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SMA Publications (Tagged: Nuclear)

SMA Publication

The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Deterrence Among Three to Twelve Nuclear Powers: Fundamental Instability and Mitigation Strategy

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike. Additionally, bilateral arms control measures (norms, treaties, protocols, institutions) provide additional stability. The problem with multicountry nuclear deterrence is that there are no levels of armaments that can support stable deterrence relations among three or more adversaries; except in cases when adversaries coalesce into two alliances, in which case the system reduces to bilateral nuclear deterrence. This paper approaches this problem through formal methods and conceptualizes a solution involving an ensemble of military and politico-diplomatic strategies which, when operating as an enhanced international security regime, can mitigate the fundamental instability of the current multicountry nuclear deterrence system.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Part 3 Encourage Regional Stability

This is Part 3 of a 9 part series of SMA Reach back responses to questions posed by USCENTCOM. Each report contains responses to multiple questions grouped by theme. At the request of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff, jointly with other elements in the JS, Services, and U.S. Government (USG) Agencies, has established a SMA virtual reach-back cell. This initiative, based on the SMA global network of scholars and area experts, is providing USCENTCOM with population based and regional expertise in support of ongoing operations in the Iraq/Syria region.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Analytic Techniques for Nuclear Strategy Analysis

The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. The CANS software developed during this effort is designed to enhance the planning process by guiding the analyst through the process of selecting appropriate alternate analytic techniques.
Year Published:
2011
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SMA Publication

Attribute Tradeoff Model (ATOM) for Force Posturing

Given New Start, the Administration’s interest in “nuclear zero” and a budget-constrained environment, analysts are likely to receive greater numbers of requests for comparison of the capacity of various force postures and structures to achieve nuclear policy goals. At present, no theoretically grounded and systematic method exists for comparing how well specific (attribute- based) force postures support specific policy objectives. In the nuclear context, the central policy objectives identified by the Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy CANS project are strategic stability, counter proliferation, deterrence, assurance and defeat.
Year Published:
2011
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SMA Publication

Concepts and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy

This paper reports the theoretical review and framework development conducted by the STRATCOM/J-5 “Concept and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) Theory Team. It reports the theoretical review and framework development with two goals in mind:
Year Published:
2011
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SMA Publication

Avoiding Self-Deterrence in the Context of Nuclear Ambiguity

The context of this Report has to do with Russia’s use of nuclear ambiguity and implied nuclear threats leading up to and after its invasion of Ukraine—specifically, threats to escalate to the use of low-yield nuclear weapons to support conventional offensive operations for political or economic gains. It examines the implications of Russia’s behavior beyond the Ukraine conflict, in particular, what lessons might other actors have taken away from the Ukraine war regarding the utility of threatening the use of low-yield nuclear weapons. We have intentionally cast a wide net to include a diverse set of perspectives on a range of actors. More specific questions of interest for this volume include, among others:
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Russian Leadership Values and Regional Goals in the Arctic

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” Table 1 outlines seven areas in which the Russian leadership holds key values in the Arctic and High North. It offers a rough range of things/interests that the West could threaten in order to deter Russian aggression. The most important are outlined below in the text below.
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

United States Deterrence Policy: 1944-Present

This literature review analyzes the evolution of US deterrence theory and policy from 1945 to the present day. It is organized into five “waves” representing different eras:
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Evolution of Deterrent Thinking in USSR and Russia: A Look through Military Reports

This comprehensive qualitative analysis examines the evolution of Russian articulations of deterrence by analyzing over 250 Russian military documents spanning from the Soviet era to the present. The research identifies seven periods that reflect paradigmatic shifts in the intellectual discourse of Russian military strategists regarding deterrence. These periods are not rigidly defined but serve as markers for transformations in military thinking. The analysis is supported by insights from relevant academic literature.
Year Published:
2025
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SMA Publication

Key Factors in Crisis Escalation

Over the past decade, the nature of international conflict has increasingly turned away from state-versus-state warfare becoming, instead, typified as relatively low-level crises. Different authors and institutionshave characterized this as gray zone warfare, hybrid warfare, or competition-short-of-war. The tools (i.e.,courses of action) used in this deliberately ambiguous space between war and peace have ranged from trade restrictions to information operations to the use of proxies in attempts to overthrow a government or aggressive maneuvers of military assets at or around contested geographic areas.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

CONCESSIONS TO THE LIMITED POWERS: Considerations of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Asymmetrical Capability, and Extended Deterrence

Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Integrated Deterrence Reachback Study

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Moloch, the Meta-Crisis, and Integrated Nuclear Deterrence

This project examines global perspectives on evolving nuclear challenges and deterrence approaches by analyzing discourse across media, arms control experts, and social platforms in major nuclear-armed nations. Using computational analysis and qualitative coding, it compiles insights from news articles, arms control blogs, and Twitter commentary over the past decade. The goal is to gain an expansive view of public conversations regarding nuclear weapons issues to inform strategic planning and assessment of the strategic environment. By compiling diverse qualitative data points, the project aims to identify areas of alignment and mismatch between official deterrence policies and public discourse that could illuminate whether existing strategies sufficiently account for media, arms control experts, and public perceptions of emergent risks. The key findings include:
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Irregular Warfare

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.
Year Published:
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SMA Publication

Russian Nuclear Rhetoric 2014-2023: Transatlantic Differences in Threat Perception

After decades of discourse on disarmament and non-proliferation, the war in Ukraine has effectively marked the return of nuclear weapons to both mainstream public rhetoric and military-policy planning, and highlighted the growing importance of strategic deterrence. Russia’s progressively more intense nuclear saber-rattling over the past decade is partly due to an updated NATO posture and gradual commitments by Western nuclear powers to update their arsenals.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Chinese Strategic Deterrence Frameworks

China does not have an overarching deterrence framework. However, it is possible to identify the primary objects of Chinese deterrence and describe the Chinese playbook. China’s core strategic aims consist of deterring 1) a nuclear attack; 2) conventional, space, and cyber-attacks; and 3) outside efforts to encourage secession or political unrest. Nuclear deterrence has traditionally taken the approach that a secure second-strike capability is sufficient to prevent an adversary from threatening first use.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Russian Strategic Deterrence Frameworks

