The United States Government possesses a vast store of information assets that can be leveraged to inform a variety of problem sets, and can be used by a wide range of governmental actors in the formation and execution of whole-of-government strategies. To enable this goal, however, these assets first must be made accessible in a single source that catalogues the information that is held.

The United States currently faces a complex and dynamic security environment. States are no longer the only critical actors in the international arena; rather, a diverse range of non-state entities also has the potential to affect US interests and security—for good or bad. Economic influence, information control and propaganda, political influence, and social discontent can be and are being utilized by state and non-state actors alike to achieve their goals, in many cases bypassing the need for direct military action. In response, the US military is challenged to accomplish more, across a greater variety of domains, while facing a constrained budget environment. There are two central implications of this: first, many of the most intractable security problems the US faces require a whole of government approach. Second, in a complex and evolving international environment characterized by new and often ambiguous threats, information itself is a critical asset.

Given the challenges of declining DOD budgets while improving our ability to monitor megacity populations, this white describe many of the issues facing the DOD for phase zero operations and collecting theinformation necessary should conflicts escalate.

Socio-Cultural Analysis (SCA) has evolved rapidly over the past decade as conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have forced the DOD to reappraise the techniques used to collect information about the populations in conflict zones. As these two major con- flicts wind down, the DOD must recognize that SCA must evolve again due the changing nature of phase zero operations and prepare for future conflicts. Given the challenges of declining DOD budgets while improving our SCA capabilities, the chap- ters in this white volume describe many of the issues facing the DOD for phase zero operations and collecting the socio-cultural information necessary should conflicts escalate. Most of the chapters’ discussions were heavily influenced by LTG Flynn et al.’s “Left of bang: The value of socio-cultural analysis in today’s environment” PRISM article.1 “Left of bang…” was also revised and included in the SMA/ERDC or- ganized White Volume “National Security Challenges: Insights from Social, Neurobi- ological, and Complexity Sciences.” SMA followed that effort with additional occa- sional white papers discussing the operational relevance of the social sciences2 and social science validity,3 available at http://www.nsiteam.com/publications.html. This White Volume builds on those efforts to provide a spectrum of views on the gaps on the operational use of SCA in a phase zero setting. If there is a valid criticism to be made regarding this white volume, it is that it favors researchers attempting to automate socio-cultural information processing over traditional qualitative techniques. The authors realize that the USG must understand socio-cultural situations across the entire planet to as high or higher level of fidelity than we did in Iraq and Afghani- stan: without spending equivalent resources. Collecting magnitudes more useful in- formation with a similar or smaller budget will require innovative techniques that don’t require socio-cultural experts hand massaging ALL the data into actionable information.

Cooperative security, stability operations and irregular warfare missions require a better understanding of the complex operational environment, notably through rich contextual understanding of the factors affecting stability. Further assessment, policy, and planning need to consider factors associated with institutional performance (community organizations, government ministries, legal structures, etc.) based on how societies emerge, develop, and function, as well as attributes that provide resiliency and flexibility.

The West Africa Exploitable Conditions Model (WAECM) is an empirical, concept-based, system-of systems model tailored to the region of West Africa, as defined by USAFRICOM’s interactive AOR map (https://www.africom.mil/military-presence). Developed from the AFRICOM Exploitable Conditions Model (AECM), it identifies various variables or factors (nodes) and their linkages through direct connections to one another (edges), representing the complex conditions and dynamics of the OE in West Africa.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

There are tremendous numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria and Iraq as a consequence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The IDPs are a mix of people; men, women, children and those who are radicalized into ISIS ideology and those who are not.

It is highly unlikely that a single catalyst could lead to a civil war or revolt in Jordan. Significant regime crisis in Jordan would more likely require a ‘perfect storm’ of severe popular grievance aimed at the government (including the monarchy), multiple catalysts, and the failure of the regime’s considerable sources of resilience (i.e., buffers).

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) conducted a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The SMA considered drivers of instability in the region to include long-term internally displaced persons and refugees, spread of radical ideologies and extremism, great power competition, disruptive non-state actors, and the potential for “black swan” scenarios.

The Middle Eastern region of the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) currently has approximately 20 million displaced persons, many of whom live in camps (see NSI Reachback question B3 response). These people have been uprooted, lost their livelihoods, and in many cases experienced severe trauma. These stresses place them at risk of radicalization as their frustrations and grievances increase with time. Research was conducted on counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs appropriate for use in refugee camps, returning a broad range of counter-radicalization measures, and screening and segregation protocols. Their validity, respective pros and cons, and implementation considerations are reported here. Determining the appropriate measures for protecting refugees, building community resilience, and triaging individuals who would most benefit from deradicalization programs can inform how USCENTCOM can take action, or support organizations that are engaged with deradicalization in refugee camps.

