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SMA Publications (Tagged: Space)

SMA Publication

Space Deterrence: Vulnerability-Credibility Tradeoff in Space Domain

We define space deterrence as preventing intentional attacks against space capabilities, regardless of their physical location. Intentional attacks may target space capabilities to deprive space-dependent nations of the ability to leverage space capabilities to either (1) provide indirect assistance to war fighting capabilities located in other domains, or (2) directly base weapons in space. We specify two types of deterrence (Type 1 and Type 2) corresponding to the two aforementioned ways in which space-faring nations leverage space capabilities. Type 1 deterrence concerns the defense of space assets which indirectly assist warfighting capabilities. Type 2 deterrence, on the other hand, concerns the prevention of the basing of weapons in space. Type 1 deterrence exhibits a distinctive vulnerability-credibility tradeoff due to peculiar characteristics of the space domain and how the United States leverages space to enhance other elements of national power. We conclude that unlike what classic deterrence models would predict, in space deterrence remaining reliant or dependent upon vulnerable space capabilities makes commitment to Type 1 deterrence more credible and thereby stable, lessening incentives for (kinetic or other forms of) aggression in crisis and conflict.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Enforcement as Verification, and the Problem of Dual-Use

This report describes expert views on the existence and non-existence of space norms and the challenges and opportunities norms represent for peaceful space use. At the broadest level, norms are informal but generally accepted rules of behavior that are recognized and understood by a community, 3 in this case a community of nations. Norms can emerge from either formal or informal channels, as Jonty Kasku-Jackson of the National Security Space Institute argues. Informal means of norm development include persuasion emerging from being a good exemplar of norm-based behavior, such as: the “creation of domestic legislation and regulations that serve as a model for others to adopt, publication and acceptance of academic papers, and shaping the discussion during ‘Track 2’ (non- governmental, informal, and unofficial) conferences and meetings” (Kasku-Jackson). Formal rule development examples consist of: “negotiation and implementation of binding international treaties, non-binding codes of conduct, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and state declaratory policy” (Kasku-Jackson).
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Governing in a Crowded Space - The Legal Regime for Space

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the lynchpin of the current international legal regime for space. 105 countries have ratified the treaty, while another 25 are signatories.6 The OST extends the UN Charter and its underlying principles to outer space (Berkowitz), and provides additional principles to guide activities in space. These principles have been elaborated and further codified in three subsequent UN treaties related to space activity: the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, and 1975 Registration Convention.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Commercial Companies’ Perceptions of Security Space

The expert contributors suggest that commercial companies’ understanding of security is fundamentally different than that of military leaders. For both, security concerns reflect their primary interests; however, as their primary interests and goals are divergent, so are their perceptions of security and threat. When synthesizing the contributors’ responses, it becomes apparent that there is a relationship between commercial actors’ key interests, their security concerns and vulnerabilities, and their expectations regarding US government warnings and protection. This relationship is captured in Figure 1 below.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Exploring the Economic Effects of Conflict in Space

This report captures the input of 19 responses contributed by experts from the National Security Space community in the US and an array of commercial space actors in the US, Australia, Italy, and Norway. Industry perspectives on this question are surprisingly varied in both their explicit responses (i.e., “yes,” “difficult,” “impossible,” etc.) and their use of methods for assessing the fallout of hostility in space. While the contributors offer a variety of useful insights, there does not appear to be an easily accessible and comprehensive analysis of the financial impact of conflict in the space domain. In fact, due to the cascading nature of warfighting events in space, contributors disagree on whether any analysis would produce a satisfactory answer, but the clear consensus is that further research needs to be done on this topic.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Int'l Rules / Norms: Constraints on Space Operations

The expert contributors identified 26 separate international agreements, treaties, and resolutions (legal codes) that have implications for space operations (Figure 1). The core of the legal space regime is composed of five UN-sponsored space treaties3 centering around the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST). Subsequent non-binding resolutions, and the ITU Treaty, reflect the evolving nature of space operations, and the perceived need for legal codes to develop in response.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Pre-Space Age Approaches to Military Capabilities

