The contributors varied in their discussions of what a Da’esh transition—or the future of Syria more broadly—would look like. Drawing on work by Gelvin, Pagano suggests that three scenarios are most likely for Da’esh’s transition in Syria. These include the complete destruction and disappearance of the group and its ideology; transition into an insurgent group capable of conducting limited operations in Syria and/or inspiring attacks abroad; or disintegration into a loose collection of former fighters and free agents conducting attacks, in some cases without organizational support. Finally, University of Oklahoma ME expert, Dr. Joshua Landis, indicated that while it is difficult to generalize, the extreme factionalization that characterized Syria prior to Da’esh’s involvement would likely come back into play. As such, we may expect a revived emphasis on the clan or tribe, with ongoing resistance to central government. Landis continued by suggesting that sufficient weakening of Da’esh will eventually enable the Syrian government led by Assad to regain broad control.

This is Part I of a larger study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. It describes the system and why it is critical to assess U.S. security interests and activities in the context of the entire system rather than just the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the U.S. is most interested. Part II describes the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actor over five of the eight conflicts. The final results are presented in a Power Point briefing.

The following set of responses to Question S3 represent an attempt to distill the input from individuals who have contributed to any number of OSD-SMA efforts in recent years. Giordano’s Access, Assess, Engage (AAE) framework will be used to categories these recommendations. The recommendations are an attempt to distill the concepts proposed in a set of recent OSD-SMA publications . CENTCOM may improve cognitive engagement by producing a broader, more expansive joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). An expanded JIPOE (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment) could potentially identify the behaviors of target audiences necessary to achieve US objectives, to develop possible psychological effects and leverage operations as a cognitive scheme of maneuver that could lead to synchronizing actions and messages to achieve coalition objectives. Below is a very high-level summary — details are in the report.

The Sunni community is not homogenous, and contributors expressed their discomfort making broad generalizations for a number of reasons. Most Sunni Arabs still consider themselves first a citizen of their respective countries with the exception of populations in the midst of conflict like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (anonymous). Local customs and histories result in a different experience for Sunnis in, for example, France versus Chechnya (Olidort). Furthermore, there is no single Sunni leader (like the Pope or the Ayatollah or even a senior theologian) with religious legitimacy to assert leadership over the Sunni community (Shaikh).

After the fall of Mosul, as it became clear that Daesh could no longer creditably claim broad swaths of territory for its caliphate, it deliberately reverted to a strategy of insurgency, according to Syrian expert Hassan Hassan.1 Its withdrawal into the rural desert landscape—and to what a radicalization expert, Haroon Ulla, calls the “cloud caliphate”2—has implications for counter-radicalization messaging. Hassan reminds us that when the organization was defeated in the late 2000s, it came back stronger than ever. He notes that its messaging has recently pivoted to attempts to erode trust between Sunni Arab populations and any form of legitimate government. Daesh’s messaging is fueled by the recent memory of the failure of the Sahwa (or Awakening) movement to produce meaningful political reforms for Sunni populations in Iraq. In Syria, Daesh still benefits from the ongoing conflict and enduring Sunni Muslim grievances. At the same time, hardened foreign fighters are leaving Syria and Iraq for other regions where extremism is flourishing including the Sinai region of Egypt and Yemen (Hassan). And, of course, some foreign fighters are returning home across the globe where they can be incubators of future generations of extremists (Hassan).

Ambassador James Dobbins and a team from the RAND Corporation contend, “the Syria civil war is approaching, if not a conclusion, at least a hiatus that might be converted into a conclusion.”1 Major regional players—United States, Russia, and NATO—have a converging interest in ending the conflict and facilitating a stable peace, Dr. Amir Bagherpour of giStrat argues. However, despite an emerging shared preference between Russia and the United States on ending the conflict in Syria, rivalry dynamics between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and the UAE will likely have a dampening effect on peace prospects as the proxy warfare intensifies following the military defeat of Da’esh. Mr. Hassan Hassan of Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy warns that the worsening of the various conflicts in the region is still a serious possibility.

Our experts noted that we cannot say with certainty what the future security environment will look like in the Middle East. The region “is highly fluid. And fluidity means that alliances are temporary and that it’s very difficult to draw any long-term or even medium-term perspectives on what might happen,” Dr. Ehteshami noted. Limited visibility into the future is compounded by the sheer number of inflection points facing actors in the region as each tries to shape the environment in its favor.

