Thresholds in Cyberspace

Speaker: Schneider, J. (Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

Date: 11 March 2020

Speaker Session Preview

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution, Stanford University) as a part of its SMA GeneralSpeaker Series. Dr. Schneider first stated that the creation and management of thresholds is critical to the success of US strategy. She then cited Connable et al.’s when defining a “threshold” as a “negotiated, declared, or tacitly understood delimiter between measures short of war and high-order conflict (such as full-scale conventional or nuclear war).” Dr. Schneider explained that thresholds are defined by two characteristics: the strength of the threshold (i.e., how large the space is between rungs on the escalation ladder) and the location of the threshold on the escalation ladder (low vs. high). Moreover, thresholds are constructed by perceptions of potential retaliation cost, domestic cost, and normative cost. Dr. Schneider then presented a series of characteristics that create strong thresholds, including treaties with punishment mechanisms, agreed upon definitions, and costly declarative statements (i.e., redlines). She also outlined a series of characteristics that move thresholds up the escalation ladder, including significant and measurable physical effects, gross violent effects, and high-saliency means. Next, Dr. Schneider focused on the cyber threshold. There is a threshold at the lower rung of the escalation ladder when it comes to cyber, but the US and its allies are uncertain of its strength yet, according to Dr. Schneider. Most actions of this nature have not occurred yet, and some more serious events (e.g., cyber operations with violent, strategic, or overt effects or the threat of such effects) may propel above the threshold of regular cyber attacks. The cyber threshold presents a problem as well. Strategy requires two thresholds: a lower threshold that restrains US and other state cyber activity from violent retaliation and a higher threshold that deters others from taking strategic cyber attacks against the US. The problem lies in the coexistence of these two thresholds. Dr. Schneider concluded by presenting a series of recommendations for the US to solve this problem: 1) by determining the cyber thresholds that it wants to create, 2) by becoming a “norm entrepreneur,” and 3) by increasing its resiliency and cross-domain punishment.

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