The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike. Additionally, bilateral arms control measures (norms, treaties, protocols, institutions) provide additional stability. The problem with multicountry nuclear deterrence is that there are no levels of armaments that can support stable deterrence relations among three or more adversaries; except in cases when adversaries coalesce into two alliances, in which case the system reduces to bilateral nuclear deterrence. This paper approaches this problem through formal methods and conceptualizes a solution involving an ensemble of military and politico-diplomatic strategies which, when operating as an enhanced international security regime, can mitigate the fundamental instability of the current multicountry nuclear deterrence system.

The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. The CANS software developed during this effort is designed to enhance the planning process by guiding the analyst through the process of selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques.

Cooperative security, stability operations and irregular warfare missions require a better understanding of the complex operational environment, notably through rich contextual understanding of the factors affecting stability. Further assessment, policy, and planning need to consider factors associated with institutional performance (community organizations, government ministries, legal structures, etc.) based on how societies emerge, develop, and function, as well as attributes that provide resiliency and flexibility.

During the cold war the conventional wisdom was that an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union was all but precluded. The key to this strategic nirvana was a carefully calibrated balance of strategic weapons and the high costs associated with nuclear conflict. The policy that was credited tobringing this state of affairs about was labeled Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. Each side threatened to obliterate the other if it were attacked.

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn (RAND) and Ms. Becca Wasser (RAND) as a part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Pettyjohn first stated that the gray zone is “more usefully conceptualized as a tactic rather than a phase in conflict.” This is in part because it is difficult to identify which actions fall into one phase versus another as Russia, for example, takes gray zone actions across the spectrum. She explained that framing the gray zone as a tactic can help NATO and the West develop more appropriate responses to particular events. There are different types of gray zone tactics, each of which require different responses. To address this issue, Dr. Pettyjohn and Ms. Wasser created a framework to distinguish some of Russia’s gray zone tactics from one another. Two distinct variables are important for distinguishing these tactics: violent versus non-violent intervention, and diffused versus focused targets. Everyday, non-violent tactics are employed to weaken the West and increase Russian influence, but it is unclear how or whether they will work. Diffuse, violent tactics implicitly involve the threat of violence and include Russian efforts to form ties with criminal and paramilitary organizations. Targeted, non-violent tactics leverage the results of “everyday” actions and are employed to achieve a specific near-term goals. Finally, aggressive and directed short-term tactics have a specific objective and involve the threat or actual use of force. Dr. Pettyjohn then stated that Russia’s ability to achieve its objectives through gray zone tactics is largely dependent on the vulnerability of the target country. This vulnerability can be indicated by state fragility and polarization. Next, Ms. Wasser advised that NATO compel, not deter, Russia to stop engaging in “everyday” gray zone tactics. NATO retaliatory threats against non-violent gray zone tactics lack credibility, however, NATO often cannot come to a decision about what constitutes a certain threshold for response or what that response would be. The attribution of gray zone tactics also isn’t sufficient enough to change Russian behavior, and doing so imposes costs on the West. Ms. Wasser advised that NATO improves the resiliency of target nations, which will reduce their vulnerability to Russian gray zone tactics. NATO can also impede Russian violent gray zone tactics through deterrence by denial and Russian non-violent gray zone tactics through supporting civilian organizations, which are best positioned to counter non-violent tactics. To conclude, Ms. Wasser stated that the West may be winning the gray zone competition without realizing it. She also stated that NATO should focus on strengthening conventional deterrence, and the West should not ignore or overreact to Russian gray zone tactics; the West should recommend a better course of action instead.

A hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Damon Coletta (US Air Force Academy) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his brief, Mr. Coletta discussed game theory’s application to modern deterrence. He began by explaining the basics of game theory, highlighting that it evolves out of market-level analysis and adopts a set of economic assumptions regarding payoffs and strategy. He then stated that, when applied to deterrence, game theory can be used to assess whether there is an instrumental rationality behind an adversary’s actions, as well as what their rationality and/or preferences might be.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Krista Langeland (RAND) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (University of Chicago) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Bueno de Mesquita began by stating that although the US and its allies have tremendous cyber capacity, practitioners tend to believe that their strategic thinking is lagging behind.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jumanne Donahue (US Army TRADOC G-27) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Donahue spoke about how societies struggle to “cope with cultural and political complexity in an increasingly interconnected world,” going on to discuss how weaponized narratives and computational propaganda contribute to societal problems. He then described his dissertation research, which examined “social and geopolitical problems and how culturally-enabled technology, games, and simulations might be used to address them.” The culmination of this work is the Intercultural Coordination System (ICS), which seeks to create ethical and enlightened communities with inclusive, prosocial values. Dr. Donahue concluded by explaining how ICS was created and describing the features of these communities, the cyclical process involved, and potential applications of ICS.

Security and privacy aren’t dichotomous or conflicting concerns—the solution lies in developing and integrating advanced information technologies for counterterrorism along with privacy-protection technologies to safeguard civil liberties. Coordinated policies can help bind the two to their intended use.