At its zenith in 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more than 100,000 square kilometers of territory. ISIS seized control over major cities, notably Mosul and Raqqa, which contributed to increasing disorder in the Middle East. As late as 2015, the geographic reach of ISIS appeared to pose serious threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria as well as the physical safety of citizens in the region. Nonetheless, as of June 2017, estimates show that about 90% of Mosul had been liberated as Iraqi forces, in coordination with the Coalition, while they continued to regain large portions of the western part of the city. Similarly, a battle to retake Raqqa is in progress. US officials estimate that only around 2,000 ISIS fighters remain in the city, while US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Coalition forces total around 55,000 fighters. Given these developments, ISIS is likely facing the end of its territorial rule.

ISIS will be defeated militarily. However, whether it is ultimately overcome by containment or by deploying ground forces to apply overwhelming force, the path to mitigating violent extremism in the region is a generations-long one. Military options are insufficient to protect US interests and stabilize the region. It will require significant strengthening of State Department and non-DOD capacity to help build inclusive political institutions and processes that protect minority rights in Syria and Iraq. Only if these flourish will ISIS — the organization and the idea it represents — have failed and the region been put on a sustainable path to stability.

On 11 May 2017, NPS convened a panel session and discuss areas related to the 4th round of CENTCOM Reach Back Cell Questions. The speakers are listed below, and their biographies are available in Appendix A.

This report represents the views and opinions of the participants. The report does not represent official USG policy or position. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff (JS), and jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and US Government (USG) Agencies, the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team established a virtual Reach Back Cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, has provided USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region. This Panel will discuss the main findings from the SMA Reach Back Cell.

To begin with a truism, people in different places speak different languages; they belong to different cultures. This is not in dispute, but it remains a persistent operational challenge. Understanding other cultures well enough to successfully communicate and to navigate each information environment means a profound effort in putting ourselves in other cultures’ shoes—trying to understand narratives around identity, political engagement and deeply held beliefs requires looking beyond language and into the cognitive domain to gain a clearer picture of the information environment (IE).

This video is a brief overview of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor effort in support of USCENTCOM. Over the past year, the SMA Reach Back Cell has produced a vast corpus of knowledge and insight in support of key USCENTCOM questions regarding Syria and Iraq. On its own, this 1000+ page (and 50+ report) collection of documents is a valuable resource, but due to its sheer size and density, it might prove difficult to fully consume and absorb. Therefore, Project Noor seeks to provide USCENTCOM with a quicker, easier, and more effective way to search through and make effective use of this vast treasure trove of information.

ISIS will be defeated militarily. However, whether it is ultimately overcome by containment or by deploying ground forces to apply overwhelming force, the path to mitigating violent extremism in the region is a generations-long one. Military options alone are insufficient to protect US interests and stabilize the region. It will require significant strengthening of State Department and non-DoD capacity to help build inclusive political institutions and processes in Syria and Iraq. Only if these flourish will ISIS — the organization and the idea it represents — have failed and the region been put on a sustainable path to stability

The enclosed reports discuss wide-ranging issues related to the defeat if ISIL and stabilization of Syria and Iraq supplementary to the 9-part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM grouped by theme. Series reports may be obtained from Sam Rhem in the SMA Office at samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil.

Let me go over the agenda very briefly. As I mentioned yesterday Doc, unfortunately Craig Whiteside has come down with a very nasty stomach virus so unfortunately will not be joining us today.We’ll start with Ryan Gingeras, who is a Turkey expert at the Naval Postgraduate School, and then I will follow Ryan. Then let’s have a discussion at that point, some Q&A.At which point John Arquilla and Hy Rothstein will be able to join us, and they will each speak, John on strategic narrative, development, and information operations more generally and Hy Rothstein on some of the lessons learned in Iraq when it comes to influence operations.After those two sets of comments, we can again open up discussion and Q&A. Does that sound reasonable to everyone?

This is Part 9 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The SME contributors to this SMA Reach-back write-up argue that the recent changes in Turkish security policy (e.g., pursuit of ISIL along with the PKK; relaxing of demands for Assad’s removal; warming relations with Russia, etc.) do not necessarily indicate that Turkey’s key interests and intentions have changed. Rather, the shifts should be seen as changes in objectives or tactics that are still thoroughly consistent with Turkey’s fundamental and enduring security interests: 1) containing and ultimately eliminating Kurdish or other threats to Turkey’s internal stability; and, 2) foiling Kurdish (or others’) ambitions that threaten the integrity of Turkey’s borders. Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence David Gompert (USNA, Rand) explains that recognizing Turkey’s dire concern with territorial integrity goes a long way in clarifying what may at first blush appear to be inconsistent policies regarding Assad, Syria, ISIL and even its “traditional enmity” toward Russia. Gompert expresses the message clearly: “…we can count on the Turks to do whatever it takes to prevent Kurdish states on their southern border.”

