George Popp

The Physical Defeat of ISIS video addresses if a physical defeat of ISIS fully eliminate the threat it poses? Highlighting some of the work NSI has conducted as part of a Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) team Reach Back Cell in support of USCENTCOM, this video discusses the future of ISIS.

The EUCOM video highlights work NSI did in collaboration with the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office and the US Department of Defense to apply NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to examine potential drivers of conflict and convergence in Eurasia over the next 5-25 years. For access to the full ViTTa analysis, please visit: ViTTa Analysis of Eurasia in the Next 5-25 Years.

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders prior to and during the annexation of Crimea. Putin’s leading indicators, those of Crimean leaders and the Russian-supported President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, are presented separately.

This report summarizes the input of 13 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. This input includes expert contributions from US voices as well as non-US voices from Australia, India, Italy, and the UK. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.

The experts solicited in this effort agree that there will be wide-ranging national security challenges and a few benefits arising from decreased launch costs. The challenges are largely derived from two structural changes to the space domain: more actors and a wider diversity of payloads. The subject matter experts indicate that changing commercial launch technology alters the monetary costs of the types and timing of deliverables national space programs can produce. These potential transformations of national space programs affect: military procurement patterns, environmental destruction, informational supply chains, and military space operations.

Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.

The Senturion Modeling Project Noor video provides a brief overview of the Senturion modeling and simulation effort in support of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor. For more information on Project Noor itself, please visit: Project Noor Video

The Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office hosted the 10th Annual SMA Conference on 25-26 April 2017 at Joint Base Andrews. This year’s conference, formally titled “From Control to Influence? A View of—and Vision for—the Future,” brought together a multidisciplinary group of participants to consider how the US and its allies can more effectively counter the influence that recently re-emerging, capable states (such as China and Russia) and non-state actors (such as ISIS) exert on their neighbors and/or third parties through multiple elements of power.

This report represents the views and opinions of the participants. The report does not represent official USG policy or position. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff (JS), and jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and US Government (USG) Agencies, the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team established a virtual Reach Back Cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, has provided USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region. This Panel will discuss the main findings from the SMA Reach Back Cell.

To begin with a truism, people in different places speak different languages; they belong to different cultures. This is not in dispute, but it remains a persistent operational challenge. Understanding other cultures well enough to successfully communicate and to navigate each information environment means a profound effort in putting ourselves in other cultures’ shoes—trying to understand narratives around identity, political engagement and deeply held beliefs requires looking beyond language and into the cognitive domain to gain a clearer picture of the information environment (IE).

This video is a brief overview of the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team’s Project Noor effort in support of USCENTCOM. Over the past year, the SMA Reach Back Cell has produced a vast corpus of knowledge and insight in support of key USCENTCOM questions regarding Syria and Iraq. On its own, this 1000+ page (and 50+ report) collection of documents is a valuable resource, but due to its sheer size and density, it might prove difficult to fully consume and absorb. Therefore, Project Noor seeks to provide USCENTCOM with a quicker, easier, and more effective way to search through and make effective use of this vast treasure trove of information.

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese government officials during peak times of conflict in the South China Sea from 2002 to 2016. The leading indicators and warnings for the Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments are presented separately, as well as findings regarding how their use of language reflects predominant national concerns.

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders and has the potential to provide leading indicators and reveal key issues and concerns.

Using the Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert elicitation methodology, NSI asked six leading gray zone experts whether Violent Non-state Actors (VNSAs) belong in the definition of the gray zone. However, experts were reticent to answer this question; they thought the question missed the point. The focus should not be how to define the major threats that are facing the USG, but rather how to leverage all instruments of national power to respond to them. When pushed to answer the original question, experts largely conceded that VNSAs, by themselves, do not rise to a level of significant threat in the gray zone, but are key tools used by state actors to achieve their ends. They concluded by identifying other challenges and solutions facing the USG in the gray zone.

Within United States government (USG) and Department of Defense (DoD) spheres, the gray zone is a relatively new terminology and phenomena of focus for characterizing the changing nature of competition, conflict, and warfare between actors in the evolving international system of today. Accordingly, in January 2016, General Joseph Votel (US Army) requested that the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct a study of the gray zone. The SMA team was asked to assess how the USG can diagnose, identify, and assess indirect strategies, and develop response options against associated types of gray zone challenges. More specifically, the request emphasized that if the USG is to respond effectively to the threats and opportunities presented in the increasingly gray security environment, it requires a much more detailed map of the gray zone than it currently possesses.