This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia?
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

Tri-polar Deterrence

During the cold war the conventional wisdom was that an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union was all but precluded. The key to this strategic nirvana was a carefully calibrated balance of strategic weapons and the high costs associated with nuclear conflict. The policy that was credited tobringing this state of affairs about was labeled Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. Each side threatened to obliterate the other if it were attacked.
Year Published:
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SMA Publication

SMA SEEK Results: Expanding US Nuclear Capability & Pessimism About Nuclear Use in the Next 15 Years

In August 2021, many of you participated in SMA’s inaugural Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK) outreach. SEEK is SMA’s new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of our 5000+ person community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on questions of interest. We conducted two surveys as part of this inaugural SEEK—one on deterrence and strategic stability, and a second on perceptions of threats and opportunities among US competitors. Perhaps surprisingly, we found:
Year Published:
2022
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SMA Publication

SMA 21st Century Strategic Challenges: Strategy and Planning for Diterrence and Triterrence

This NSI Reachback report is part of an effort requested by USSTRATCOM to the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Office, Joint Staff (J39). The essence of the question is how to develop an approach for assessing and developing strategy in the current environment.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

China’s Historical Plutonium Production

In this paper, we reevaluate China’s production of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) in order to estimate the maximum number of nuclear weapons using WGPu that China could build.† This WGPu was produced in the 801 Reactor at the 404 Plant in Gansu Province (or the 404 Plant reactor) and the 821 Plant reactor in Sichuan Province. Both are graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled production reactors that began operation in late 1966 and late 1973, respectively, and both have been shut down for decades (with the date of termination at issue between different authors). We know of no openly available information indicating that China has resumed WGPu production elsewhere.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Guide to Analytic Techniques for Nuclear Strategy Analysis

This Guide to Analytic Techniques, developed for SMA’s 2011 Concepts & Analysis Of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project for USSTRATCOM, is offered in response to the following question from SMA’s 2021 Reachback Effort on Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Modeling Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure

George Mason University (GMU) worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to model risk of strategic deterrence failure, identify potential indicators and factors the U.S. and its partners can influence, and explain this risk to members of Congress and other organizations in a position to influence strategies to protect against a catastrophic strategic deterrence failure. The model examines strategic deterrence risk using an adversary restraint-centric course of action (COA) selection approach that decomposes into two primary causes of deterrence failure: (1) Adversary perceived need to act (adversely to U.S. interests) and (2) adversary perceived advantage after executing the COA and experiencing a likely U.S. response. The strength of this approach is that by understanding the adversary’s perceived need to act due to a scenario, the U.S. and its partners can take steps to influence selection of a COA that meets the adversary’s need to act but does not undermine U.S. vital interests or national survival. Recognizing that the U.S. may have limited control of the scenario, the report further decomposes the risk factors to suggest Adversary COA selection Causal Factors that the U.S. can influence as a means to deter critically unacceptable actions from a U.S. perspective. It also describes an approach to identify indications and warnings of an impending situation that could lead an adversary to contemplate courses of action posing threats to U.S. vital interests or national survival.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Challenge of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Western Air Supremacy as One Russian Justification for NSNW

Significant and enduring US/NATO advantages in aircraft and precision-guided munitions drives the Russian need for a varied and large stock of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). NATO nations, particularly those on the eastern periphery of the alliance, perceive a need for this defensive air combat capability to ensure their security. Russia views events – such as the Kosovo War and Desert Storm – as validating its fear that these capabilities could be used offensively against it. Moreover, for historical and geographical reasons, Russia is apprehensive about threats all along its dynamic European border. Against large numbers of truly fifth-generation F-22s and F-35s, backed by fourth-plus-generation F- 15EXs and Block III F-18E/Fs, Russian air defenders will likely experience high early attrition rates in a military conflict. The United States is expected to retain this advantage well into the future, as it is already flight testing is latest sixth-generation fighter aircraft. Based on this firm sense of technological and numerical inferiority, Russian political and military leadership perceives the need for a range of non- strategic nuclear capabilities.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Escalatory Attraction of Limited Nuclear Employment For Great Power Competitors of the United States

The United States has entered into a dangerously new era in which, for the first time in our nation’s history, we now face two nuclear-armed great power competitors. Over the past three decades, while the United States has been focused on a variety of other national security challenges, Russia and China have observed the “US way of war” and made immense strides to position themselves to successfully counter that. While having achieved some level of success in closing the gap across a wide spectrum of military capabilities and operational realities, those two nuclear-armed peers have concluded not only that limited nuclear employment might be required in any conflict with the United States, but that this is a domain of conflict and level of escalation affording unique advantage for them since it is an area in which the US has neither the perceived will nor the perceived capabilities to compete. This paper discusses that “escalatory attraction” of limited nuclear employment for our great power competitors.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Invited Perspective: Anticipating the Effects of Emerging Technologies on Nuclear Deterrence

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence depends upon mutual confidence in second-strike capabilities – for nuclear deterrence to work, nuclear-armed competitors must all believe that each can absorb a first strike and still return a nuclear response. Emerging technologies being pursued by US competitors that enhance their ability to locate, track, and target nuclear assets, and those that can be used to compromise or to damage components of nuclear communication, command, and control (NC3) erode second-strike and put at risk the future deterrent effectiveness of US strategic forces. The United States can guard against this outcome by modernizing its air- and sea-based nuclear assets, developing resilient and redundant cyber defenses, and actively pursuing international agreements that limit the deleterious effects of ISR and that prohibit kinetic or cyber attacks on terrestrial and satellite-based components of NC3.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

12th Annual SMA Conference- The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World

The 12th Annual SMA Conference, entitled “The Evolving Anatomy of Conflict in a Dynamically Changing World,” was held 21-22 May 2019 at the General Jacob E. Smart Conference Center at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland. The conference theme was defined as:
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Negotiating with the Leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Inferences from Thematic Content Analysis