This is Part 8 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

This is Part 4 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

Question (R2 QL8): How does the U.S./Coalition view Shia extremism? Different from Sunni extremism? How do Sunni communities, Shia communities, MENA countries, and media perceive the U.S./Coalition position on combatting extremists?

Question (R3 QL6): How will the population in northwest Syria react to future Salafist political institutions? Similar to points made by other contributors to this SMA Reach-back report, Dr. Kathleen Reedy of Rand includes a caveat in her response to the CENTCOM question. Given international pressure to avoid Salafi expansion in Syria, it is doubtful she argues, that Salafist policies or leaders would be allowed to become dominant over sizeable areas of northwest Syria. Nonetheless, contributors’ input on the likely response to future Salafist political institutions in northwest Syria tends to align with one of two viewpoints: 1) Syrians will reject Salafi efforts to establish political institutions (i.e., to govern); or 2) Salafi governance will be accepted under certain circumstances.

Question (R2 QL7): What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post-ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups?

This is Part 3 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

Question (R2 #5): What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah?

This is Part 5 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

This is Part 6 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

This is Part 2 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

This is Part 1 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.

The contributors varied in their discussions of what a Da’esh transition—or the future of Syria more broadly—would look like. Drawing on work by Gelvin, Pagano suggests that three scenarios are most likely for Da’esh’s transition in Syria. These include the complete destruction and disappearance of the group and its ideology; transition into an insurgent group capable of conducting limited operations in Syria and/or inspiring attacks abroad; or disintegration into a loose collection of former fighters and free agents conducting attacks, in some cases without organizational support. Finally, University of Oklahoma ME expert, Dr. Joshua Landis, indicated that while it is difficult to generalize, the extreme factionalization that characterized Syria prior to Da’esh’s involvement would likely come back into play. As such, we may expect a revived emphasis on the clan or tribe, with ongoing resistance to central government. Landis continued by suggesting that sufficient weakening of Da’esh will eventually enable the Syrian government led by Assad to regain broad control.

Question (S2): In light of their divergent goals and interests, what are the necessary factors that would permit the U.S.-led Coalition, regional stakeholders (including Israel, Russia, and Iran), or jihadist groups to achieve their aims in Iraq? Where do disparate groups’ interests align and where do they diverge? What can the U.S. coalition do to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their goals?

What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?

Question (R3 QL4): What are the critical elements of a continued Coalition presence, following the effective military defeat of Da’esh [in Iraq] that Iran may view as beneficial?

Question (R3 QL3): What are the aims and objectives of the Shia Militia Groups following the effective military defeat of Da’esh?

Question (R3 #2): How does Da’esh’s transition to insurgency manifest itself, and what actions should the Coalition take to minimize their ability to maintain either military effectiveness or popular support?

Question (Sim#3): What must the coalition do in the information environment to achieve its objectives in Iraq and Syria and how can it deny adversaries the ability to achieve theirs? Part 2

Question (Follow-up QL3): The response to QL5 (see Appendix A) noted that ISIL is moving to ZeroNet platform for peer-to-peer messaging, which is extremely robust to distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack/other counter measures. What effect could this have on Intel efforts?

Question (S#1): What are the correlations between the US/coalition operational and tactical actions in theater effecting terrorist activity throughout the world (i.e., external events). For example, does the loss of ISIL controlled territory or kill/capture of an ISIL high value target lead to an increase/decrease in terrorist attacks in other areas of the world? Can location, intensity, duration or timing of attacks be predicted from a model?

As ISIS loses ground in Syria and Iraq, the organization seems to be evolving to emphasize the information battlefront to both maintain and gain support from sympathetic Sunni Muslims across the globe and open a new front against its far enemies. Research conducted by Dr. Larry Kuznar, NSI, showed a marked shift in Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s and Abu Mohammed al Adnani’s (before his death) speeches in 2016 indicating a shift towards the virtual caliphate. Adnani’s speech first signaled a turn towards virtual caliphate in May 2016. Baghdadi, whose speeches have traditionally focused on the near enemy, signaled a turn toward the virtual caliphate in November 2016 as indicated by more frequent mentions of Libya and Tunisia, decreased mentions of an apocalyptic showdown in Dabiq, and the beginning of the expression of an alternative conceptualization of the caliphate.