This report summarizes the input of 13 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Principles of Response to Aggression in Space

Upon considering the question of focus, several expert contributors argue that it is confusing or even misleading (Cheng; Gallagher; Hertzfeld; Masson-Zwaan). The contributors maintain that this confusion comes from two sources: the ambiguity of the language used in the question and the ambiguity of existing space treaty law. Noting the inherent contention in the legal realm of space, the contributors as a whole nonetheless work to articulate how the US might derive a set of principles for response to aggression in space. Contributors divide into two camps: those who argue that principles already exist that can be used to guide a response to aggression, and those who argue that these principles are—and must be—emergent. Although distinct reasons are given between the two camps, the chief principle on which all camps agree is what we might call the “precaution principle.”
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Effectiveness of International Agreements in Space

The expert contributors divided nearly evenly on whether international space agreements can provide protection to space assets. While all contributors agreed that international agreements create norms of behavior, they disagreed on whether these norms create restraints on state behavior that will hold in a crisis. The contributors who did believe that international agreements could provide protection also maintained that focusing on prohibited activities, such as the generation of space debris, rather than prohibited technologies, increased the enforceability and verification of effective international space agreements as well as mitigated the dual-use problem. In short, their argument was that with regard to dual-use technology, ultimately it does not matter what states build, it really only matters how they use what they put into space.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Strategic Risk in the Space Domain

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. This input includes expert contributions from US voices as well as non-US voices from Australia, India, Italy, and the UK. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
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SMA Publication

Commercial Space Actors: Disruptors or Solid Partners

There was considerable variation in how the expert contributors interpreted this question, and in their assessments of the future relationship between commercial and government space enterprises. While the contributors who saw commercial entities as solid partners of the government were, with one exception, representatives of commercial space, respondents from think tank, commercial, and government communities tended to view commercial actors as potential disruptors (39%). However, the majority response among the expert contributors overall (44%) was that commercial entities might serve as both disruptors and partners.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Is US Success Contingent on Dominance in Every Domain

Contributors were varied in their responses, with approximately half of the subject matter experts replying to this question with a variation of “it depends.” In other words, campaign success in a multi- domain conflict (MDC) is not solely a question of US need to dominate in all domains (or not), but instead is contingent on contextual factors that are likely to vary from one conflict to the next. Broadly, these can be grouped into the following categories, which can be examined individually or in concert: a) aspects of the conflict, b) aspects of the adversary, and c) aspects of the domain (Berkowitz; Cheng; Harris Corporation; Hitchens; Karpiscak; Steer). Figure 1 presents a set of guiding questions derived from contributor inputs, which address these categories and demonstrate the range of considerations when engaging in a multi-domain conflict.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

National Security Implications of Space-Launch Innovation

The experts solicited in this effort agree that there will be wide-ranging national security challenges and a few benefits arising from decreased launch costs. The challenges are largely derived from two structural changes to the space domain: more actors and a wider diversity of payloads. The subject matter experts indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs affect: military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space

Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

How Should Space Feature in US Deterrence Strategy

This report summarizes key points from 27 insightful responses contributed by space experts from industry, the US government, academia, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. These also include expert contributions from non-US voices from Australia, France, and Italy. While this summary response presents an overview of the key subject matter expert insights, the points summarized below cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert input provided, each of which is well worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Hindrances Between Private and Gov't Space Sectors

The 33 individuals or teams that provided input represent large, medium, and small/start-up space companies; 4 USG civil space agencies; academia; think tanks; and professional organizations. Four of these are non-US voices (Australia, Canada, Italy, and Norway.)
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Allied/Commercial Capabilities to Enhance Resilience

The importance of strengthening the resilience of US space capabilities is directly addressed in the 2010 National Space Policy, and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. While these documents identify resilience as central to mission assurance, they do not provide any detail on what comprises resilience in the context of US space capabilities. The 2012 DoD Directive 3100.10 is consistent with these documents and offers the following definition of resilience: The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Motivations and Costs to Contest Uses of Space