Host countries, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have the primary responsibility for the management and ongoing care of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The 12th Annual SMA Conference, entitled “The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World,” was held 21-22 May 2019 at the General Jacob E. Smart Conference Center at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. The conference theme was defined as:

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

SMA hosted a panel with Mr. Michael A. Clark (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM), Ms. Kayse Jansen (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5), Mr. James “JJ” Jenista (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD), Mr. Robert C. Jones (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group), Mr. Jimmy Krakar (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM), Ms. Lesley Kucharski (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Dr. Robert M. Toguchi (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC), Col David W. Walker (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5), and Ms. Michele K. Wolfe (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

The creation of a computational model that encapsulates the increasingly complex and overwhelming world as multiple systems that can be measured empirically could have strong implications for civilian and military decision makers. NSI Inc. and SMA are currently working on such a model that is expanding on prior research conducted by TRADOC G-2. NSI has expanded on TRADOC’s original 24 exploitable conditions to create the Global Exploitable Conditions Model (GECM) as part of the Anticipating the Future Operational Environment (AFOE) project for the US Joint Staff. Dr. Kuznar stated that while GECM is supported by a large corpus of qualitative research, a computational model has been built to empirically test it through network and system dynamics. GECM contains 17 subsystems that are comprised of 124 nodes and 829 edges where nodes connect. This model is the starting point for all of NSI’s research during the AFOE project.

Peoples’ lives can be accurately predicted by the demographics they are born into, including their gender and family’s socioeconomic status.

According to Dr. Lustick, the current dispute over the West Bank and the disputed sovereignty of the Israeli government will not end in an ideal way for any group involved. He reasoned that the Palestinian government is not a viable authority and because of this the “two states” solution, which would divide Israel, is no longer viable. Instead, the Palestinian authorities are mostly used by citizens of Arab decent to interact with Israeli authorities. The Israeli government learned early on that it could not give anything to the Palestinians, which they would accept. However, they believed that they could negotiate with Palestinian moderates, and isolate extremists.

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA CENTCOM/AFRICOM Speaker Series, entitled “The Clash of Values in the Middle East and North Africa: Islamic Fundamentalism versus Liberal Nationalism.” The speaker was Dr. Mansoor Moaddel (University of Maryland).Dr. Moaddel began his presentation with an explanation of the methodology that he used in his research, which focused on shifts in values in the Middle East and North Africa. He identified four historically significant issues that act as features of cultural warfare: 1) secular politics, 2) national identity, 3) religious tolerance, and 4) gender equality. Dr. Moaddel assessed these four factors across a variety of countries, namely Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey. He stated that secular politics act as a composite measure with four indicators: 1) separation of religion and politics, 2) desirability of a Western-type government, 3) Islamic governance, and 4) Sharia. Identity highlights the contrast between religious and national identity in Middle Eastern and North African countries. It also covers trends occurring in terms of national identity. With regards to religious tolerance, Dr. Moaddel constructed an index that posed a variety of questions aiming to measure individuals’ beliefs regarding Islam and the tolerance of other religious beliefs in Muslim-dominated regions. He constructed a similar index when examining gender equality, in which he posed five questions to individuals regarding their beliefs on equality between men and women. After conducting his research, Dr. Moaddel concluded that ideas are significantly important in bringing about a new pattern of historical development.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider (Hoover Institution, Stanford University) as a part of its SMA GeneralSpeaker Series. Dr. Schneider first stated that the creation and management of thresholds is critical to the success of US strategy. She then cited Connable et al.’s when defining a “threshold” as a “negotiated, declared, or tacitly understood delimiter between measures short of war and high-order conflict (such as full-scale conventional or nuclear war).” Dr. Schneider explained that thresholds are defined by two characteristics: the strength of the threshold (i.e., how large the space is between rungs on the escalation ladder) and the location of the threshold on the escalation ladder (low vs. high). Moreover, thresholds are constructed by perceptions of potential retaliation cost, domestic cost, and normative cost. Dr. Schneider then presented a series of characteristics that create strong thresholds, including treaties with punishment mechanisms, agreed upon definitions, and costly declarative statements (i.e., redlines). She also outlined a series of characteristics that move thresholds up the escalation ladder, including significant and measurable physical effects, gross violent effects, and high-saliency means. Next, Dr. Schneider focused on the cyber threshold. There is a threshold at the lower rung of the escalation ladder when it comes to cyber, but the US and its allies are uncertain of its strength yet, according to Dr. Schneider. Most actions of this nature have not occurred yet, and some more serious events (e.g., cyber operations with violent, strategic, or overt effects or the threat of such effects) may propel above the threshold of regular cyber attacks. The cyber threshold presents a problem as well. Strategy requires two thresholds: a lower threshold that restrains US and other state cyber activity from violent retaliation and a higher threshold that deters others from taking strategic cyber attacks against the US. The problem lies in the coexistence of these two thresholds. Dr. Schneider concluded by presenting a series of recommendations for the US to solve this problem: 1) by determining the cyber thresholds that it wants to create, 2) by becoming a “norm entrepreneur,” and 3) by increasing its resiliency and cross-domain punishment.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Adam Seligman (Boston University & Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion [CEDAR]) and Dr. David Montgomery (University of Maryland & CEDAR) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Montgomery and Dr. Seligman’s presentation focused on addressing the challenges of living with difference and identifying the tools needed to rebuild civil society. The speakers began by discussing rights and belonging. Belonging, Dr. Seligman explained, is specific, particular, and exclusive. Belonging in a community constrains how one can act in a community too. Rights, on the other hand, are generalized and framed as inclusive. Rights apply to individuals and allow one to act freely in a community as well. Dr. Seligman then spoke about boundaries and how they allow for both group (and community) cohesion and exclusion. Next, the speakers focused on political divisions forming throughout the world. Dr. Montgomery and Dr. Seligman offered a “sociological analysis of these divisions that focuses on different approaches to the problem of society as envisioned by the political left and right.”