Building on the vision of USSOCOM strategic guidance documents, the Operating in the Human Domain (OHD) Concept describes the mindset and approaches that are necessary to achieve strategic ends and create enduring effects in the current and future environment. The Human Domain consists of the people (individuals, groups, and populations) in the environment, including their perceptions, decision-making, and behavior. Success in the Human Domain depends on an understanding of, and competency in, the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that influence human behavior.2 Operations in the Human Domain strengthen the resolve, commitment, and capability of partners; earn the support of neutral actors in the environment; and take away backing and assistance from adversaries. If successful in these efforts, Special Operations Forces (SOF) will gain military, political, and psychological advantages over their opponents. The OHD Concept integrates existing capabilities and disciplines into an updated and comprehensive approach that is applicable to all SOF core activities.

This paper found that Russia¹s strategic interests in the Middle East are fairly stable. What could change is how Russia prioritizes its interests in the wake of the US election and change in administration. Indicators of change might include troop movement or alteration in leader discourse.

Topic 1: How the Mosul Campaign Shapes the Future of Iraq John Arquilla, Chair of the Defense Analysis Department, spoke about how the Mosul campaign will shape the future of Iraq.

This paper addresses the issue of ISIL recruitment from Literature Review Question #3. To do this, it utilizes a quick look format and focuses on two non-standard ideas approaches to challenge of terrorist recruitment. For readers interested in source materials on this subject, this paper also incorporates a bibliography at the end of the document.

Opinion polls conducted by independent outfits in 2015 and 2016 derive the same result: the vast majority of Muslims in the region—both inside and outside of the CJOA—do not support ISIL. In fact, ISIL enjoys very low support as a percent of the population across all countries covered by the surveys included in this compilation. Syria showed the highest level of support (20%) while most Muslim-majority countries fall in the single digits (Mauro, 2015). These low numbers recede further when support is defined as providing active or material support rather than sympathy for the cause (Burson-Marsteller, 2016).

To be most effective, messaging need to be targeted to specific populations, politically/ethnically correct, and entertaining. First, while there is a need for transnational messages (often those that seek to introduce alternative narratives—a mass targeting technique that uses non-linear messaging to achieve desired outcomes [see Beutel and Ruston]), messaging is most effective when it is tailored to local circumstances; presented by trusted, local voices; and in a format preferred by the target audience (radio, television, social media, religious services, etc.). This requires that information operators clearly understand the motivations, interests, and world views of potential adherents (Zalman). Based on analysis of extremist narratives by Scott Ruston at Arizona State University, an effective system of alternative narratives must recognize the need for justice, recognize threats faced by the target audience, must offer some route to glory (resolution), and must offer some subjection to a higher ideal (whether that is family, tribe, or nation). Nuanced understanding of the target audience can serve to not only contextualize the type of messaging effort and its aims but also to provide a necessary constraint upon the expected return of these programs (Huckabey & Picucci).

Question (V4): Post-ISIL Iraq Scenarios. What are the most likely post-lSIL Iraq scenarios with regards to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT)? Where are the main PMESII-PT friction points, which are most acute, and how are they best exploited to accomplish a stable end state favorable to U.S. and coalition interests?

Experts varied from pessimistic (chronic warfare) to cautiously optimistic regarding their expectations for the future of Syria, yet mentioned many of the same factors that they felt would influence Syria’s future path. Most of these key factors – ranging from external geopolitical rivalries to the health and welfare of individual Syrians – were outside what typical military operations might affect. Instead they center on political and humanitarian recovery, healing of social division.

Question (V6): Strategic and Operational Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal. What are the strategic and operational implications of the Iran nuclear deal on the US-led coalition¹s ability to prosecute the war against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to create the conditions for political, humanitarian and security sector stability?

Based on the balance of actor interests, resolve and capability, the defeat of Islamic State organization seems highly likely (defeat of the ideology is another matter). Specifically, the push for ISIL defeat in Syria is led by Iran and the Assad regime, both of which have high potential capacity and high resolve relative to ISIL defeat. Only ISIL has high resolve toward ISIL expansion in Syria. Iran, Jordan,Iraqi Kurds, Saudi Arabia, and Shi’a Hardline & Militia, show highest resolve for ISIL defeat in Iraq.