Subject matter experts generally agreed that there were multiple motive pathways for nation-states to contest use of space. These pathways were:the vulnerabilities and sensitivities that come from increasing cross-domain dependence on space systems; the national pursuit of space programs as a form of (major power) prestige and status; and the yet unresolved rules about how to project national sovereignty into space.Experts also agreed that there are very high costs associated with acting on any of these motives, although they disagreed on whether high costs increased or decreased the likelihood of conflict.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

(Outer) Space: An Exploration of Definitional Issues

Operationalizing or defining terms is an important first step to understanding concepts, including their boundaries and how they are distinguished from other, potentially related ideas. Similarly, clarity in communication is an essential condition for ensuring that the message or information that is transmitted is as close as possible to what is received. Within the DOD, definitions matter because they are a necessary component for the establishment and application of doctrine. Given the breadth of the space field as a whole, establishing precise definitions may become an even more pressing task, as coordination is sought over a broad base of space sub-communities (e.g., national security space, civil space, and commercial). Each field as a whole and each sub-domain within it naturally has its own terminology, which tends to evolve over time. To best advance coordination within and across the various US and allied space communities, we must be capable of fruitfully combining the work that is being done in various commands, DOD offices, and other agencies and organizations. This can be best achieved when we identify those terms for which precise definitions are required in order to move forward. Doing so also enables the US to avoid any unintended responses from our adversaries. This coordination begins by getting a broad view of the terminological landscape and any terms for which there is current contention.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Commercial Space Industry for Military Purposes

All the experts who contributed to this question noted that it begins from the incorrect assumption that space industries in other countries are organized in a similar manner to the US—with clear delineations among civil, military, and commercial space industries. Furthermore, most indicate that, taking advantage of the dual use nature of much space technology, many states both non-Western and Western, are already tapping commercial and civil space capabilities for military use. Their responses suggest that a better way to frame this question might be: “Which nations outside the West are tapping into their civil (commercial and/or government run) space industry for military purposes?”
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Space Services Among Actors Without Space Capabilities

NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) provides rapid response to critical information needs by pulsing our global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of expert insight.For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used to address 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force project sponsors. The ViTTa team received written and verbal input from over 111 experts from National Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academic communities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains two sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked; and 2) the full written and/or transcribed interview input received from each expert contributor organized alphabetically. Biographies for all expert contributors have been collated in a companion document.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

The Clash of Sectors: Why Public Private Partnerships Can Reduce ‘Coerced Cooperation’ in Commercial-Government Joint Ventures

Many experts believe that one of the best investments to expand opportunities for United States’ multi-and cross-domain dominance lies in the successful joint investment of the United States’ government alongside commercial space actors to increase the US technological lead. Yet, as the commercial space market grows, there are greater numbers of private actors, some of whom have the ability to operate independently (or even disruptively) in the space domain. This potential for disruption and autonomy begs the question of what forms cooperation between the national security space (NSS) sector and the commercial space sector (CSS) will take in the future. In so far as breakthroughs in the space domain offer both benefits and potential danger from a national security perspective, the NSS would likely want some say in the direction of research, and be able to limit the potential buyers of the tech.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Space Virtual Think Tank Summary Overview

Over the past year, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)2 team employed NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) methodology to reach out to a global network of space subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, government, and national security space to elicit expert insight on 23 key questions relating to contested space operations.3 Responses were received from over 111 experts from institutions in the US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Malicious Non-state Actors and Contested Space Operations

This report provides an analysis of potential threats to space-based systems posed by non-state actors. It places particular emphasis on the need to consider the space domain as part of a multi-domain threat environment where domains are interconnected and interdependent. This research devotes significant attention to examining the nexus between space and cybersecurity, and to the strategic vulnerabilities posed by the increasing integration of cyber and space technologies in critical infrastructure.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Vladimir Putin’s Worldview and Perspectives on Space

