Cyber Risks in Nuclear Escalation Scenarios

Speaker(s):
Dr. Herbert Lin
Date of Event:
October 29, 2021
Associated SMA Project
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Speaker(s): Lin, H. (Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation & Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

Date: 27 October 2021

Speaker Session Summary

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Herb Lin (Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution & Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University), as part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

As the frequency and prevalence of cyber-attacks continues to increase, defending against cyber-attacks continues to increase in importance, especially relating to nuclear security. Dr. Lin commented that maintaining strong cyber defense is important because individuals who are online are constantly under attack; however, most people do not realize they are threatened because the security measures for their computers is sufficient to defend their data. Furthermore, many times people do not realize an attack has been successful until the harmful code enacts its attack sequence. Even after this occurs, it is difficult to discern the intent or real impact of the cyber-attack. Therefore, protecting computers responsible for nuclear deterrence is crucial for national security.

Because cyber security does not automatically increase a systems ability to carry out its function, it is rarely given enough attention by software developers. Dr. Lin listed five scenarios where cyber security is crucial to protecting software responsible for monitoring nuclear weaponry and keeping the information environment clear for leaders and personnel. These scenarios are: a) cyberattacks vs espionage or intelligence gathering, b) cyberattacks on ambiguous targets, c) cyberattacks on US military supply chains, d) cyberattacks as a counterforce, and e) social media’s impact on nuclear deterrence. Cyberattacks can mimic enemy missile launches, send fake messages, disable machinery, or cloud the judgement of leaders by overwhelming them with information. Dr. Lin concluded that all personnel, leaders, and decision makers must learn how to interact in an increasingly noisy and chaotic digital realm.

Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.

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Dr. Herbert Lin

Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution

Biography

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in the use of offensive operations in cyberspace as instruments of national policy and in the security dimensions of information warfare and influence operations on national security.  In addition tohis positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University; and a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. In 2016, he served on President Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity.  Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

Advocationally, he is a long time folk and swing dancer and a lousy magician. Apart from his work on cyberspace and cybersecurity, he is published in cognitive science, science education, biophysics, and arms control and defense policy. He also consults on K-12 math and science education.

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