This White Paper presents the analytic results from Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) project touching on the Middle East and North Africa. The objective is to suggest options to manage conflict in the region and to facilitate socio-political stability in Iraq and Syria. Options that are discussed are intentionally “out-of-the-box”, non-kinetic, and focused on potential Coalition efforts to:

This briefing is the final part of a four-part study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. Part II describes the system and why it is critical to assess U.S. security interests and activities in the context of the entire system rather than just the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the U.S. is most interested. Part II describes the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actor over five of the eight conflicts. Part IV presents the results of the interest, resolve, capability assessment.

This is Part III of a larger study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. Part I described the system and why it is critical to assess US security interests and activities holistically rather than just in terms of the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the US is most interested. Part II described the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actors for five conflicts. It uses the Syrian Civil War as a use case.

This is Part II of a larger study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. Part I described the system and why it is critical to assess US security interests and activities holistically rather than just in terms of the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the US is most interested. Part II described the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actors for five conflicts. It uses the Syrian Civil War as a use case.

At the request of Joint Staff, the SMA program, in coordination with United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), participated in a second Counter-Da’esh Messaging Simulation that brought together nearly 100 Psychological Operation (PSYOP) operators, USG and international observers, interagency representatives, population experts from Iraq and North Africa, Da’esh experts, universities, and think tanks. This exercise served as both a test bed for messaging techniques and a training opportunity for PSYOP operators.

The paper leverages and melds the latest thinking of academic and operational subject matter experts in fields of organizational and social dynamics, network analysis, psychology, information operations and narrative development, social media analysis, and doctrine development related to aspects of maneuver and engagement in the narrative space.

This white paper represents the work of intra- and extramural subject matter experts (SMEs) from multiple disciplines, convened to provide views and insights to define and further develop a bio- psychosocial approach to understanding, assessing, and influencing the cognitions and behaviors of individuals and groups that are devising, recruiting, training, and implementing organized aggression and violence. In light of current national and international security concerns, a major focus of this report is upon those bio-psychosocial factors that are influential to, and influenced by the activities of the group known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant— ISIL (or Daesh/Da’ish).

During FY 2014, the SOCCENT Commander requested a short-term effort to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural, and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL. As shown below, the SMA1 team really addressed two related questions: “What makes ISIL attractive?” or how has the idea or ideology of ISIL gained purchase with different demographics; and “What makes ISIL successful?” or which of the organization’s characteristics and which of the tactics it has employed account for its push across Syria and Iraq.

From July through November 2014, NSI conducted a Subject Matter Expert (SME) Elicitation study to gather insights from interviews, panel discussions, seminars, and personal communications with over 50 SMEs from the United States, the Middle East, and Europe. The interview questionnaire and transcripts from the SME elicitation effort are available upon request. CTTSO provided the Apptek Talk2Me platform to expedite the transcription of the SME Elicitation interviews. In addition, all of the data (human edited and original audio) are posted on the Web-based Talk2Me platform for the SMA study for further analytics and reporting.

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary discourse analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources.

SOCCENT has requested a short-term effort to assess the appeal of ISIL, specifically to answer, “What makes ISIL so magnetic, inspirational, and deeply resonant with a specific, but large, portion of the Islamic population allowing it to draw recruitment of foreign fighters, money and weapons, advocacy, general popularity, and finally support from other groups such as Boko Haram, several North African Extremist Groups, and other members of the Regional and International Sunni Extremist organizations?” A study was undertaken to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL. This white paper summarizes results from analytical efforts and key results and observations.

This report provides the operational and policy communities with a deeper understanding of the unique behavioral and neurobiological factors that underlie political extremism enhanced by interaction in the cyber realm. It addresses the implications of advances in neurobiology and neuropsychology for the way we plan and execute military operations as part of a comprehensive approach to counter violent extremists and the spread of their violent political narratives. The paper focuses on the intersection of emerging cyber technologies and human biology including of both psychological and neurobiological dimensions of behavior. For the purposes of this white paper, we will refer to these two dimensions as cyberpsychology and cyberneurobiology respectively.

The SMA Strategic Deterrence effort is a methodological study to evaluate the appropriateness and utility of modeling and wargaming to support the analytic requirements of the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC). The objective of the study is to determine which aspects of deterrence operations and planning can be appropriately analyzed through gaming, and which aspects can be appropriately analyzed through different forms of modeling. The project also examines the synthesis of deterrence gaming and modeling, how the results of gaming can inform deterrence modeling, and how modeling can shape deterrence gaming.