A corpus of Vladimir Putin’s speeches was drawn from his official Kremlin website. The corpus was examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Putin’s concerns with space and how these are articulated with general political and cultural issues. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as Putin’s perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Kim Jong Un's Worldview and Perspectives on Space

A collection of Kim Jong Un’s speeches from 2012 to 2017, translated and published online by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Kim Jong Un’s concerns in the space domain and how these concerns are articulated with general political and cultural themes. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as the DPRK’s (i.e., Kim Jong Un’s) perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Chinese Worldview and Perspectives on Space

Corpora from three sources were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge the Chinese government’s concerns in the space domain and how these interests are articulated with general political and cultural issues. The sources were releases from the Chinese MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2011 – 2017), stories reported by CPC (Communist Party of China) News (2013 – 2014), and two months of speeches by Chinese president Xi Jinping (2014). The primary findings from the discourse are presented as Chinese perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Allocation of Commercial Space Industry Components

Thirty-four subject matter expert (SME) contributors, the majority from the commercial space industry, responded to this question. They provided details on the commercial space activities of 17 countries and the European Space Agency (ESA). As discussed in detail in other ViTTa reports,4 it is important to recognize that the division between public and private organizations and activities is rarely clear-cut. Furthermore, as contributors have noted in their responses both to this question5 and others,6 much of the space activity outside the US is concentrated on dual-use technologies and applications. For these reasons, we define the “commercial space industry” as capabilities and activities undertaken for commercial purposes, rather than capabilities and activities undertaken by a purely commercial space actor.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

How Disagreement Over Space Terms Can Create Barriers to Transparency in the Space Domain

Because limitations space situational awareness functionally limit direct observation of adverse events in space, actors in space instead rely on other methods of making inferences about the causes behind adverse events, including communicating with each other. As a result, miscommunications that lead to incorrect inferences about the causes of adverse events can pose great risks to stable governance and crisis management in the space domain. One solution to reduce the risks of miscommunications is creating transparency by sharing SSA-relevant information, particularly in times of crisis. An under-appreciated (and under-theorized) aspect of this process is the key space terms used to describe events and causality in the space domain. Key space terms shape and reflect how actors ascribe intentionality and describe threats within the space domain. In this Concept Paper, we argue that disagreement over key terms related to events in space form barriers to creating communication transparency. While the consequences of these discrepancies in the use of key space terms are in some cases benign, in other cases, disagreement over key space terms can negatively impact US national security when terminological disagreement stifle effective, transparent communication among space actors.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Outer Space in the Media Space: How Russian and Chinese News Media Present the Commercialization and Militarization of the Space Domain

This report details Russian and Chinese media presentations of operations and intentions in the space domain to their respective populations. These presentations provide us insight into how members of these nation states understand their government’s intentions and activities in the space domain, the opportunities and challenges their government’s face in approaching those intentions and activities, the alliances and norms necessary for space usage, and which actors are attempting to destabilizing the space domain.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Leaders of the Chinese Economy: Cognitive and Motivational Analyses

In order to gain a quantified, evidence-based picture of decision-making tendencies of Chinese industrial, technical, economic, and political leaders, the UBC research group assessed the integrative complexity and motivational hierarchy of high-level figures in government and (ostensibly) private enterprise.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation

United States policymakers must prepare to manage escalation in West Pacific confrontations that involve space operations. How can they put themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners and manage escalation in the current strategic environment in space? We raise three key points.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Malicious Non-state Actors and Contested Space Operations

This report provides an analysis of potential threats to space-based systems posed by non-state actors. It places particular emphasis on the need to consider the space domain as part of a multi-domain threat environment where domains are interconnected and interdependent. This research devotes significant attention to examining the nexus between space and cybersecurity, and to the strategic vulnerabilities posed by the increasing integration of cyber and space technologies in critical infrastructure.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Speaker Series (Tagged: Space)

