Speaker: Nephew, R. (Columbia University)
Date: 31 January 2020
SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Richard Nephew (Columbia University) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. Mr. Nephew first suggested that the series of tit for tat events between the US and Iran that occurred after the US decided to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and restart its sanctions campaign has been predictable. Therefore, Mr. Nephew focused his presentation on what this tit for tat engagement might lead to instead. He then argued that the US’s maximum pressure campaign is likely to result in failure. The two most fundamental problems with the maximum pressure campaign, according to Mr. Nephew, involve 1) the manner in which US sanctions against Iran were applied and 2) the absence of off-ramps for Iran. He explained that the partners and allies that the US has gathered to support its sanctions are not particularly invested in the situation and are therefore not providing much reinforcement. Consequently, the US is relying mostly on the force and strength of its economy to reinforce its own sanctions. The US is also encountering nations who are directly opposed to its sanctions against Iran, such as China and India, which makes it even more difficult for the maximum pressure campaign to be successful. Mr. Nephew stated that there are also tremendous inconsistencies in this campaign. He explained that when a nation has a mission of policing global economic activity and doesn’t have much direct international support, it must engage in frequent sanctions corrections. However, the US’s inconsistency makes it difficult for Iran to believe that the US won’t back out of a negotiation at the last minute. Furthermore, the pressure that the US has put on Iran’s relations with Hezbollah has made negotiations with Iran nearly impossible, according to Mr. Nephew, as Iran believes this off-ramp is implausible and incredible. Next, Mr. Nephew stated that maximum pressure could still produce economic problems in Iran; however, it is unlikely that Iran will face severe economic struggles within the next few years. Furthermore, political collapse does not necessarily go hand in hand with economic collapse, and Iran is fully prepared to use force to maintain power. To conclude, Mr. Nephew presented several broader implications for US sanctions policy involving international skepticism about US intent and reliability, sanctions effectiveness, a reduction in international dependency on the US economy, and these sanctions’ effects on Nordstream 2.
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