The UBC research group assessed psychological processes of six DPRK leaders, including Kim Jong-un, using thematic content analysis for integrative complexity and motive imagery, and Profiler Plus® computer-scored measures of Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE), Distrust, and Self-Confidence. Despite some individual differences, in general the leaders were low in complexity, higher in power motivation than other motives, and high in BACE and distrust. This pattern indicates closed-mindedness, rigid thinking and planning, lack of perceptiveness in considering or trusting outsiders’ viewpoints and goals, a need for rapid and definite closure, and low probability of negotiating mutual concessions or flexibility in interaction. When under increased tension, the DPRK leaders’ profiles showed even higher distrust and need for power, somewhat increased affiliation need, and reduced motivation for achievement. These patterns indicate a low likelihood of significant changes of basic beliefs, motives, and strategies, despite possible overt assertions of such changes.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Korea Strategic Outcomes

The GMU Korean Peninsula strategic outcomes project sought viable political-military options to achieve U.S. strategic objectives with respect to the Korean Peninsula, and examined whether executing these options will introduce risk to other regional U.S. objectives. Timed Influence Net (TIN) models were used to identify potential sources of strategic risk for the United States, and to develop a framework for use by operational planning teams. The TIN model started with possible end-states and examined influence factors that could contribute or undermine attainment of the end-state of interest—in this case Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization (FFVD). The model explored possible intermediate states that would be likely to occur on a path towards FFVD denuclearization and also considered potential US and partner influence factors that could contribute to the intermediate and end-states. Experiments suggest that denuclearization, if achieved, will require many years to implement and the achievement of political, economic, and military accommodations that seem improbable today.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) of Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula- Part 1: Key Findings

This paper reports a number of the top-level findings from the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Strategic Outcomes in the Korean Peninsula project requested by the Joint Staff and USINDOPACOM. They are based on an integration of the results of the eleven different analytic efforts included in the project.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Necessary Conditions For Achieving FFVD Without Militarized Conflict – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q3] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to achieve final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) of the DPRK without resorting to militarized conflict (i.e., what conditions would have had to occur to make that possible)?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Conditions Conducive to Enforcing a Non-Proliferation Regime in the Asia Pacific Region – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q4] Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime in the region including extra-regional sales? What conditions would have had to occur to make that possible?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Achieving a Stable Regional Order in the Asia Pacific: What Does the US Need and What Should It Not Negotiate Away – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q6] What are the minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region? That is, what should not be negotiated away?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Is There A Win-Win Scenario for the Key Actors Concerned with the DPRK? – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

This report summarizes the input of thirty-three insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider the possibility of a win-win scenario for the key actors involved with the DPRK. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Narratives Before & After the 2018 North Korea- United States Summit: An Analysis of Chinese and Russian News Media Coverage of Events on the Korean Peninsula

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Approaches and Measures to Stabilizing the Korean Peninsula – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

This report summarizes the input of 18 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there is anything that the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Speaker Series (Tagged: Nuclear)

SMA Speaker Series

China’s Nuclear Modernization and Its Implications

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Tong Zhao (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
February 23, 2022
Tong Zhao
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Entanglement: The Growing Threat to Command and Control

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. James Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as a part of its SMA Space Speaker Series. Dr. Acton’s talk focused on two findings: 1) Nuclear weapons and their command-and-control (C3I) systems are becoming increasingly entangled with non nuclear capabilities, and 2) many of the satellites used for nuclear C3I are dual-use and are increasingly becoming vulnerable to damage during a conflict involving either nuclear or non nuclear weapons.
April 19, 2018
Dr. James Acton
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SMA Speaker Series

Russian Nuclear Strategy after the Cold War

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Ms. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard (Center for International Security and Cooperation [CISAC] at Stanford University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Ms. Ven Bruusgaard began the session by providing reasons why studying Russian nuclear strategy is important. She introduced the four iterations of Russian declaratory nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War (occurring in 1993, 2000, 2010, and 2014), identifying their major features and changes across versions.
April 17, 2018
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard
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SMA Speaker Series

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Matt Kroenig (Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Kroenig began the session by posing the question “What kind of nuclear posture does the United States need to protect itself and its allies?”
March 30, 2018
Dr. Matt Kroenig
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SMA Speaker Series

Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

SMA hosted a panel with Mr. Michael A. Clark (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM), Ms. Kayse Jansen (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5), Mr. James “JJ” Jenista (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD), Mr. Robert C. Jones (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group), Mr. Jimmy Krakar (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM), Ms. Lesley Kucharski (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Dr. Robert M. Toguchi (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC), Col David W. Walker (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5), and Ms. Michele K. Wolfe (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
January 25, 2023
Clark, M. (Director for Acquisition and Technology (J9), USCYBERCOM); Jansen, K. (Branch Chief, Deterrence Analysis and Outreach, Plans and Policy Directorate, USSTRATCOM/J5); Jenista, J. (Air Force Civilian, Joint Training, Exercise, and Wargaming Directorate (J7), USNORTHCOM & NORAD); Jones, R. (Senior Strategist, USSOCOM J5-JSOU Donovan Integration Group); Krakar, J. (Academic Coordinator, USEUCOM); Kucharski, L. (Analyst, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory); Toguchi, R. (Chief, Concepts Division, Force Modernization Directorate (FMD), USASOC); Walker, D. (Policy Division Chief, USCENTCOM CCJ5); Wolfe, M. (Senior Operations Research Analyst, USAFRICOM)
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence Among Three to Twelve Nuclear Powers: Fundamental Instability and Mitigation Strategy

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike.
June 27, 2024
Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (George Mason University)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries.
November 11, 2021
Bragg, B
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SMA Speaker Series

Assessing Deterrence: Understanding Adversary Behaviour and Their Perception of our Behaviour

For Western allies to properly deter unwanted Russian actions, there must be a shared allied perception of Russian threats and behaviors.
April 8, 2025
Catherine Royle
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SMA Speaker Series

Strategic Stability and Emerging Russian and Chinese Technologies

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Juljan Krause (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation), Dr. Kimberly Peh (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Dr. Spenser Warren (Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
March 20, 2025
Dr. Juljan Krause, Dr. Kimberly Peh, and Dr. Spenser A. Warren
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Deterrence in a Two-peer World: Implications for Europe

Speaker: Dr. Max Hoell (Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory).
February 27, 2025
Dr. Max Hoell
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence and escalation maneuver in a two-peer environment: Developing a new escalation management strategy for the United States

Saudi Arabia and Iran have a deeply rooted rivalry stemming from their contrasting visions for the future of their individual nations and the broader Middle East.
January 8, 2025
Karim Sadjadpour
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SMA Speaker Series

Dynamic Parity: The Nuclear Strategy We Need

Russia, China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are expanding their nuclear capabilities relative to the United States.
October 24, 2024
Adam Lowther, PhD and Curtis McGiffin
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SMA Speaker Series

How Innovative is China in Nuclear Power?