Question (R6.5): After a long period of war, both Iraq and Syria are devastated and considerable rebuilding efforts will be necessary to make these countries economically sound again. Is there an opportunity to entice regional countries to invest and thus improve stability and inter-state relations in the region and decrease their (economical) dependence on western countries? What impact does foreign military sales have on the ultimate regional stability?

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

Experts contend that the risk of militarization of the dispute between Qatar and the Quartet is low. However, prolonged tension between the two sides has failed attempts at mediation and the underlying issues persist.

There are tremendous numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria and Iraq as a consequence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The IDPs are a mix of people; men, women, children and those who are radicalized into ISIS ideology and those who are not.

[B4] How do you reintegrate radicalized people back into society? Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have centers focussed on this problem. What should the international community do with people who cannot be reintegrated into society? Are there lessons from other regions on reintegration and reconciliation that could be applied to the central region?

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) conducted a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The SMA considered drivers of instability in the region to include long-term internally displaced persons and refugees, spread of radical ideologies and extremism, great power competition, disruptive non-state actors, and the potential for “black swan” scenarios.

At present, collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is generally considered to be a remote possibility for three reasons: the Syrian government’s consolidation of power, a fragmented opposition, and the resolve of international actors who are strongly committed to the survival of the regime.

The political overtures made by Turkish President Erdogan to normalize relations with the Assad regime are reshaping the dynamics of the Syrian civil war.

India’s expanding political influence is altering the current geopolitical order in Asia, with India positioned at its center. India’s growing role in geopolitics will over time take away some of the geopolitical focus on the Asia-Pacific region and place it on the Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Soliman emphasized that India’s geographical position at the center of the economic corridor running between China and the Middle East, give it a political and economic advantage. India’s massive population gives it massive economic and industrial potential on its own. India is also in a unique position to build political ties throughout the Indo-Pacific region with its historic and cultural ties throughout the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. To further its geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific, India is not only relying on its economic potential, but also signing military and security deals with other nations in the region. India is increasing its dialogue with several significant actors in the Middle East: Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Mr. Soliman put forth that Shinzo Abe’s Indo-Pacific vision, an India-centric strategy with a focus on bilateral security dialogue with Australia and the US, is now coming true.

Combatants’ willingness to fight and sacrifice their lives, family, or personal property has altered the expected outcome of military conflicts throughout history. An opponent’s unexpected will to fight has affected the US in many of its regional conflicts, such as Vietnam and Korea. Recent conflicts in Iraq and Ukraine have further demonstrated that leaders in the US and other countries have a poor understanding of what constitutes a combatant’s will to fight and its effects on the battlefield. Most research to understand populations utilize mass survey data collection, which lacks the scientific rigor that analytical study of this topic requires. The research by Artis International uses online tools and social media, brain scans, and in-person interviews to understand what affects individuals’ will to fight. The studies focus on right-wing nationalists in Spain, jihadist fighters, and Ukrainian soldiers defending their homeland.

The increasing proliferation of smart phones and internet availability is changing the way that digital investigations are occurring, especially in remote areas. While the digital realm has existed since the invention of radio, video and satellite imagery have given digital investigators new tools within the past few decades. New tools and the creation of social media have also resulted in the need for new global standards regarding the collection and handling of digital information for legal purposes. These new standards are encapsulated in the Berkley Protocol. Dr. Koenig explained that the Berkley Protocol—the first international standard used in digital investigation and prosecution—is used to give investigators a starting point regarding the quality standards of information being collected and how to legally go undercover on social media.

“FMSO Review of Selected Operational Environment Watch (OE Watch) Articles”

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Simon Mabon (Lancaster University) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. During this presentation, Dr. Mabon discussed the complexity of the broader competition in the Persian Gulf, posed a series of questions about political Islam (any interpretation of Islam as a source of political identity and action) and organizational security, assessed the role that the US can play to bring about peace in the region, and explained how this competition fits into the broader Iranian question. Dr. Mabon explained that the tensions and events unfolding among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf affect the Iran situation.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Hassan Hassan (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. During his presentation, Mr. Hassan spoke about how ISIS will likely model its new strategy after its 2008 strategy, which was implemented at a time when the organization did not have a territorial caliphate and operated primarily underground.