Talking to the Enemy: Explaining Diplomatic Strategy in Conflicts with China
“Talking to the Enemy: Explaining Diplomatic Strategy in Conflicts with China“
Speaker: Mastro, O. (Georgetown University)
Date: 9 September 2019
Speaker Session Preview
SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series. Dr. Mastro first explained the motivation behind her research. The US does not have a good understanding of how to end conflicts or how to bring enemies to the negotiating table, according to Dr. Mastro. Moreover, individuals often have varying views on how to best get an enemy to agree to talks. Therefore, Dr. Mastro sought to answer the following question: After a war breaks out, what factors influence belligerents’ decisions about whether to talk to the enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? She defined diplomatic posture as “a belligerent’s willingness to engage in direct talks with its enemy at a given point in a war,” and explained that there are two types of diplomatic posture: open (where the warring party is willing to talk directly with the enemy in a given period of time unconditionally) and closed (where either the warring party is unwilling to talk directly to the enemy or is unwilling to do so unless preconditions are met). When conducting her research, Dr. Mastro examined every war fought since World War II and recognized that 1) there is a near universal tendency to have a period at the beginning of a war where there is only fighting and no talking; 2) states’ diplomatic posture varies over time and over conflicts; 3) expected strategic costs of conversation determine diplomatic posture; 4) when leaders’ cost valuation is high, they chose closed diplomatic postures; 5) when leaders’ cost valuation is low, they chose open diplomatic postures; and 6) states will only go to the negotiating table when/strategic costs are determined by likelihood of adverse inference and the enemy’s ability to respond given adverse inference. Dr. Mastro also provided a historic case study—China during the Korean War—to bring forth several of the conclusions she derived from her research. To conclude, Dr. Mastro provided a series of recommendations, including that US policymakers and defense planners must 1) rethink the US’s approach to wartime diplomacy, 2) integrate diplomats into contingency planning, and 3) rethink the role of mediators.
Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. Dr. Mastro is also a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute where she is working on a book about China's challenge to U.S. primacy. Mastro continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve for which she works as a Senior China Analyst at the Pentagon. For her contributions to U.S. strategy in Asia, she won the Individual Reservist of the Year Award in 2016. She has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Survival, and Asian Security, and is the author of The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime, (Cornell University Press, 2019). She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. Her publications and other commentary can be found on twitter @osmastro and www.orianaskylarmastro.com.
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