Analysts have long debated China’s capacity to innovate within its industry and economy. Mr. Ezell presented compelling evidence that China is not only more innovative than most analysts predict, but that its nuclear industry is particularly advanced.
September 10, 2024
Stephen Ezell
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SMA Speaker Series

Shades of Grim: Scenarios for Ukraine and Global Order

The ongoing war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and its outcome is widely debated among politicians, researchers, and military practitioners.
July 16, 2024
Luis Simón and Lotje Boswinkel
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SMA Speaker Series

Arms Control Opportunities in the Emerging Two-nuclear-peer Environment

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is increasingly critical to international security, particularly concerning long-standing nuclear-capable adversaries like Russia and China. Both nations have significant geopolitical and security considerations that make bilateral nuclear arms control agreements with the United States unlikely.
May 14, 2024
Amy F. Woolf
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SMA Speaker Series

Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

The changing nuclear rhetoric and actions from Russian leadership during the Ukraine War has put US and Western leaders on edge. Mr. Lokker, in his latest article co-authored for CNAS entitled “Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat,” discusses the implications of evolving Russian nuclear discourse and actions.
April 17, 2024
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
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SMA Speaker Series

Extended Deterrence Across the Continuum of Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, US extended deterrence has undergone significant evolution, initially appearing to diminish in importance with the perceived decrease in the need for a robust nuclear arsenal following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
February 20, 2024
Dr. Maximilian Hoell
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SMA Speaker Series

North Korea in Regional—and Global—Multi-body Nuclear Strategy

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Markus Garlauskas (Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council) and Dr. Lauren Sukin (The London School of Economics and Political Science) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
February 8, 2024
Markus Garlauskas and Lauren Sukin
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SMA Speaker Series

Building U.S. Responses to Russia’s Threats to Use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinksmanship

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Krista S. Langeland (Deputy Lead, RAND Space Enterprise Initiative; Senior Physical Scientist) and Mr. Clinton Reach (RAND) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
January 16, 2024
Krista Langeland and Clinton Reach
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SMA Speaker Series

AI and the Bomb

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. James Johnson (University of Aberdeen) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
October 27, 2023
Dr. James Johnson
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SMA Speaker Series

The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War

SMA hosted a speaker session with Professor Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky (School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University) as part of its SMA “Strategic Deterrence Frameworks” (SDF) Speaker Series.
January 23, 2024
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky
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SMA Speaker Series

British and French Nuclear Thinking in the ‘Three Body Problem’ Era

France and Britain are part of a Western democratic alliance; however, they have developed their own unique perspectives on nuclear deterrence, issues such as the three-body problem, and how to best confront Russian aggression. Both speakers, Dr. Tertais and Professor Chalmers, emphasized that their views were their own and did not represent the opinions of the UK and French government.
December 12, 2023
Dr. Bruno Tertrais and Malcolm Chalmers
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SMA Speaker Series

Alternative Ukrainian Future Trajectories: Implications for Russia and the West

Dr. Graeme Herd at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is conducting multiple workshops and seminars, creating predicted pathways for war in Ukraine, using open-source materials. Dr. Herd identified five potential future pathways for the war in Ukraine, being: Ukrainian victory, Russian victory, protracted conflict, frozen conflict, and negotiated peace.
June 22, 2023
‍Dr. Graeme P. Herd
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SMA Speaker Series

The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence After Ukraine

The narrative surrounding nuclear deterrence and statecraft has changed since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; particularly Vladimir Putin’s threat of a nuclear strike against Ukraine. Putin’s overt threat of a nuclear strike has caused experts to ask how the US and other democratic actors can promote responsible nuclear statecraft. In spring of 2023, the Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a one-day workshop with esteemed panels of experts. In addition to their discussions, the panelists responded to a series of survey questions. They were asked if they believed Russia would be likely to use a nuclear weapon, and topics relating to nuclear statecraft including, the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), nuclear cooperation between the US and China, and the likelihood of the ROK and Japan developing their own nuclear weapons.
October 17, 2023
Thomas Shattuck (Perry World House, University of Pennsylvania)
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SMA Speaker Series

Putin and the Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship

The world has not experienced a global military conflict since World War II. Countries’ possession of nuclear weapons is frequently thought of as a contributing factor to this seven-decade peace. However, Dr. McDermott and Dr. Slovic asserted that this peace has less to do with countries’ possession of nuclear weapons and more to do with countries not being faced with true existential crises. Dr. Slovic commented that another reason for a potential miscalculation of nuclear weapons’ influence on deterrence is that the science of risk taking and decision making has historically been done by philosophers and scientists who do not work closely with military leadership. However, analysis of how people make decisions, including their psychological biases, can shed light on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Unfortunately, phenomena like psychological numbing and virtuous violence make it more likely that a state leader—especially a personality driven leader—to offensively use their country’s nuclear arsenal.
September 28, 2023
Dr. Rose McDermott (Brown University) and Dr. Paul Slovic (Brown University)
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SMA Speaker Series