SMA Speaker Series

SMA Space Panel- UK Perspectives

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. The panelists for this session included Dr. Bleddyn Bowen (University of Leicester), Dr. Mark Hilborne (King’s College London), and moderator Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology; Georgetown University). Dr. Bowen first provided an overview of UK government and commercial space capabilities.
May 17, 2018
Dr Bleddyn Bowen, Dr. Mark Hilborne, and Dr. Nicholas Wright
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SMA Speaker Series

A Japanese Perspective on Space Deterrence and the Role of the US-Japan Alliance

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Kazuto Suzuki (Public Policy School of Hokkaido University, Japan) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Dr. Suzuki began the session by discussing the importance, indispensability, and vulnerability of space systems, as well as the difficulty of defending and deterring attacks on these systems.
May 1, 2018
Kazuto Suzuki
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Entanglement: The Growing Threat to Command and Control

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. James Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Dr. Acton’s talk focused on two findings: 1) Nuclear weapons and their command-and-control (C3I) systems are becoming increasingly entangled with non nuclear capabilities, and 2) many of the satellites used for nuclear C3I are dual-use and are increasingly becoming vulnerable to damage during a conflict involving either nuclear or non nuclear weapons.
April 19, 2018
Dr. James Acton
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SMA Speaker Series

Space-Based Missile Defense: Still Grounded

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Ms. Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland [CISSM]) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series.
March 29, 2018
Theresa Hitchens
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence and Space Warfare

The strategy of space warfare is a subset of general warfare strategy; therefore, the ideas of deterrence, compellence, and dissuasion have applicability in the space domain.
January 4, 2024
Dr. John Klein
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SMA Speaker Series

Outcompeting China in Space: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Integrated Deterrence

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. John “Patsy” Klein (Falcon Research, Inc.; George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute) and Mr. Dean Cheng (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies; Users Advisory Group of the National Space Council) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.The US and China are locked in a grand geopolitical competition that includes continuous use of deterrence against each other. Mr. Cheng emphasized that China and the US conceptualize deterrence very differently. The US primarily conceives of deterrence as a dissuasive tool used to preemptively stop an adversary’s aggression, while the primary Chinese conceptualization of deterrence, wēi-shè, also includes coercion. China approaches wēi-shè holistically, using many different leverages of national power, such as economic deals. Sometimes, the US is unprepared to deter adversaries because it prepares to deter actors that mirror itself, commented Dr. Klein.
February 28, 2023
Dean Cheng, (Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies; Senior Adviser, United States Institute of Peace); and Dr. John Klein (Senior Fellow and Strategist, Falcon Research, Inc.)
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SMA Speaker Series

Identifying and Exploiting Fleeting Opportunities in Complex Systems

Modern strategic competition is forcing decision-making to occur more quickly in an increasingly cluttered information environment.
July 7, 2022
John Bicknell
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges and Opportunities of Advances in Satellite Technologies: A National Security Perspective

SMA hosted a panel discussion with Dr. Mariel Borowitz (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), Maj. Brian Stewart (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia institute of Technology), and Dr. Glenn Lightsey (School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series.Dr. Lawrence Rubin (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology), moderated the event and provided a few introductory remarks.
April 7, 2021
Rubin, L. (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology); Borowitz, M. J. (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology); Stewart, B. (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia institute of Technology); Lightsey, G. (School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology)
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SMA Speaker Series

Exploring Space Deterrence: A Game Theoretic Model to Inform Future Strategies

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Krista Langeland (RAND) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
March 5, 2019
Langeland, K. (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

SMA Space Panel Discussion: Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation

SMA hosted a panel discussion focused on a recently-published white paper as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Presenters included Mr. Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Lt Col Peter Garretson (US Air Force), Dr. Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), Mr. Bruce MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation), and Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology / Georgetown University).
October 30, 2018
Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Lt Col Peter Garretson (US Air Force); Dr. Namrata Goswami (Independent Analyst), Bruce MacDonald (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies), Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation), and Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology / Georgetown University)
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SMA Speaker Series

MINDSPACE: Cognition in Space Operations

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology / Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Dr. Wright began by posing a question: “How do we create power in space?” He then stated that strategy is the art of creating power in space and that creating this power is fundamentally cognitive, requires both influence and control, and is dependent on the environment. Dr. Wright explained that US (space) decision makers need to think from the “outside in,” meaning that they should place the audience’s decision-making process at the heart of influence. They must also take culture seriously, for example, by considering if strategic thinking differs between China and the US due to cultural differences, and positing the key cognitive foundations that underlie deterrence, escalation management, offense, and defense in space. He then reviewed all of the key factors and associated cognitive foundations that are crucial for successful space operations. Dr. Wright concluded the session by discussing the role of space in gray zone conflicts.
June 21, 2018
Dr. Nicholas Wright
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SMA Speaker Series

Missile Defenses as Anti-Satellite Weapons

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Laura Grego (Union of Concerned Scientists) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Dr. Grego first outlined the various types of missile defenses and explained that “because long-range ballistic missiles travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, missile defense systems designed to target them have inherent capabilities as ASAT weapons.” She then talked about two forms of kinetic energy interceptors and stated that existing US ground- and sea-based missile defense systems are “projected to grow significantly within the next decade and will, in theory, be able hold at risk nearly all Chinese and Russian satellites in low-earth orbits, which has serious implications for stability and security in space.” To conclude the session, Dr. Grego discussed potential solutions and strategies to diminish the problematic effects of missile defense development.
June 1, 2018
Dr. Laura Grego
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NSI Publications (Tagged: Space)

NSI Publication

Vladimir Putin’s Worldview and Perspectives on Space

A corpus of Vladimir Putin’s speeches was drawn from his official Kremlin website. The corpus was examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Putin’s concerns with space and how these are articulated with general political and cultural issues. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as Putin’s perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Strategic Risk in the Space Domain

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. This input includes expert contributions from US voices as well as non-US voices from Australia, India, Italy, and the UK. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
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NSI Publication

Space Services Among Actors Without Space Capabilities

NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) provides rapid response to critical information needs by pulsing our global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of expert insight.For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used to address 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force project sponsors. The ViTTa team received written and verbal input from over 111 experts from National Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academic communities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains two sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked; and 2) the full written and/or transcribed interview input received from each expert contributor organized alphabetically. Biographies for all expert contributors have been collated in a companion document.
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Space Virtual Think Tank Summary Overview

Over the past year, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)2 team employed NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) methodology to reach out to a global network of space subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, government, and national security space to elicit expert insight on 23 key questions relating to contested space operations.3 Responses were received from over 111 experts from institutions in the US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Pre-Space Age Approaches to Military Capabilities

This report summarizes the input of 13 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation

United States policymakers must prepare to manage escalation in West Pacific confrontations that involve space operations. How can they put themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners and manage escalation in the current strategic environment in space? We raise three key points.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

National Security Implications of Space-Launch Innovation

The experts solicited in this effort agree that there will be wide-ranging national security challenges and a few benefits arising from decreased launch costs. The challenges are largely derived from two structural changes to the space domain: more actors and a wider diversity of payloads. The subject matter experts indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs affect: military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Kim Jong Un's Worldview and Perspectives on Space

A collection of Kim Jong Un’s speeches from 2012 to 2017, translated and published online by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge Kim Jong Un’s concerns in the space domain and how these concerns are articulated with general political and cultural themes. The primary findings from the discourse are presented as the DPRK’s (i.e., Kim Jong Un’s) perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Is US Success Contingent on Dominance in Every Domain

Contributors were varied in their responses, with approximately half of the subject matter experts replying to this question with a variation of “it depends.” In other words, campaign success in a multi- domain conflict (MDC) is not solely a question of US need to dominate in all domains (or not), but instead is contingent on contextual factors that are likely to vary from one conflict to the next. Broadly, these can be grouped into the following categories, which can be examined individually or in concert: a) aspects of the conflict, b) aspects of the adversary, and c) aspects of the domain (Berkowitz; Cheng; Harris Corporation; Hitchens; Karpiscak; Steer). Figure 1 presents a set of guiding questions derived from contributor inputs, which address these categories and demonstrate the range of considerations when engaging in a multi-domain conflict.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

