This case study elucidates the dynamics of Gray Zone conflict with particular emphasis on the role of non- state actors. It does so through a detailed examination of the most recent phase (2002-present) of Colombia’s internal conflict (1964-present). More specifically, this research analyzes conflict dyads occurring between different types of conflict actors. It further examines which types of dyads leverage which instruments of power and to what extent activities are Gray versus Black or White across each type of dyad and instrument of power. Consequently, this research will help practitioners determine which instruments of power warrant careful consideration in Gray Zone conflicts depending on the types of actors engaged in conflict. This investigation will also aid Special Operations Forces in determining which types of belligerents may make effective partners and which instruments of power they should train and equip these partners to implement.

Question (R2 #5): What are potential unanticipated complications or reactions (or “black swans”) with respect to defeating ISIL in al-Raqqah?

This case study is intended to highlight the dynamics of Gray Zone conflict in Libya since 2014. It places specific emphasis on the roles of non‐state actors within the conflict and how these actors utilize different levels of power to achieve their aims. With a focus on analyzing the dyadic relationships between various types of conflict actors, this research examines which types of dyads employ which instruments of power, as well as to what extent these activities fall within the Gray Zone of conflict as opposed to the more precisely delineated Black and White arenas. This research aims to assist practitioners and policy makers in determining how the types of actors involved in a conflict can influence which instruments of power deserve special consideration in that conflict. This investigation will also aid Special Operations Forces (SOF) in determining which types of belligerents may make effective partners depending on the type of adversary faced, and which instruments of power SOF should train and equip these partners to implement.

The current case study analyzes the presence and importance of Gray Zone conflict dynamics and the employment of various instruments of power during the still ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas) since its beginning in 2014. More specifically, it studies the use of various instruments of power across a number of conflict dyads, present in the conflict. The case study’s findings can better inform practitioners and analysts about the presence, content, and effectiveness of utilizing different instruments of power in the Gray Zone.

The author of this report is Barnett S. Koven, Senior Researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Questions about this report should be directed to Barnett S. Koven at bkoven@start.umd.edu.

At the request of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) the J-39 Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Branch undertook a Coordinator’s Mission Review in July 2014 and concluded it in February 2015. This SMA project resulted in an unprecedented collaborative effort among over one hundred subject-matter experts from numerous organizations across the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Departments and Intelligence Agencies, Academia, Think Tanks, and Private Industry. The work of these subject- matter experts is summarized in this white paper.

This report explores the potential pathways associated with two hypothetical futures for the nation of Pakistan–Fragmentation and Muddling through. We started with theoretical propositions about the nature of, and points along, the pathways, tested these against historical cases, refined our characterizations of the paths, and then applied these to look at Pakistan from today forward.

Cooperative security, stability operations and irregular warfare missions require a better understanding of the complex operational environment, notably through rich contextual understanding of the factors affecting stability. Further assessment, policy, and planning need to consider factors associated with institutional performance (community organizations, government ministries, legal structures, etc.) based on how societies emerge, develop, and function, as well as attributes that provide resiliency and flexibility.

This report evaluates how crisis actors respond to adversary actions in the early stages of an international crisis. We specifically consider the first three stages of a crisis: the trigger act from a challenger, the response act from the defender state which has been triggered, and then the counter-response

Public health experts often approach “deterrence”—or prevention of behaviors and/or decisions that adversely affect health outcomes—by considering the many factors that influence health behaviors and decision-making. These factors, often called “health determinants,” can be divided into three levels: micro- (individual), meso- (social/community), and macro- (systems). Interventions to influence health-related decision-making at each level have been developed, tested, and refined for a variety of public health deterrence efforts.

This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia?

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

The concept of strategic culture emerges in discussions of both tailored and integrated deterrence. This report examines the concept’s history, current consensus, and enduring debates about what it entails. It also proposes a model of strategic culture as a complex system.

Coming soon!

There is no “one size fits all” approach to disengagement and deradicalization—disengagement and deradicalization programs should be tailored to the specific environments and individuals/groups of interest. However, analysis of historical cases of disengagement and deradicalization programs reveals what appear to be several common characteristics of programs that have demonstrated some levels of success: creating a sense of hope and purpose, building a sense of community, providing individual attention and regimented daily schedules, and ensuring sustainable, long-term commitment following completion of the program (i.e., after- care).

The US government’s objectives of protecting its security interests and promoting democratic ideals abroad sometimes coincide (e.g., Ukraine), while at other times, they appear at odds. The US spends billions of dollars per year on foreign aid to support democratic values and human rights efforts. However, it also gives large amounts of aid and support to countries that have weakening democracies, human rights issues, or full autocracies in the name of national and regional security. The US has encountered this dilemma since the Cold War and the Reagan administration, Mr. Press stated. During this time, the US viewed supporting democratic values as pivotal while also partnering with oppressive autocracies like Chile to combat the USSR. The three major drivers of this dilemma in recent years, according to Mr. Press, include a) the US’s interest in maintaining stability in the MENA region, b) countering violent extremist organizations, and c) managing strategic competition with China.