US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity

US nuclear deterrence has changed drastically during the last few decades. One of the factors forcing the US to change its nuclear deterrence doctrine was the emergence of nuclear tripolarity between the US, China, and Russia. How states manage nuclear deterrence and geopolitics has become an area of focus for media outlets and civil leaders amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s fast growing nuclear arsenal. Dr. Press stated that unless the US changes its current nuclear doctrine, focusing on how the US conducts nuclear deterrence and chooses targets for retaliatory strikes, then there is a strong likelihood that there will be a trilateral nuclear arms race. Current US doctrine has three principle missions: 1) deter a nuclear strike, 2) assure allies of the US’s commitment to protect international stability, and 3) mitigate the consequences if deterrence fails.
September 6, 2023
Dr. Keir Lieber (Georgetown University) and Dr. Daryl Press (Dartmouth College)
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SMA Speaker Series

Russia’s Role in Global Nuclear Supply Chains

Ms. Dolzikova discussed how Russia’s civil nuclear sector has largely evaded the sanctions placed on the rest of the Russian economy since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. During her presentation she outlined the drivers of the global dependency on Russia’s civil nuclear supplies, highlighting the challenges and potential approaches to diversification. For more information on this topic, you can read Ms. Dolzikova’s article Catch-235: Western Dependence on Russian Nuclear Supplies is Hard to Shake.
September 12, 2023
Ms. Darya Dolzikova (RUSI)
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Intimidation: A Russian Success Story

Russia’s long-term information operations (IO) and influence campaigns have altered how US and Western decision makers perceive the risk level of Russia using a nuclear weapon. Russian IO are designed to influence the decision makers through several levers, including through their constituents. These IO use multi-domain approaches such as Russia’s own domestic media. Mr. Giles pointed out that most Russian media is broadcast in many countries, giving it a wide reach and large non-Russian audience. An example of this targeted use of media is Russian news showing the trajectory needed for Russian missiles to strike specific European cities—even though the Russian missile system required to launch the missiles is believed to be offline. The Kremlin uses long-term IO to convince its adversaries that it is willing to use a nuclear missile if contested.
September 5, 2023
Professor Keir Giles (Chatham House)
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SMA Speaker Series

Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations in Ukraine and Implications for Future Conflicts

The war in Ukraine is raising questions about the security of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and the safety of civilians who are in their proximity. Military and civilian leaders in other countries that possess nuclear power plants are examining how litigation could protect their own facilities during future conflicts. Ms. Dolzikova stated that this discussion has intensified since Russia occupied the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone and captured the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) during the early stages of its invasion of Ukraine. The ZNPP is still under Russian occupation, forcing collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian nuclear scientists, Ukrainian workers at ZNPP, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Russian occupiers to ensure the plant’s safety and security. Since Russia’s take-over, all six ZNPP nuclear reactors have been shut down. One reactor is in a “hot shutdown,” allowing it to produce steam. Russian nuclear scientists are insisting that it is necessary for this reactor to produce steam for the safety of the power plant, but Ukrainian scientists claim that a “hot shutdown” is an unnecessary hazard. They claim that keeping the reactor in this state is reducing the time window that workers would have to divert a catastrophe during a systems failure.
August 1, 2023
Ms. Darya Dolzikova (RUSI)
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SMA Speaker Series

Using a Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Approach to Reduce US-PRC Escalation Risks in a DPRK Collapse Scenario

Despite the deep freeze in US-China relations, the US and China have mutual interests that could reduce risk in a future DPRK regime collapse scenario. The US and China have prior experience successfully collaborating on nonproliferation initiatives, including standards for nuclear facilities and security measures relating to the storage and transportation of nuclear material. US and Chinese scientists have also collaborated in unstable and conflict-ridden countries, such as Nigeria, to collect and clean nuclear waste. Moreover, the US and China have signed bilateral nuclear agreements in the past and are two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, or P5. Their status as P5 countries provides the US and China an easy avenue for communication and litigation. Dr. Anderson stated that the US can try to increase bilateral communication, collaboration, and invite Chinese scientists to observe or participate in future nuclear exercises or try and better bilateral political relations in this DPRK regime collapse scenario. South Korea can also play a role in increasing the awareness surrounding denuclearization by hosting UN security conferences.
June 8, 2023
Dr. Justin Anderson (NDU)
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SMA Speaker Series

China's Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for US Nuclear Deterrence

The deterrence landscape has changed drastically and quickly during the decades since the Cold War. In response to these changes, USSTRATCOM is reforming its nuclear deterrence strategy to protect against emerging short-term nuclear threats and the long-term threat of nuclear parity with two adversarial nations, Russia and China. Dr. Roberts commented that the rewriting of US nuclear deterrence inspired the report from the Center for Global Security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which was written by a diverse working group, and includes more than 100 different findings and recommendations. The group examined how the US can prepare both militarily and politically for competition with two near-peer nuclear adversaries. He emphasized that while short-term nuclear competition is a triad between the US, China, and Russia, both North Korea and Iran could emerge as disruptive nuclear actors in the future. The report gives recommendations for the required size of the overall US nuclear arsenal and the required nuclear force in each military theatre.
June 21, 2023
Dr. Bradford Roberts (LLNL)
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SMA Speaker Series

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Coercion and the Russian Way of War

The Kremlin is blending its nuclear discourse, politics, and theological beliefs, changing the domestic perception in Russia regarding just nuclear war and nuclear escalation with the West. Prof. Adamsky stated that the Kremlin has been integrating the Russian Orthodox Church in its military campaigns for many years. The use of the Orthodox Church in Russian military operations has traditionally been to provide spiritual and psychological support for troops, bolstering individual and unit moral while reaffirming Russian soldiers’ belief in their cause. The Kremlin also uses Orthodoxy to justify its military activities to other state leaders, depicting Russia’s conflicts as good against evil. However, the war in Ukraine is forcing the Russian Orthodox Church to address the cognitive disconnect many Russians feel when fighting fellow Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.
July 19, 2023
Professor Dmitry Adamsky (Reichman University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Lost Seoul? Assessing Pyongyang's Other Deterrent

North Korea poses many military threats to its neighbor, South Korea, including a massive artillery barrage on its capital city, Seoul. A conventional artillery barrage would destroy infrastructure and threaten the lives of civilians living in the metropolitan area. Dr. Press and Dr. Anderson built a model, mapping the loss of civilian life during three specific scenarios: a) a surprise attack by North Korea during peacetime, b) a North Korean attack during a military crisis, and c) a preemptive US and South Korean attack. To determine the total loss of civilian casualties, the model considers the known number of North Korean artillery batteries, their predicted rate of fire, and their predicted overall effectiveness among other variables. Dr. Press estimated that North Korea has around 300 artillery batteries that can currently bombard Seoul.
November 29, 2022
Anderson, N. (Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University); Press, D. (Dartmouth College)
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SMA Speaker Series