How Should Space Feature in US Deterrence Strategy

This report summarizes key points from 27 insightful responses contributed by space experts from industry, the US government, academia, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. These also include expert contributions from non-US voices from Australia, France, and Italy. While this summary response presents an overview of the key subject matter expert insights, the points summarized below cannot fully convey the fine detail of the expert input provided, each of which is well worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Int'l Rules / Norms: Constraints on Space Operations

The expert contributors identified 26 separate international agreements, treaties, and resolutions (legal codes) that have implications for space operations (Figure 1). The core of the legal space regime is composed of five UN-sponsored space treaties3 centering around the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST). Subsequent non-binding resolutions, and the ITU Treaty, reflect the evolving nature of space operations, and the perceived need for legal codes to develop in response.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

How Disagreement Over Space Terms Can Create Barriers to Transparency in the Space Domain

Because limitations space situational awareness functionally limit direct observation of adverse events in space, actors in space instead rely on other methods of making inferences about the causes behind adverse events, including communicating with each other. As a result, miscommunications that lead to incorrect inferences about the causes of adverse events can pose great risks to stable governance and crisis management in the space domain. One solution to reduce the risks of miscommunications is creating transparency by sharing SSA-relevant information, particularly in times of crisis. An under-appreciated (and under-theorized) aspect of this process is the key space terms used to describe events and causality in the space domain. Key space terms shape and reflect how actors ascribe intentionality and describe threats within the space domain. In this Concept Paper, we argue that disagreement over key terms related to events in space form barriers to creating communication transparency. While the consequences of these discrepancies in the use of key space terms are in some cases benign, in other cases, disagreement over key space terms can negatively impact US national security when terminological disagreement stifle effective, transparent communication among space actors.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Hindrances Between Private and Gov't Space Sectors

The 33 individuals or teams that provided input represent large, medium, and small/start-up space companies; 4 USG civil space agencies; academia; think tanks; and professional organizations. Four of these are non-US voices (Australia, Canada, Italy, and Norway.)
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Governing in a Crowded Space - The Legal Regime for Space

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the lynchpin of the current international legal regime for space. 105 countries have ratified the treaty, while another 25 are signatories.6 The OST extends the UN Charter and its underlying principles to outer space (Berkowitz), and provides additional principles to guide activities in space. These principles have been elaborated and further codified in three subsequent UN treaties related to space activity: the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 1972 Liability Convention, and 1975 Registration Convention.
Year Published:
2018
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Enforcement as Verification, and the Problem of Dual-Use

This report describes expert views on the existence and non-existence of space norms and the challenges and opportunities norms represent for peaceful space use. At the broadest level, norms are informal but generally accepted rules of behavior that are recognized and understood by a community, 3 in this case a community of nations. Norms can emerge from either formal or informal channels, as Jonty Kasku-Jackson of the National Security Space Institute argues. Informal means of norm development include persuasion emerging from being a good exemplar of norm-based behavior, such as: the “creation of domestic legislation and regulations that serve as a model for others to adopt, publication and acceptance of academic papers, and shaping the discussion during ‘Track 2’ (non- governmental, informal, and unofficial) conferences and meetings” (Kasku-Jackson). Formal rule development examples consist of: “negotiation and implementation of binding international treaties, non-binding codes of conduct, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and state declaratory policy” (Kasku-Jackson).
Year Published:
2018
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Commercial Space Actors: Disruptors or Solid Partners