Combatants’ willingness to fight and sacrifice their lives, family, or personal property has altered the expected outcome of military conflicts throughout history. An opponent’s unexpected will to fight has affected the US in many of its regional conflicts, such as Vietnam and Korea. Recent conflicts in Iraq and Ukraine have further demonstrated that leaders in the US and other countries have a poor understanding of what constitutes a combatant’s will to fight and its effects on the battlefield. Most research to understand populations utilize mass survey data collection, which lacks the scientific rigor that analytical study of this topic requires. The research by Artis International uses online tools and social media, brain scans, and in-person interviews to understand what affects individuals’ will to fight. The studies focus on right-wing nationalists in Spain, jihadist fighters, and Ukrainian soldiers defending their homeland.

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Lt Col Ray Rounds (US Air Force) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. During his presentation, Lt Col Rounds argued that international arms transfers are not just economic exchanges or transfers of goods, but also crucial parts of larger state-to-state relationships. To begin, he presented his primary research question: Under what conditions are states willing to accept the inefficiencies and costs associated with sourcing change?

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series. Dr. Mastro first explained the motivation behind her research. The US does not have a good understanding of how to end conflicts or how to bring enemies to the negotiating table, according to Dr. Mastro. Moreover, individuals often have varying views on how to best get an enemy to agree to talks. Therefore, Dr. Mastro sought to answer the following question: After a war breaks out, what factors influence belligerents’ decisions about whether to talk to the enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? She defined diplomatic posture as “a belligerent’s willingness to engage in direct talks with its enemy at a given point in a war,” and explained that there are two types of diplomatic posture: open (where the warring party is willing to talk directly with the enemy in a given period of time unconditionally) and closed (where either the warring party is unwilling to talk directly to the enemy or is unwilling to do so unless preconditions are met). When conducting her research, Dr. Mastro examined every war fought since World War II and recognized that 1) there is a near universal tendency to have a period at the beginning of a war where there is only fighting and no talking; 2) states’ diplomatic posture varies over time and over conflicts; 3) expected strategic costs of conversation determine diplomatic posture; 4) when leaders’ cost valuation is high, they chose closed diplomatic postures; 5) when leaders’ cost valuation is low, they chose open diplomatic postures; and 6) states will only go to the negotiating table when/strategic costs are determined by likelihood of adverse inference and the enemy’s ability to respond given adverse inference. Dr. Mastro also provided a historic case study—China during the Korean War—to bring forth several of the conclusions she derived from her research. To conclude, Dr. Mastro provided a series of recommendations, including that US policymakers and defense planners must 1) rethink the US’s approach to wartime diplomacy, 2) integrate diplomats into contingency planning, and 3) rethink the role of mediators.

“FMSO Review of Selected Operational Environment Watch (OE Watch) Articles”

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Robert Angevine (Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)), Mr. Clark Frye (IDA), and Mr. John Warden (IDA) as a part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Angevine first explained that he and his colleagues conducted this research due both to shared topical interest and the lack of sufficient attention being paid to the lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict. Moreover, they argued that other efforts conducted by the Military Services and others to collect lessons from the conflict in Ukraine are notable, but generally cluster in two categories: geo-political and tactical/technical. Consequently, the current research effort was conducted in order to develop lessons in the broad middle ground, focusing on the operational level.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by LTC Stephen Battle (US 8th Army at Camp Humphreys – Republic of Korea) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. LTC Battle’s presentation focused on his thesis, which studies historical social movements in order to “determine a prioritized set of processes and network-based nodal relationships that can be used by both strategists during the planning processes and tacticians during the execution phase of campaigns that seek to achieve strategic aims of the US government.” He also highlighted his work’s application to the current US-China-Russia competitive environment.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Thomas Sherlock (United States Military Academy at West Point) and Col E. John Gregory (US Army) as a part of its SMA Future of Global Competition and Conflict Speaker Series. In their research, Col Gregory and Dr. Sherlock examined the prospects for the future of the China-Russia relationship by surveying Chinese and Russian youths. They also aimed to determine whether common opinions are a result of political views or merely hedging behaviors.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jennifer Kavanagh (RAND) and Dr. Bryan Frederick (RAND) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. During their presentation, Dr. Frederick and Dr. Kavanagh presented their research, which synthesizes the results of multiple RAND Arroyo projects that focus on the characteristics of successful military interventions. Their research focused on three areas: 1) background (Where and when has the US historically intervened? On what scale?), 2) determinants of success (What objectives has the US pursued? How successful have interventions been? What factors influence the likelihood of success?), and 3) operational requirements (How quickly do forces need to be prepared to deploy in interventions?

Ms. Robinson focused her presentation on a recent RAND report that examined the practice of political warfare during the Cold War (using George Kennan’s definition as a basis) and similar types of activities today. She first outlined Kennan’s definition of political warfare and then explained how her work applied additional rigor to this definition.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by MAJ Thomas Doherty (US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)) and MAJ Robert McBride (USASOC) as a part of its SMA NDU Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jessica Liao (North Carolina State University) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by CW4 Nickolas Bidoli (US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)) as a part of its SMA NDU Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Jerry Hansen (Gallup) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. During his presentation, Mr. Hansen discussed Gallup’s ongoing work and highlighted its World Poll initiative.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Mazarr spoke about a recent RAND study, entitled “What Deters and Why: Assessing Requirements for Effective Deterrence.”

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Daniel Altman (Georgia State University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.