During his presentation, Dr. Kuznar discussed his team’s findings regarding the drivers of grievance and unrest among the world’s populations, particularly as they relate to instability, terrorism, and migration. He first spoke about the primary inspiration for his team’s research: SMA’s “Age of Disruption” white paper. This white paper suggests that populations are key battlefields in global power competition, as great powers vie for the allegiance of populations, manipulate the grievances of these populations, and have objectives that can be frustrated by social unrest among these populations. He also stated that the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF) work on social unrest events and predicting instability inspired his team’s work as well. Next, Dr. Kuznar conveyed that the purpose of NSI’s aggrieved populations project was to anticipate the operational environment from 2019 to 2029 by identifying emerging regional and non-state challenges. This effort was broken up into two phases: a global analysis phase and a country-specific analysis phase. He then presented a notional graph depicting the distribution of social status and wealth of a typical society and explained the concepts of risk aversion and risk acceptance. For the remainder of his brief, Dr. Kuznar discussed his team’s results, beginning with those from his team’s global study, which included the following: 1) Political instability is driven by hunger, risk acceptant elites, the interaction of fuel export and corruption, weak democracy, mountainous terrain, economic isolation, and ethnic division; and 2) migration from undeveloped countries is driven by hunger, a youth bulge, homicide, and political oppression. He concluded by discussing the results of their country-specific study, which included the following: 1) Countries with low inequality, such as Finland, are stable; 2) countries with unusually high levels of inequality, such as Honduras and South Africa, are characterized by extremely high levels of interpersonal violence; and 3) agrarian countries have extremely high levels of inequality and consequently experience unrest in rural areas, which in turn is exacerbated by rural/urban inequalities (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Honduras, Nigeria, and Ethiopia are good examples).

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Dr. Vera Mironova (Harvard University) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. During her brief, Dr. Mironova presented the results of her December 2018-January 2019 survey of civilians and ISIS families in Mosul and its surrounding areas. Her research sought to answer the following questions: 1) What was ISIS?; 2) Why did people in Mosul support ISIS?; 3) Who is to blame for the crimes committed by ISIS?; 4) Who should be held accountable for their role in supporting ISIS?; and 5) Who deserves punishment for their support of ISIS, and what type(s) of punishment do they deserve? Dr. Mironova then highlighted some of her findings. There was a discrepancy between civilians’ (i.e., those victimized by ISIS) and ISIS families’ answers regarding whether ISIS was immediately welcomed when it moved into Mosul. Civilians and families did agree, however, that those who publicly supported ISIS in Mosul most commonly did so because they yearned for power and money. ISIS families also argued that some individuals may have joined ISIS to improve the economy, to improve law and order, to fight crime and corruption, and to fight immorality in society.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Matthew Cancian (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. During his presentation, Mr. Cancian posed the following question: Can US training improve battlefield participation of our partners? He began by defining combat motivation as “the reasons why soldiers under fire believe that they should continue fighting” and explained that combat motivation increases battlefield participation, which he defined as “attempts to defeat the enemy when under fire, as opposed to non-participation by either fleeing or hiding.”

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Thomas Sherlock (United States Military Academy at West Point) and Col E. John Gregory (US Army) as a part of its SMA Future of Global Competition and Conflict Speaker Series. In their research, Col Gregory and Dr. Sherlock examined the prospects for the future of the China-Russia relationship by surveying Chinese and Russian youths. They also aimed to determine whether common opinions are a result of political views or merely hedging behaviors.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL)) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. Mr. Liebl began by stating that Iran does not present a large military threat to the US. Moreover, Iran’s military capabilities are fairly limited, and it does not have a strong ability to sustain military power in the event of war. Regardless, in the context of this conflict, Mr. Liebl stressed the importance of viewing Iran’s actions through its own perspective.

During his presentation, Dr. Sherlock discussed a study that draws upon Russian public opinion surveys conducted over the past 2-3 years.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Hoshang Waziri (ARTIS International) and Dr. Scott Atran (ARTIS International / University of Michigan) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Jerry Hansen (Gallup) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. During his presentation, Mr. Hansen discussed Gallup’s ongoing work and highlighted its World Poll initiative.

During the Cold War era, the strategic threat against the US was clear. The country responded clearly with a policy toward the Soviet threat that centered on deterrence, containment, and mutually assured destruction. To enforce this policy, the US created a strategic triad composed of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, Trident nuclear submarines, and long-range strategic bombers. Today, however, our security environment is profoundly different.