Report on Building US Responses to Russia’s Threats to use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons – A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinkmanship

Speaker: Krista S. Langeland (Deputy Lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative; Senior Physical Scientist); Mr. Clinton Reach (RAND)

Date: 16 January 2024

Speaker Session Summary

Vladimir Putin expected a quick Russian victory after ordering the invasion of Ukraine. However, the war has prolonged, and there is now a possibility that Ukraine might achieve a military victory. A Ukrainian victory would not only be a military disaster for Putin but also a significant symbolic defeat, raising concerns that he might exhaust all available resources and potentially resort to using a nuclear weapon. Dr. Langeland and Mr. Reach based their presentation on their recent report, examining Russian nuclear deterrence through the lens of game theory. Dr. Langeland described game theory as a tool to represent strategic interactions between actors, noting that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine provided the research team with a timely case study to apply their ongoing research on what happens when the US crosses an adversary’s “red lines.”

Mr. Reach detailed Russia’s available nuclear doctrine, including its publicly available doctrine that describes the four conditions that would warrant a first strike from Russia. He also identified both likely and unlikely targets of a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine. He suggested that Russia has deliberately created some nuclear ambiguity regarding Ukraine to enhance its own deterrence activities. The presenters outlined three game theory designs used to examine Russian and US strategic decision-making: 1) the chicken game, 2) asymmetric deterrence, and 3) an extended game for retaliation options. Some of the researchers’ final observations include, but are not limited to, emphasizing the high stakes for the US in the conflict, which could deter Russian nuclear escalation but presents challenges for US policymakers. Additionally, doing nothing or not sending clear messages to Russia gives Russia the ability to move first, providing it with a distinct advantage.

Speaker Session Recording

Briefing Materials

Report: Building U.S. Responses to Russia’s Threats to Use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinkmanship | RAND

Biographies:

Krista Langeland is a physical scientist at the RAND Corporation focusing on developing frameworks and models for strategic development and decision making support. Her recent work at RAND focuses on policy and strategy in the space domain, including deterrence in space, building cooperation with allies, assessing adversary perceptions, and examining escalation dynamics. She leverages a wide set of tools and techniques for her analysis, including game theoretic and behavioral modeling, event tree analysis, risk assessments, and network analysis. She has developed frameworks to support decision making in a number of different areas, including examining the potential impact of space technology investments and assessing possible approaches for increasing resilience in the space domain. Since joining RAND, her research has supported technology assessments and policy development through a wide variety of focus areas that include 21st century deterrence, advanced sensing technology, space situational awareness, design principles for technological innovation, optimization of data value, nuclear systems and sustainment, and organizational resiliency. Prior to joining RAND, she received her Ph.D. in materials science from the California Institute of Technology, where she studied methods for enhancing the performance of thin-film silicon solar cells via waveguiding and sub-wavelength metallic scattering surface structures.

Clinton Reach is an International Defense Researcher at RAND. He graduated from Kansas State University with a Bachelor’s degree in Management Information Systems and a Master’s degree in Political Science. He also holds a Master’s degree in Russian and Eurasian studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS. Clint served for nine years in the U.S. Navy as a Russian linguist in various positions at the National Security Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. During his time in the Navy, he participated in New Start Treaty inspections, deployed to Baghdad to provide intelligence support to the Army during the Iraqi “Surge,” and was sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to defuse a situation involving a Russian-speaking detainee. In 2014, Clint received the Navy Language Professional of the Year award. Prior to joining RAND in 2015, Clint worked for a short time at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy – Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.