More than ever, United States Government (USG) activities are planned and implemented in an atmosphere of shrinking budgets, high expectations and intense scrutiny at home, plus non-conventional enemies and complex operating environments abroad. In the security realm, there is little debate that the demand for cost-effective, high-impact, and transparent use of government resources requires the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DoS), and other government entities that operate oversees to work together or in complementary ways. Still, departments and their components have their own expanding missions, dwindling resources and programs to administer, making achieving unity of effort difficult. At present, there is no readily accessible process or framework that can incorporate and integrate the range of USG security-related activities abroad and that DOD planners and non-DOD practitioners might use to build common operating pictures – either within their own departments or in coordination with other departments working related activities. This deficiency increases the likelihood that what might be cost-saving efficiencies or wasteful redundancies in US security assistance and engagement programs will go unnoticed by planners and decision makers. Recognizing that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) engagement strategists and planners are in particular need of a systematic process for aligning resources and activities to strategies in the most effective and efficient ways possible, the Command J5 requested that the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team, “develop an evaluative tool to aid in prioritization and metric development for command engagement strategies.”

This briefing is the final part of a four-part study exploring the dynamics of the central Middle East conflict system. Part II describes the system and why it is critical to assess U.S. security interests and activities in the context of the entire system rather than just the conflicts (e.g., defeat of ISIL) in which the U.S. is most interested. Part II describes the analytic approach used to assess regional dynamics and regional futures based on the alignments and conflicts among three critical drivers: actor interests, resources and resolves. Part III illustrates the analytic process applied to 20-plus actor over five of the eight conflicts. Part IV presents the results of the interest, resolve, capability assessment.

The US is affected by the decisions of highly diverse actors, ranging from individuals, to groups (e.g. Violent Extremist Organizations; VEOs) to large and sophisticated states. The behavior of actors at any of these levels can seem “irrational” or “incomprehensible” and thus difficult to deter or influence. Understanding seemingly incomprehensible decision making is even more crucial given the growing centrality of hybrid warfare to the challenges US planners face.

The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. The CANS software developed during this effort is designed to enhance the planning process by guiding the analyst through the process of selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques.

The purpose of From the Mind to the Feet is to open a much deeper dialogue about gauging intent than currently exists ei- ther in operational or academic arenas. It is intended to serve military and civilian defense leaders, deterrence and policy planners, and practitioners with a review of the basic concepts and state-of-the-art understanding of intent. It is organized into two sections: operational and academic perspectives on intent.

This paper reports the theoretical review and framework development conducted by the STRATCOM/J-5 “Concept and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) Theory Team. It reports the theoretical review and framework development with two goals in mind:

The SMA Strategic Deterrence effort is a methodological study to evaluate the appropriateness and utility of modeling and wargaming to support the analytic requirements of the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC). The objective of the study is to determine which aspects of deterrence operations and planning can be appropriately analyzed through gaming, and which aspects can be appropriately analyzed through different forms of modeling. The project also examines the synthesis of deterrence gaming and modeling, how the results of gaming can inform deterrence modeling, and how modeling can shape deterrence gaming.

This white paper covers topics related to the field of anticipating/forecasting specific categories of “rare events” such as acts of terror, use of a weapon of mass destruction, or other high profile attacks. It is primarily meant for the operational community in DoD, DHS, and other USG agencies. It addresses three interrelated facets of the problem set:

This report summarizes the results from a 120-day effort that was undertaken to meet these challenges. A scope of the effort is provided by Lt Col Shannahan in section 1; namely, decision makers, policy makers and commanders at all levels need to better understand deterrence theory applicable to the 21st century security environment. The USG requires a typology to understand the ways and means to deter a non-nation-state actor while simultaneously retaining the means to deter and compel nation-states.

This Deterrence Typology was created to assist in the development of deterrence options and plans for State and Non-State Actors. It can be used as a stand alone document for identifying important information to characterize and understand State or Non-State Actors. It can also assist in the development of initial questions that should be answered about either type of actor to be deterred.

Supporting material for Volume II -- Deterrence Typology, which was created to assist in the development of deterrence options and plans for State and Non-State Actors.

Given the current distribution of actor interests, capabilities and resolve (I-R-C), North Korean denuclearization is highly unlikely without significant change in regional interests and conditions. Under current conditions:

The US government’s objectives of protecting its security interests and promoting democratic ideals abroad sometimes coincide (e.g., Ukraine), while at other times, they appear at odds. The US spends billions of dollars per year on foreign aid to support democratic values and human rights efforts. However, it also gives large amounts of aid and support to countries that have weakening democracies, human rights issues, or full autocracies in the name of national and regional security. The US has encountered this dilemma since the Cold War and the Reagan administration, Mr. Press stated. During this time, the US viewed supporting democratic values as pivotal while also partnering with oppressive autocracies like Chile to combat the USSR. The three major drivers of this dilemma in recent years, according to Mr. Press, include a) the US’s interest in maintaining stability in the MENA region, b) countering violent extremist organizations, and c) managing strategic competition with China.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series. Dr. Mastro first explained the motivation behind her research. The US does not have a good understanding of how to end conflicts or how to bring enemies to the negotiating table, according to Dr. Mastro. Moreover, individuals often have varying views on how to best get an enemy to agree to talks. Therefore, Dr. Mastro sought to answer the following question: After a war breaks out, what factors influence belligerents’ decisions about whether to talk to the enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? She defined diplomatic posture as “a belligerent’s willingness to engage in direct talks with its enemy at a given point in a war,” and explained that there are two types of diplomatic posture: open (where the warring party is willing to talk directly with the enemy in a given period of time unconditionally) and closed (where either the warring party is unwilling to talk directly to the enemy or is unwilling to do so unless preconditions are met). When conducting her research, Dr. Mastro examined every war fought since World War II and recognized that 1) there is a near universal tendency to have a period at the beginning of a war where there is only fighting and no talking; 2) states’ diplomatic posture varies over time and over conflicts; 3) expected strategic costs of conversation determine diplomatic posture; 4) when leaders’ cost valuation is high, they chose closed diplomatic postures; 5) when leaders’ cost valuation is low, they chose open diplomatic postures; and 6) states will only go to the negotiating table when/strategic costs are determined by likelihood of adverse inference and the enemy’s ability to respond given adverse inference. Dr. Mastro also provided a historic case study—China during the Korean War—to bring forth several of the conclusions she derived from her research. To conclude, Dr. Mastro provided a series of recommendations, including that US policymakers and defense planners must 1) rethink the US’s approach to wartime diplomacy, 2) integrate diplomats into contingency planning, and 3) rethink the role of mediators.

Security and privacy aren’t dichotomous or conflicting concerns—the solution lies in developing and integrating advanced information technologies for counterterrorism along with privacy-protection technologies to safeguard civil liberties. Coordinated policies can help bind the two to their intended use.

This book explores both counter-terrorism and enabling policy dimensions of emerging information technologies in national security.

September 11, 2001 might have been just another day if the U.S. intelligence agencies had been better equipped with information technology, according to the report of Congress’s Joint Inquiry into the events leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks.