The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike. Additionally, bilateral arms control measures (norms, treaties, protocols, institutions) provide additional stability. The problem with multicountry nuclear deterrence is that there are no levels of armaments that can support stable deterrence relations among three or more adversaries; except in cases when adversaries coalesce into two alliances, in which case the system reduces to bilateral nuclear deterrence. This paper approaches this problem through formal methods and conceptualizes a solution involving an ensemble of military and politico-diplomatic strategies which, when operating as an enhanced international security regime, can mitigate the fundamental instability of the current multicountry nuclear deterrence system.

This report presents insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and PA sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank territories with Palestinian violence and cross-border attacks against Israeli citizens, as well as IDF/COGAT activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect those dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. Specifically, the loop analyses suggest that:

The Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Megacity Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence (M- RSI) project seeks to aid United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in understanding socio-cultural dynamics within megacities. For this portion of the project, USPACOM socio-cultural analysis (SCA) planning frameworks (“the SCA approach”) were used to guide remote data collection for a proto-type assessment of the risk of humanitarian crisis in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The SCA approach consists of five distinct, yet related frameworks1 that are designed to provide planners with a quick triage tool to assess risk, as well as provide a guide for analysts conducting longer-term assessments. The five frameworks are structured to reflect USPACOM’s mission objectives and planning process. Given this was a proof of concept effort, analysts were asked to apply two of the five SCA frameworks—the SCA Humanitarian Crisis (HC) Framework and the Intra-state Violence (IV) Framework—to Dhaka, Bangladesh.

SOCCENT has requested a short-term effort to assess the appeal of ISIL, specifically to answer, “What makes ISIL so magnetic, inspirational, and deeply resonant with a specific, but large, portion of the Islamic population allowing it to draw recruitment of foreign fighters, money and weapons, advocacy, general popularity, and finally support from other groups such as Boko Haram, several North African Extremist Groups, and other members of the Regional and International Sunni Extremist organizations?” A study was undertaken to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL. This white paper summarizes results from analytical efforts and key results and observations.

This paper reports the theoretical review and framework development conducted by the STRATCOM/J-5 “Concept and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) Theory Team. It reports the theoretical review and framework development with two goals in mind:

The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.

The concept of strategic culture emerges in discussions of both tailored and integrated deterrence. This report examines the concept’s history, current consensus, and enduring debates about what it entails. It also proposes a model of strategic culture as a complex system.

This report provides a concise, highly visual overview of the food security subsystem of the AECM (AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model). In addition to enabling analysis of causes and consequences of food security (and insecurity) in USAFRICOM’s AOR, it identifies three possible leverage points where interventions by the US could improve food security on the continent:

With support from GTRI, GMU worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assess strategic risk to U.S. and partner interests in the Middle East caused by great power competition in the region.

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) conducted a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The SMA considered drivers of instability in the region to include long-term internally displaced persons and refugees, spread of radical ideologies and extremism, great power competition, disruptive non-state actors, and the potential for “black swan” scenarios.

The purpose of this project was to gain a better understanding of how United States Government (USG) actions influence violent extremist organizations (VEOs). It is important to understand how actions taken by the government to suppress a VEO might result in negative, unforeseen consequences such as making a VEO stronger or increasing its public support.

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Oliver Kaplan (University of Denver) and Dr. Jonathan Moyer (University of Denver) as part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Moyer presented their research on how the COVID-19 pandemic and its second-, third-, and fourth-order effects may increase the probability of armed internal conflict. Dr. Kaplan predicted that there will be a 56% increase in conflicts through 2022 (approximately 13 additional conflicts), most of which will be concentrated in Africa, South America, and/or Central Asia. Additionally, Dr. Kaplan stated that different states will experience instability for different reasons and with different causal processes. He further explained that COVID-19 has provided a challenging environment of increased poverty, weakened states, and health issues that makes armed conflict more likely and exacerbates the effects of current ongoing conflicts. Dr. Kaplan then presented his and Dr. Moyer’s findings on overall post-pandemic global fragility from 2020-2022, highlighting that countries experiencing armed conflict in 2018 will continue to remain unstable due to the aftermath of COVID-19. Their findings also showed an increased probability of conflicts igniting in certain regions (Africa, in particular) as a result of the pandemic, all of which were calculated using a political instability task force dataset that categorizes revolutionary and ethnic wars. Next, Dr. Moyer discussed the model he and Dr. Kaplan used in their research­—the International Futures Model—in further detail. Through his research, Dr. Moyer identified macro-level indicators that anticipate internal conflicts, including GDP, mixed regimes, states discrimination, and trade. These indicators play into the International Futures Model, which simulates global development at a national level and displays how long-term development patterns work. The model that Dr. Moyer displayed during this brief shows the dynamic effects across health, government, and demographic systems, while contrasting pre-COVID and post-COVID growth rates, as well. He then emphasized this tool’s usefulness in broadening a state’s perspective and drawing it away from narrow probabilistic models in order to better understand and anticipate the drivers of state fragility. Next, Dr. Kaplan expanded on the quantitative part of his and Dr. Moyer’s research and the results of 50 cases studies they examined on fragility conflicts. Their results concluded that “economic stability and challenges” was the most frequently cited explanation for state fragility, along with “horizontal inequality” and “international intervention.” Dr. Kaplan also cited some real-world examples to show how his and Dr. Moyer’s model can be useful when analyzing various conflicts, including the ongoing crisis in Yemen and the recent explosion in Lebanon. To conclude, Dr. Kaplan provided specific policy recommendations for how to mitigate the pandemic now and prevent conflicts in the future, including funding the World Health Organization (WHO) to address first-order effects, tailoring COVID-19 response to higher-risk countries, and addressing “sparks” that could ignite COVID-related conflicts before they occur.

SMA hosted speaker session presented by MAJ Andrew Webb (US Army) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Dale Copeland (University of Virginia) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Copeland stated that he would move beyond the two schools of thought that dominate great power thinking (containment theory and engagement theory) by proposing an alternative, which he called stabilization theory.