Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.

This report summarizes the input of 12 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. The expert contributors identify factors that explain the apparent condoning of controlled marketization in North Korea, as well as factors that appear to be inhibiting broader marketization in the country. This summary first discusses the key drivers of North Korean marketization and then considers the primary inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

The Indo-Pacific region is home to approximately 60% of the world’s population and contributes 60% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), making it one of the most significant regions to monitor.

North Korea poses many military threats to its neighbor, South Korea, including a massive artillery barrage on its capital city, Seoul. A conventional artillery barrage would destroy infrastructure and threaten the lives of civilians living in the metropolitan area. Dr. Press and Dr. Anderson built a model, mapping the loss of civilian life during three specific scenarios: a) a surprise attack by North Korea during peacetime, b) a North Korean attack during a military crisis, and c) a preemptive US and South Korean attack. To determine the total loss of civilian casualties, the model considers the known number of North Korean artillery batteries, their predicted rate of fire, and their predicted overall effectiveness among other variables. Dr. Press estimated that North Korea has around 300 artillery batteries that can currently bombard Seoul.

To begin the presentation, Dr. Astorino-Courtois explained the methodology behind NSI’s Interest-Resolve-Capability (IRC) analysis, outlined the results and primary findings, and highlighted the regional dynamics that emerged during the analysis.