There was considerable variation in how the expert contributors interpreted this question, and in their assessments of the future relationship between commercial and government space enterprises. While the contributors who saw commercial entities as solid partners of the government were, with one exception, representatives of commercial space, respondents from think tank, commercial, and government communities tended to view commercial actors as potential disruptors (39%). However, the majority response among the expert contributors overall (44%) was that commercial entities might serve as both disruptors and partners.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Commercial Space Industry for Military Purposes

All the experts who contributed to this question noted that it begins from the incorrect assumption that space industries in other countries are organized in a similar manner to the US—with clear delineations among civil, military, and commercial space industries. Furthermore, most indicate that, taking advantage of the dual use nature of much space technology, many states both non-Western and Western, are already tapping commercial and civil space capabilities for military use. Their responses suggest that a better way to frame this question might be: “Which nations outside the West are tapping into their civil (commercial and/or government run) space industry for military purposes?”
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Commercial Companies’ Perceptions of Security Space

The expert contributors suggest that commercial companies’ understanding of security is fundamentally different than that of military leaders. For both, security concerns reflect their primary interests; however, as their primary interests and goals are divergent, so are their perceptions of security and threat. When synthesizing the contributors’ responses, it becomes apparent that there is a relationship between commercial actors’ key interests, their security concerns and vulnerabilities, and their expectations regarding US government warnings and protection. This relationship is captured in Figure 1 below.
Year Published:
2018
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NSI Publication

Chinese Worldview and Perspectives on Space

Corpora from three sources were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge the Chinese government’s concerns in the space domain and how these interests are articulated with general political and cultural issues. The sources were releases from the Chinese MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2011 – 2017), stories reported by CPC (Communist Party of China) News (2013 – 2014), and two months of speeches by Chinese president Xi Jinping (2014). The primary findings from the discourse are presented as Chinese perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space

Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.
Year Published:
2017
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Allocation of Commercial Space Industry Components

Thirty-four subject matter expert (SME) contributors, the majority from the commercial space industry, responded to this question. They provided details on the commercial space activities of 17 countries and the European Space Agency (ESA). As discussed in detail in other ViTTa reports,4 it is important to recognize that the division between public and private organizations and activities is rarely clear-cut. Furthermore, as contributors have noted in their responses both to this question5 and others,6 much of the space activity outside the US is concentrated on dual-use technologies and applications. For these reasons, we define the “commercial space industry” as capabilities and activities undertaken for commercial purposes, rather than capabilities and activities undertaken by a purely commercial space actor.
Year Published:
2018
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Allied/Commercial Capabilities to Enhance Resilience

The importance of strengthening the resilience of US space capabilities is directly addressed in the 2010 National Space Policy, and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. While these documents identify resilience as central to mission assurance, they do not provide any detail on what comprises resilience in the context of US space capabilities. The 2012 DoD Directive 3100.10 is consistent with these documents and offers the following definition of resilience: The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities.
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

(Outer) Space: An Exploration of Definitional Issues

Operationalizing or defining terms is an important first step to understanding concepts, including their boundaries and how they are distinguished from other, potentially related ideas. Similarly, clarity in communication is an essential condition for ensuring that the message or information that is transmitted is as close as possible to what is received. Within the DOD, definitions matter because they are a necessary component for the establishment and application of doctrine. Given the breadth of the space field as a whole, establishing precise definitions may become an even more pressing task, as coordination is sought over a broad base of space sub-communities (e.g., national security space, civil space, and commercial). Each field as a whole and each sub-domain within it naturally has its own terminology, which tends to evolve over time. To best advance coordination within and across the various US and allied space communities, we must be capable of fruitfully combining the work that is being done in various commands, DOD offices, and other agencies and organizations. This can be best achieved when we identify those terms for which precise definitions are required in order to move forward. Doing so also enables the US to avoid any unintended responses from our adversaries. This coordination begins by getting a broad view of the terminological landscape and any terms for which there is current contention.
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Dominance in a Warfighting Domain Won’t Get Us There

Recent statements by senior national security space leaders dubbing space a “warfighting domain” and calling for US space superiority are not a sufficient foundation for achieving a stable security environment in space.
Year Published:
2017
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