Since the end of the Cold War and with the advent of the new century, new geopolitical realities have emerged that have made classical wars with national military forces pitted against each other far less likely. What we are witnessing are new categories of conflict that cannot be considered full1scale wars in the classical sense but cannot be described as “peace” either. Small1scale conflicts are complemented with intense engagement in the Information and other Spheres. These will almost certainly have great implications in the legal domains as well new forms of alliances. Multiple factors have come into play for these trends to emerge. This is a story of change versus continuity, and the conference focused on what has changed since the collapse of the USSR. As such, there are structural and intellectual challenges that prevent the United States Government (USG) from adapting and thriving is this new environment.

This report explores the potential pathways associated with two hypothetical futures for the nation of Pakistan–Fragmentation and Muddling through. We started with theoretical propositions about the nature of, and points along, the pathways, tested these against historical cases, refined our characterizations of the paths, and then applied these to look at Pakistan from today forward.

This report marries contemporary social science theory, applied research, and operational experience to provide a range of perspectives on terrorism to challenge the reader to ask better, more relevant questions.

The 7th Annual Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Conference was held at Joint Base Andrews from 13-14 November 2013. The conference was focused on global megatrends and their implications in all spheres of national security. It is no exaggeration to state that the world today is a very different place than it was barely 12 years ago when the war against al Qaida and its affiliates began. As we move forward, continuing advances in various spheres such as the sociotechnical world will present both challenges and opportunities. The conference examined these and related themes and highlighted new insights from the social and neurosciences.

The Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) office provides planning support to the Combatant Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi- disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across the United States Government (USG) and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff and executed by ASD (R&E)/RFD/RRTO.

The 5th Annual Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Conference was held at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland from 29-30 November 2011. The SMA program is prioritized by the Joint Staff and executed by ASD (R&E) RFD. The focus of the SMA Conference was on influence strategies of state and non-state actors as well as the impact of the social and neurobiological sciences on key aspects of national security. The conference also hosted special sessions on geospatial applications, influence and deterrence in cyber space, and complex adaptive systems. Each session was designed to draw on diverse perspectives and insights from across the United States Government (USG), industry, and academia as well as from around the globe.

The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. The CANS software developed during this effort is designed to enhance the planning process by guiding the analyst through the process of selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques.

Over the past decade the United States Government has recognized the importance of obtaining a rich contextual understanding of the operating environment, specifically focusing on the human terrain element, when addressing the current threats facing United States security interests, at home and abroad. This emphasis reflects a desire to obtain insight into the motivations underlying others’ intended or actual participation in violence against the United States, as well as the engagement strategies and initiatives that would be effective and sustainable within a given area of interest (AOI). However, this shift in thinking requires analysts and planners to quickly develop a nuanced understanding of the AOIs in which they are working in order to systematically assess their overall stability and identify areas of strength and weakness. A holistic understanding of the operating environment makes it possible to identify critical points in the system – both for stability and instability – and target engagement strategies and initiatives accordingly. This assessment also examines not only the first-order effects, but also potential second- and third-order effects, of US actions across multiple dimensions (governing, economic, and social).,

From July through November 2015, NSI employed its Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to systematically interview 26 subject matter experts in support of a Strategic Multilayer Assessment effort to research and identify drivers of conflict and cooperation in Eurasia in the next 5-25 years. Representatives from the United States European Command (EUCOM) provided 37 questions to guide the interview effort (see Appendix A). This report summarizes SME knowledge and insights on these questions—grouped into nine chapters.

Over the past year, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)2 team employed NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) methodology to reach out to a global network of space subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, government, and national security space to elicit expert insight on 23 key questions relating to contested space operations.3 Responses were received from over 111 experts from institutions in the US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK.

The concept of strategic culture emerges in discussions of both tailored and integrated deterrence. This report examines the concept’s history, current consensus, and enduring debates about what it entails. It also proposes a model of strategic culture as a complex system.

In August 2021, many of you participated in SMA’s inaugural Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK) outreach. SEEK is SMA’s new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of our 5000+ person community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on questions of interest. We conducted two surveys as part of this inaugural SEEK—one on deterrence and strategic stability, and a second on perceptions of threats and opportunities among US competitors. Perhaps surprisingly, we found:

This Guide to Analytic Techniques, developed for SMA’s 2011 Concepts & Analysis Of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project for USSTRATCOM, is offered in response to the following question from SMA’s 2021 Reachback Effort on Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.

This report integrates key insights and lessons learned from the SMA IIJO effort about how those outside of the US government and military (i.e., non-government and private sector organizations) use messaging and communication to influence and inform. Ultimately, what emerges is a collection of best practices for effective communication. The source material for this report consists of final deliverables produced as part of the SMA IIJO effort. In particular, the findings presented in this report are largely built upon the integration of the work done as part of the IIJO Quick Looks and IIJO Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) lines of effort.