Slaughtering Sacred Cows? German Energy Security, Nuclear Sharing, and the War in Ukraine

After the Cold War, despite many warning symbols from Russia (e.g., President Vladimir Putin’s election in 1999, the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014), Germany and the rest of Europe entered a state of complacency regarding a potential Russian threat to Western security, energy, and hard power. Dr. Dorondo explained that successive German chancellors adopted a rosy vision of the nation’s future—a carbon-neutral Germany within a peaceful Europe. In the process, the nuclear power generation sector of Germany’s economy would be phased out, coal would no longer be used, and natural gas production would contribute to a new socioeconomic vision of the future. In part due to the lack of a perceived threat from Russia, German limited its military spending.
November 21, 2022
Dorondo, D. (Western Carolina University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Implications of China’s Nuclear Modernization and Expansion

China is modernizing its nuclear forces which is routine for modern nuclear countries; however, the speed and acceleration of China’s modernization is alarming Western leaders and scholars. Ms. Bradley commented that by growing its nuclear forces, China is creating nuclear capabilities to match their geopolitical ambitions, including regional hegemony. As China increases its nuclear capabilities, its adversaries will need to increase their levels of deterrence to maintain the geopolitical status quo. The characteristics of China’s nuclear deterrence can be described as focused, limited, and defensive. Historically, China has maintained a ‘no first strike’ policy. As it increases its nuclear capabilities, this policy may change. Its recent escalation of its nuclear forces represents a change in its nuclear strategy, not its security environment.
November 1, 2022
Bradley, J. (Plans and Policy Directorate, United States Strategic Command)
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SMA Speaker Series

Towards a Third Nuclear Age?

The world is undergoing an era of nuclear transition while the mechanisms normally used to control these transitions are being placed under stress. Moreover, technological, geopolitical, and normative changes can influence the nuclear ecosystem and how actors handle nuclear threats and understand nuclear technology. Mr. Futter argued that this nuclear transition is a global and multifaceted phenomenon. He separated nuclear transitions into three-time frames: a) the first nuclear age (1945-1990), b) the second nuclear age (1990s-2014), and c) the third nuclear age (2018-present). These ages are defined by actors’ policy choices and the number of actors acquiring nuclear power.
September 8, 2022
Futter, A. (Professor of International Politics, University of Leicester, UK)
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SMA Speaker Series

Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Dr. Pettyjohn explained that nuclear deterrence is frequently examined in the context of a bilateral competition rather than a multipolar competition between three or more nuclear capable states.
July 26, 2022
Pettyjohn, S. (Senior Fellow & Director of the Defense Program, Center for a New American Security [CNAS])
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SMA Speaker Series

Weaponizing Critical Resources on a Changing Planet

Understanding an actors’ ability to weaponize resources is reliant on a large pool of available and diverse data. Too often, research on resource vulnerability and climate change is driven by philosophy and opinions, commented Dr. Alessa.
June 14, 2022
Dr. Lillian Alessa
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SMA Speaker Series

The Future of European Security

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. James Goldgeier (Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution; & Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.
April 21, 2022
Dr. James Goldgeier
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SMA Speaker Series

China’s Nuclear Modernization and Its Implications

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Tong Zhao (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
February 25, 2022
Tong Zhoa
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SMA Speaker Series

The Real and Present Risk of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on the Battlefield

Russia’s and China’s status as near-peer nuclear competitors with the US is changing the reality of what a military conflict would look like.
January 12, 2022
Dr. Adam Lowther
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part III)

As US adversaries reach nuclear parity—or near nuclear parity—with the US, multi-actor deterrence is becoming more prevalent in global influence competition.
January 10, 2022
Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part I)

SMA hosted a panel discussion with Mr. Benjamin W. Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), and Dr. Melanie Sisson (Brookings Institution) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series..
December 3, 2021
Benjamin Bahney, Anna Péczeli, and Melanie W. Sisson
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SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part II)

SMA hosted a panel discussion with Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder, PhD (George Mason University), Mr. James A. Siebens (Defense Strategy & Planning Program, Stimson Center), and Dr. Christopher Yeaw (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series.
December 10, 2021
Lieutenant General Robert Elder, James A. Siebens, and Dr. Christopher Yeaw
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SMA Speaker Series

Cyber Risks in Nuclear Escalation Scenarios

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Herb Lin (Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution & Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University), as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
October 29, 2021
Dr. Herbert Lin
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SMA Speaker Series

The Challenges of Multipolar Deterrence: Theory and Evidence

More countries building nuclear weapons forces the US to conduct multipolar nuclear deterrence and balance its political relationships in a way that it never has before.
September 29, 2021
Vipin Narang
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SMA Speaker Series

Key Elements of the 2021 Nuclear Posture Review

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Anna Péczeli (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series.The purpose of a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is to assess the current nuclear threat environment, outline nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next 5-10 years, and align participating countries’ nuclear forces. Dr. Péczeli reviewed the similarities and differences of past US Nuclear Posture Reviews. Several similarities of past NPRs include: a) deciding against a no first use policy, b) deciding against a sole purpose posture, c) maintaining a form of negative security assurance, and d) excepting a level of calculated ambiguity for nuclear retaliation. This level of ambiguity relating to nuclear retaliation allows for the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstance.
July 22, 2021
Anna Péczeli
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SMA Speaker Series

The Lapsing Arms Embargo on Iran: Challenges, Change, Iranian Military Modernization, and US Responses

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series, featuring Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu (Foundation for Defense of Democracies).Mr. Taleblu’s presentation focused on the lapsing UN arms embargo on Iran. He stated that four primary groups are affected by the expiration of the arms embargo: 1) those who are interested in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); 2) the US sanctions community; 3) those in the US military who are looking at Iran’s conventional and asymmetric capabilities; and 4) those employed by multilateral or international organizations, or by non-government organizations that do diplomacy with UN Security Council (UNSC) member nations. Mr. Taleblu also provided a brief history of US arms embargoes against Iran, beginning with that of 1979 (during the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis).
October 10, 2020
Behnam Ben Taleblu
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SMA Speaker Series

