Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

There is general consensus among the expert contributors that the strategic and operational implications of the Turkish incursion are minimal: each sees the incursion as consistent with previous Turkish policy and long-standing interests. Turkey’s activities should be viewed through the lens of its core strategic interest in removing the threat of Kurdish separatism, which at present has been exacerbated by renewed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) insurgency inside Turkey, its influence in northern Iraq, and the expansion of Kurdish territories in Syria more generally. As one commented, Turkey will prioritize itself. This means preventing the strengthening of Kurds at all costs (including indirect support to those fighting them). It also means patrolling borders, harsh treatment of those who try to get through and/or corrupt practices such as involvement in smuggling. One implication of note however is the increased risk of escalation between Turkey and Russia and Turkey and the US-backed Peoples Protection Units (YPG) that the incursion poses.

Thirty-four subject matter expert (SME) contributors, the majority from the commercial space industry, responded to this question. They provided details on the commercial space activities of 17 countries and the European Space Agency (ESA). As discussed in detail in other ViTTa reports,4 it is important to recognize that the division between public and private organizations and activities is rarely clear-cut. Furthermore, as contributors have noted in their responses both to this question5 and others,6 much of the space activity outside the US is concentrated on dual-use technologies and applications. For these reasons, we define the “commercial space industry” as capabilities and activities undertaken for commercial purposes, rather than capabilities and activities undertaken by a purely commercial space actor.

The United States’ (US) engagement of public health resources to meet the current SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) crisis has revealed vulnerabilities in testing and treatment components of biosecurity. Facing a severe shortage of available testing kits, the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) attempted to develop its own test for COVID-19, rather than following World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations for testing methods. The lack of tests has made it difficult to track exactly how many people within each state, as well as the US at-large have been affected, which has implications both for the extent of public health response, and considerations for approaches to stabilize and sustain the national economy.

The cluster of technologies associated with artificial intelligence (AI) research and development, and the implications of these technologies across the spectrum of human activity including national security, generates a blur of fast-moving technological, political, strategic, and ethical puzzles. For all their hyper-modern veneer, tracing the trajectories of historical thought associated with these puzzles offers some much-needed clarity. To this end, what follows is an overview of three relevant trajectories. While far from exhaustive, practitioners and theorists alike in national security should have a solid grounding in these thought trajectories to facilitate reasoned decisions about AI research and development.

In this paper, as part of SMA’s Invited Perspectives series, Mr. Vern Liebl indicates that ‘violent extremist organization’ (VEO) may not be an accurate term for describing modern terrorist entities. To illustrate this point, Mr. Liebl first provides a brief history of how the term ‘VEO’ entered US defense, intelligence, and law enforcement officials’ lexicon and became commonly used. He then defines what the term ‘VEO’ means and questions whether it still appropriately applies to the organizations that have been labelled as such (namely Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State).

“Influence” and “power” are foundational to how geopolitics are discussed and understood. Many American planners and policymakers are strong believers in global influence: fearing both its relative and absolute loss; seeking to “grow” and “spread” the United States’ influence; and trying to counter the influence of critical competitors such as the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jafri & Stevenson, 2019).

Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Nicholas Michelsen (King’s College, London), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Dr. Laura Roselle (Elon University), Dr. Scott Ruston (Arizona State University), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

[Q9] Are there any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against US interests, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions?

Dr. Kerry Brown (King’s College, London), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Major Christopher Culver (US Air Force Academy), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Andrew Small (German Marshall Fund), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Paul I. Bernstein (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics)

[Q8] How do China and Russia approach global, not just regional, arenas for competition?

[Q5] In which regions should the US expect significant challenges to its interests over the coming decade? What form will these challenges take (e.g., poor/instable governance, rising hegemons, aggrieved populations, violent non-state actors, external influence operations, etc.) and which US interests will these challenges most likely impact?

[Q4] How does Russia perceive the continuum of conflict? How does Russia plan for, operate within, and manage risk within the competitive space? From the Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalation management? What are the implications of those differences for senior political and military decision makers in the US?

[Q2] What kinetic (e.g., weapon systems) and non-kinetic (e.g., disinformation campaigns, financial market manipulation, political tampering) tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to undercut US interests over the coming decade?

[Q1] How will the character of global competition and conflict change over the next decade, and which emerging global trends and conditions will drive this change? What are the implications of expected future global conditions for developing integrated US strategy and plans to defend US interests over both short- and long- term timeframes?

SMA hosted a panel with Mr. Michael A. Clark (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM), Ms. Kayse Jansen (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5), Mr. James “JJ” Jenista (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD), Mr. Robert C. Jones (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group), Mr. Jimmy Krakar (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM), Ms. Lesley Kucharski (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Dr. Robert M. Toguchi (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC), Col David W. Walker (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5), and Ms. Michele K. Wolfe (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

Minerals are crucial components of advanced weapons systems, playing a pivotal role in military capability and power projection. They are increasingly integrated into new attack platforms, including Virginia-class attack submarines and long-range missiles.

On August 2, 2022, US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, Taiwan, triggering a series of Chinese military activities around the island. These activities presented an opportunity to observe how China and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might conduct a future blockade of Taiwan. Prof. Lockyer argued that China’s public display of these exercises was intentional. China sought to convey a strategic message to nations across the globe that China could implement such a blockade; therefore, Taiwan should be hesitant to take any further actions towards independence. This recent example illustrates how sea power can serve as an incredibly flexible tool and shape the strategic environment as a deterrence strategy.

The use of autonomous weapons systems is frequently debated by countries’ leadership, military personnel, and scholars because of its potentially destructive capabilities.

SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Mr. Pete Steen (Joint Staff, J5), as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series.Mr. Steen began his presentation by posing the question, “How did the pandemic affect the US economy, and what are the implications for national security?” He noted that pre-COVID, the underlying narratives that characterized the strategic environment were trade war, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), cheap money, and digital surveillance. In contrast, the post-COVID themes will likely shift to include multipolar competition and lessons on efficacy, durable damage distribution, and uneven digitization. Mr. Steen argued that there is a growing narrative that compares the US to China in terms of their effectiveness in handling the pandemic. He noted that this is an example of the ongoing competition between authoritarianism and democracy as a model for society. According to Mr. Steen, China is propagating a message that argues that the tools of authoritarianism have allowed it to manage the pandemic better than the US and democracies, more generally. This narrative reflects the competition for perceived success, not only in the healthcare realm but also in terms of the economy.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ashley Townshend (University of Sydney), Dr. David Santoro (Pacific Forum), and Dr. Brendan Thomas-Noone (University of Sydney) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Our speakers focused on the US-Australia Indo-Pacific deterrence dialogue, specifically with regards to China and conventional deterrence.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Ms. Sarah Chayes (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [CEIP]) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM (Afghanistan) Speaker Series. During her discussion, Ms. Chayes provided insights on whether there is ‘good’ corruption in Afghanistan and how corruption is understood there, based on her 10 years of experience in Kandahar. She also described how Afghans responded when she asked what corruption meant to them. Moreover, she emphasized that the degree to which ordinary citizens feel like they have input into the decision-making process and real checks on power are critical, as opposed to devolution, which would not solve the corruption problem. Ms. Chayes concluded the session by discussing how decisions are made in Afghanistan, how the Soviet invasion disrupted and altered the its former democratic structure, and how the majority of Afghanistan’s problems resulted from external actors’ involvement as opposed to internal issues.