It would be comforting to be able to find some constants, some footholds in our understanding of terrorism. It is, in fact, the element of mystery as to what drives people to collective violence that makes us uncomfortable -- that fills us with terror. Researchers, policy makers, those who must combat terrorism, and the public hope for some simple formula for radicalization, a program or set of programs that will prevent groups of people from deliberately targeting other people in order to meet their needs (political, economic, social, etc). There is no magic formula within this paper collection, but there are a variety of perspectives that, either in isolation or when integrated, provide new ways to think about terrorism and potentially to inform decisions that will abate this global phenomenon, not exacerbate it.

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.

Three datasets on wealth and status distribution in United Kingdom were analyzed: 2015 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and International Labor Organization (ILO) income by occupation data for years 2017 and 2011.

What drives warfighters to make costly sacrifices—including their lives—is a long-standing question that military and civilian leaders have tried to answer. Dr. Atran explained that this question can be studied through two different psychological models: 1) rational choice theory and 2) the devoted actor model. He argued that the devoted actor model is most suitable when assessing why people are willing to make costly sacrifices. When fighters decide that they are ready to freely give their lives, it is rarely a rational decision. Instead, it is a result of their devotion to the values that they hold most sacred. Understanding an individual’s sacred values is contingent on many factors, including how fused that individual’s identity is to that of a group. Individuals whose identities are completely fused with that of a single group are the most likely to give their lives in support of that group’s values.

Lord O’Donnell began the discussion by recalling several moments when the UK’s government was forced to react to a national or international crisis. These events were Desert Storm (1991), Black Wednesday (1992), the Global Financial Crisis (2008), and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020). One characteristic that these events had in common, excluding Desert Storm, was that there was no contingency plan in place when the crisis began. The lack of a contingency plan by the government was either a result of the event occurring too quickly or, as in the case of Brexit, the government did not want to influence how the public voted in a referendum. Lord O’Donnell emphasized that even if a government does not have a contingency plan, it is still important for that government to gather data and react quickly to events. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, when it first broke out, the UK government was working on a contingency plan for a flu virus. COVID-19 is not a flu, however, so the government was left with only a partial contingency plan. The COVID-19 pandemic also demonstrated how dealing with a global pandemic is not solely a medical issue but a societal issue. When addressing how to best counter a pandemic, it will take input from the whole of society, which includes educators, medical personnel, politicians, and communicators, Lord O’Donnell argued.

Sir David argued that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused countries to realize that they must broaden their definition of national security threats. As proof that some nations are already doing this, Sir David cited the creation of the Joint Biosecurity Center in the UK, which was developed in the image of its Joint Terrorism Center. The creation of the Joint Biosecurity Center is likely the first of several new centers that will help the UK grow its capability to predict the impact of future national security risks, such as climate change. Sir David emphasized that an increase in a country’s ability to predict the impact of future security risks–and thus properly scale the problem–will help combat a sense of over-optimism or pessimism, both of which can lead to a distortion of reality. Sir David concluded his remarks by pointing out that as a result of COVID, some nations have started to adopt surveillance technologies and practices that jeopardize the individual freedoms of their civilians. The creation of new surveillance states could potentially be the beginning of an ideological battle between China’s surveillance society and the US’s ideology based on individuality, he suggested.

SMA hosted a panel discussion as part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series, entitled “Harnessing Futures and Foresighting Techniques – Using Methods, Approaches, and Multidisciplinary Teams to Understand the Strategic Implications of COVID,” featuring Prof. Rebecca Braun (Professor of Modern Languages and Creative Futures, Lancaster University, UK), Mr. Andrew Curry (Director of Futures, School of International Futures (SOIF)), and Mr. Philip Tovey (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)). The moderator was Ms. Nicole Omundson (NSI, Inc.).

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Sir Lawrence Freedman (King’s College London) as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. Sir Lawrence presented a series of lessons that can be learned from the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in the UK.