[Q4] What are relevant insights from the private sector with respect to using messaging and communication to influence and inform different audiences?

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.

There is no “one size fits all” approach to disengagement and deradicalization—disengagement and deradicalization programs should be tailored to the specific environments and individuals/groups of interest. However, analysis of historical cases of disengagement and deradicalization programs reveals what appear to be several common characteristics of programs that have demonstrated some levels of success: creating a sense of hope and purpose, building a sense of community, providing individual attention and regimented daily schedules, and ensuring sustainable, long-term commitment following completion of the program (i.e., after- care).

Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Nicholas J. Cull (University of Southern California), Dr. John Delury (Yonsei University), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Nicholas Michelsen (King’s College, London), Dr. Christopher Paul (RAND Corporation), Dr. Laura Roselle (Elon University), Dr. Scott Ruston (Arizona State University), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

[Q9] Are there any commonly valued objectives that may enable an alliance between China and Russia against US interests, or among all three nations allowing a reduction of tensions?

Dr. Kerry Brown (King’s College, London), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Major Christopher Culver (US Air Force Academy), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Peter E. Harrell (Center for a New American Security), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Derek M. Scissors (American Enterprise Institute), Andrew Small (German Marshall Fund), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Yun Sun (Stimson Center), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics), Dr. Yuval Weber (Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security), Ali Wyne (RAND Corporation), Lieutenant Colonel Maciej Zaborowski (US Central Command)

Paul I. Bernstein (National Defense University), Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Abraham M. Denmark (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Michael Fabey (Jane’s Fighting Ships), Dr. Peter Layton (Griffith University), Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (CSIS), Dr. Jahara Matisek (US Air Force), Dr. Sean McFate (National Defense University), Dr. Lukas Milevski (Leiden University), Anthony Rinna (Sino-NK), Dr. Jaganath Sankaran (University of Texas at Austin), Dr. Robert S. Spalding III (US Air Force), Dr. Michael D. Swaine (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Nicolas Véron (Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics)

[Q8] How do China and Russia approach global, not just regional, arenas for competition?

[Q7] How can the US defend its interests against regional competitors (e.g., Iran, North Korea) in ways complementary to US strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia, while not undercutting other US interests?

[Q5] In which regions should the US expect significant challenges to its interests over the coming decade? What form will these challenges take (e.g., poor/instable governance, rising hegemons, aggrieved populations, violent non-state actors, external influence operations, etc.) and which US interests will these challenges most likely impact?

[Q6] How might US allies and neutral nations be impacted by increasing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa? How might US allies and neutral nations be impacted by Russian efforts to assert its influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa?

[Q4] How does Russia perceive the continuum of conflict? How does Russia plan for, operate within, and manage risk within the competitive space? From the Russian perspective, what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalation management? What are the implications of those differences for senior political and military decision makers in the US?

[Q2] What kinetic (e.g., weapon systems) and non-kinetic (e.g., disinformation campaigns, financial market manipulation, political tampering) tactics are and will be used by competing powers domestically and abroad to undercut US interests over the coming decade?

[Q1] How will the character of global competition and conflict change over the next decade, and which emerging global trends and conditions will drive this change? What are the implications of expected future global conditions for developing integrated US strategy and plans to defend US interests over both short- and long- term timeframes?

[Q3] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to achieve final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict (i.e., what conditions would have had to occur to make that possible)?

[Q4] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime in the region including extra-regional sales? What conditions would have had to occur to make that possible?

[Q6] What are the minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region? That is, what should not be negotiated away?

This report summarizes the input of thirty-three insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider the possibility of a win-win scenario for the key actors involved with the DPRK. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

This report summarizes the input of 18 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there is anything that the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

This report summarizes the input of 12 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. The expert contributors identify factors that explain the apparent condoning of controlled marketization in North Korea, as well as factors that appear to be inhibiting broader marketization in the country. This summary first discusses the key drivers of North Korean marketization and then considers the primary inhibitors to broader North Korean marketization efforts.

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider how the US can work with its partners to contest DPRK operations. This summary details the various approaches that emerge.

[Q8] How do key actors in the Asia Pacific (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) define their key national interests / regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen by each actor to be the major threats to each interest? Are there any redlines associated with these interests?

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Population Dynamics Speaker Series. The panelists included Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University), Mr. George Popp (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia), and Mr. Thomas Rieger (NSI, Inc.). The moderator was Ms. Sarah Canna (NSI, Inc.).