U.S. Nuclear Policy from the Cold War to 2020—A Comparative Analysis of the Nuclear Posture Reviews

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Péczeli first stated that the main role of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is for the current administration to assess the threat environment, outline nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next five to ten years, and align the country’s nuclear forces accordingly. She elaborated that, depending on the time and which administration was in office, the threats and challenges of the time and the scope of the NPR differ. Furthermore, the NPR is only the “tip of the iceberg” regarding US nuclear guidance because it is the only substantive document that individuals can access in the unclassified domain; the actual employment guidelines and operational capabilities behind US nuclear guidance are classified and much more complex. Dr. Péczeli proceeded to provide a brief history of each NPR to date. President Clinton’s NPR in 1994 focused on deterrence requirements in a post-Cold War period. She stated that the main threats the US faced at the time were conventional threats from the former Soviet Union, as well as Russian nuclear weapons in other countries. Dr. Péczeli claimed that a large accomplishment from this NPR that holds significance today is the extension of the 1992 nuclear testing moratorium and navigation guidelines regarding how to maintain a nuclear arsenal without conducting underground tests. President Bush’s NPR from 2001 was similar to Clinton’s in that it focused on employment decisions and deterrence needs. However, Dr. Péczeli emphasized that Bush’s NPR included all the components of effective deterrence, including nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defense, and infrastructure. Because there was no longer a bipolar system of threats to the US, the growing spectrum of contingency plans and the importance of arms control became pillars of this NPR. President Obama’s NPR from 2010 was extremely transparent and a true interagency review, as it kept allies involved and willing to buy in. Obama navigated the balance between the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and maintaining a secure and effective nuclear arsenal. Dr. Péczeli suggested that this NPR also laid some of the framework for President Trump’s NPR, as the threats emerging relied on strategic stability with Russia and China, two countries in which the US is competing with in 2018. Next, Dr. Péczeli outlined some of the main similarities between the NPRs, including a testing moratorium, deciding against a “no first use” policy, and continuing investments in the modernization of nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure. She also identified some of the primary differences between these policies, including the difference in transparency and interagency involvement, the formal and informal approaches to arms control, and the strategic stability vs. competition declaratory policies. To conclude, Dr. Péczeli stated that as the security environment changes to face different challenges, there have been many different approaches and shifts of focus, but there has also been also a great degree of continuity on three levels: declaratory policy, force structure, and operational policy.
August 24, 2020
Dr. Péczeli
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SMA Speaker Series

Scenario-based Planning to Maintain the Credibility of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent Against Emerging Threats

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Amb. Ronald F. Lehman II (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]) and Maj Gen (Ret) Bill Chambers (Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA]) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
June 30, 2020
Amb. Ronald F. Lehman II and William A. Chambers
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SMA Speaker Series

A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Michael Horowitz (University of Pennsylvania) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Horowitz began by explaining how nuclear technologies are shaping global politics. He used the global telegraph program, the Cuban missile crisis, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the Chinese proliferation of drones as examples. He then focused on automation, autonomy, and artificial intelligence (AI). Dr. Horowitz defined AI as “the use of computers to simulate human behavior that requires intelligence.” AI is also broad, multi-purpose, dual use, and has a low barrier to entry. There are various methods of AI (e.g., symbolic vs. connectionist, machine learning, neural networks) and types of AI (e.g., narrow, general intelligence, superintelligence). Furthermore, AI is an enabler rather than a weapon. AI can direct physical objects, process data, and perform overall information management, but it is not a gun, nor is it a plane. The implication of this is that AI can be used for much broader purposes than military technologies. Next, Dr. Horowitz explained that individuals pursue autonomy and AI for their speed, precision, bandwidth/hacking capabilities, and decision making assistance. AI also has its downsides, however. Autonomous systems can be “brittle” (i.e., limited in terms of their potential areas of operation and requiring an immense amount of training). One must be weary of automation bias and trusting machines/algorithms too much to avoid making mistakes as well. Dr. Horowitz added that if a nation is already confident in its second-strike capabilities, over-trusting a machine is not necessarily worth the brittleness risks.
March 18, 2020
Michael Horowitz
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SMA Speaker Series

It Can Get You into Trouble, but It Can’t Get You Out: Missile Defense and the Future of Nuclear Stability

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Eric Gomez (Cato Institute) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Gomez began by discussing the present state and future of US missile defense. He explained that the US has both a homeland missile defense system, which protects the continental US from intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a regional missile defense system, which protects relatively small areas from shorter-range threats. Its regional missile defense system currently has more reliable testing records than does its homeland defense system. He then stated that the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) reveals a wholesale expansion of the US’s missile defense architecture, in addition to greater integration of homeland and regional missile defense assets. Dr. Gomez then highlighted the implications of US missile defense on adversary threat perceptions. Russia and China do not view missile defense as a unique or siloed program; instead, they both see it as a component of broader US military strategy. Being cognizant of this can help US decision makers understand threat perceptions and the action/reaction cycles that are generated or accelerated by missile defense, according to Dr. Gomez. Moreover, missile defense is a component of great power competition, and adversary threat perceptions can become reality; thus, it is important for the US to understand Russian and Chinese threat perceptions. Next, Dr. Gomez explained that missile defense is neither inherently stabilizing nor inherently destabilizing. Its implications for nuclear stability flow from two factors: 1) how missile defense factors into a state’s broader approach to nuclear deterrence and 2) the strategies that other countries adopt to counteract the threat posed by growing missile defenses arrayed against them. He then stated that steady expansion of US missile defense architecture fosters destabilizing counter strategies by great power rivals without providing the ability to protect the US from the consequences of that spiral. Furthermore, the 2019 MDR plan may not accelerate the slide into nuclear instability, but it definitely won’t stop it. Consequently, missile defense and nuclear stability can get the US into trouble, but it can’t get it out. To conclude, Dr. Gomez spoke about how the US can balance missile defense and stability, highlighting that restraining US homeland missile defense capabilities should reduce great power adversaries’ “use or lose” pressure while making it harder for them to initiate limited, regional conflicts.
February 5, 2020
Eric Gomez
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SMA Speaker Series

