measures against China in the Asia-Pacific, protect Taiwan’s sovereignty, and not place Japan or other allies in politically compromising positions. Dr. Swaine commented that building deterrence through overall US military capabilities and the individual armed forces is a multi-faceted issue, involving both military deterrence and credible reassurance measures to avoid inadvertent conflict. Three ideal types of military deterrence approaches identified were: a) punishment, b) control, and c) denial. Dr. Heginbotham mentioned that the DoD’s military strategy has been slowly and consistently shifting toward active denial, but that more remains to be done. Active denial relies on phased operations and divisions of labor with allies among other principles. Effectively utilizing active denial’s principles will include some restructuring and aligning of the armed forces.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Cristina Garafola (Associate Policy Researcher, RAND) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Series.