Iran Under Maximum Pressure: Between Graduated Escalation and Strategic Patience

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. Mr. Taleblu began his brief by stating that the primary force driving Iran’s escalatory actions as of late April/early May 2019 is political in nature. He explained that Iran has shifted from a posture of strategic escalation to one of strategic patience, and this shift was driven by a change in Iran’s understanding of the efficacy of the US’s maximum pressure campaign. Iran believes that it can outlast the US’s campaign, and it is also attempting to force the US back into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement. Furthermore, according to Mr. Taleblu, Iran believes that the US does not have the resolve over time to contest Iran in all of the domains that it perceives as important: nuclear, cyber, missiles, and geopolitical. He then specified that Iran has and is likely to escalate in these domains.
October 8, 2019
Behnam Ben Taleblu
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SMA Speaker Series

The United States, Iran, and the Politics of the JCPOA

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Professor Ali Ansari (University of St. Andrews / Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. Professor Ansari first stated that some of the issues related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are a result of the negotiation process itself. He explained that the US sees the election of Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, as an important staging post in the relationship between the US and Iran. However, to most Iranians, other factors still inhibit the development of this relationship. In 2009, when the JCPOA was being negotiated, the crisis following the Iranian presidential election brought forth serious divisions between the elite and Iranian citizens.
August 7, 2019
Ali M Ansari
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SMA Speaker Series

How to Think About Nuclear Crises

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Julia Macdonald (University of Denver) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
April 3, 2019
Macdonald, J. (University of Denver)
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SMA Speaker Series

A Win-Win Strategy to Transform North Korea

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Maorong Jiang (Creighton University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
January 9, 2019
Jiang, M. (Creighton University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Andrew Futter (University of Leicester) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Futter highlighted his research on cyber threats and nuclear weapons.
November 29, 2018
Futter, A. (University of Leicester)
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SMA Speaker Series

Strategic Outcomes on the Korean Peninsula: Effort Results and Primary Findings

To begin the presentation, Dr. Astorino-Courtois explained the methodology behind NSI’s Interest-Resolve-Capability (IRC) analysis, outlined the results and primary findings, and highlighted the regional dynamics that emerged during the analysis.
November 20, 2018
Dr. Astorino-Courtois
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SMA Speaker Series

Normalizing the US-DPRK Relations: Nuclear Weapons and Political Changes in Pyongyang

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jongseok Woo (University of South Florida) as a part of its SMA Korea Strategic Outcomes Speaker Series.
November 8, 2018
Dr. Jongseok Woo (University of South Florida)
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SMA Speaker Series

On Target: Capabilities, Intentions, and the Post-JCPOA Future of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. After summarizing his main conclusions, Mr. Taleblu provided a brief history of Iran’s missile program and outlined Iran’s inventory of ballistic missiles.
October 18, 2018
Taleblu, B. (Foundation for Defense of Democracies)
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SMA Speaker Series

Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. John Warden (Institute for Defense Analyses) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.
September 12, 2018
Warden, J. (Institute for Defense Analyses)
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SMA Speaker Series

Nuclear Command and Control in the 21st Century: Maintaining Surety in Outer Space and Cyberspace

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jared Dunnmon (Stanford University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Dr. Dunnmon began his presentation by discussing the challenges for 21st century nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3), as well as the US’s increasing reliance on space-based NC3. He identified potential NC3 vulnerabilities in both outer space and cyber space and explained a few major classes of exploitable flaws in these domains. He proceeded to describe various technological tools currently being developed for risk mitigation and policy tools that “adapt old rules to new domains.” Dr. Dunnmon concluded his presentation by talking through a scenario (an Advanced Extremely High Frequency [AEHF] satellite malfunction) and offering his concluding thoughts.
August 22, 2018
Jared Dunnmon
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SMA Speaker Series

Four Scenarios for the Korean Peninsula's Future

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Prof. Narushige Michishita (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies [GRIPS]) as a part of its SMA Korea Strategic Outcomes Speaker Series. During this presentation, Prof. Michishita provided his assessment of the recent Singapore conference. He argued that what was concluded in the joint statement was “not enough;” however, President Trump’s and Kim Jong-un’s intentions have become more important in determining the future of the Korean Peninsula than what is stated in formal documents. So, it is difficult to say what will happen next based only on the summit. Prof. Michishita concluded by discussing four different scenarios for the future of the Korean Peninsula: 1) the “okay” scenario, 2) the “bad” scenario (i.e. a military crisis), 3) the “precarious peace” scenario, and 4) the “Gorbachev” scenario.
June 20, 2018
Narushige Michishita
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NSI Publications (Tagged: Nuclear)

NSI Publication

Trajectory of U.S./North Korean Nuclear War

Hours after the Washington Post broke the story that North Korea may have miniaturized a nuclear warhead, enabling its ICBM to deliver a nuclear blow to U.S. soil, President Trump announced that if North Korea continues to provoke, will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Russian and Chinese Influence in Iran: Sources and Future Trends

Among all the experts interviewed for this report, there was a general consensus that relations between Iran and both Russia and China are driven by pragmatic considerations. Many described the Iran-Russia and Iran- China relationships as primarily transactional, with each having something concrete the other needs to meet their domestic economic growth and development needs.
Year Published:
2020
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NSI Publication

A New US-Iran Nuclear Agreement: What are the Chances?

Most of the expert contributors agree that, though not a certainty, it appears likely that Iran will be willing to reengage in some form of nuclear negotiations with the United States at some point over the next five years.
Year Published:
2020
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NSI Publication

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Launch Criteria: Change or Continuity?

The experts interviewed for this study do not see Iran’s recent operational use of its ballistic missiles as signaling a fundamental change in its foreign policy, which they characterize as deliberate, defensive, and with a long time horizon.
Year Published:
2020
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