The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Eurasian regional leaders prior to and during the annexation of Crimea. Putin’s leading indicators, those of Crimean leaders and the Russian-supported President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, are presented separately.

The current case study analyzes the presence and importance of Gray Zone conflict dynamics and the employment of various instruments of power during the still ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas) since its beginning in 2014. More specifically, it studies the use of various instruments of power across a number of conflict dyads, present in the conflict. The case study’s findings can better inform practitioners and analysts about the presence, content, and effectiveness of utilizing different instruments of power in the Gray Zone.

The author of this report is Barnett S. Koven, Senior Researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Questions about this report should be directed to Barnett S. Koven at bkoven@start.umd.edu.

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.

This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia?

Speakers: Dr. T. X. Hammes (Institute for National Strategic Studies)with Guest Host Dr. Nicholas Wright (Intelligent Biology)

A key element of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion has been its ability to counter Russian disinformation. In their recent report for RAND, Dr. Helmus and Dr. Holynska discuss Ukraine’s approach to combating disinformation and the lessons that the United States and NATO can draw from this effort.

Russia seeks to dominate both Ukraine’s territory and its political future. Dr. Kimmage analyzed Russia’s motivations for initiating the war, as well as the failures of the United States, Europe, and Ukraine in deterring the invasion.

The ongoing war in Ukraine remains unresolved, and its outcome is widely debated among politicians, researchers, and military practitioners.

The ongoing Russian invasion has dramatically affected Ukraine’s industry and economy, forcing Ukraine to reimagine and rebuild its industrial base and market structure.

Modern threats from developed nations like China are beginning to exceed US capabilities, partly because the US military was predominantly focused on regional adversaries such as Iraq during Desert Storm. Mr. Ochmanek categorized the US approach to military power projection during this period as expeditionary and sequential.

The sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its past aggressive actions, such as the annexation of Crimea, targeted actors directly involved in its aggression. However, the current sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine have a much broader scope, encompassing actors and institutions throughout Russian society.

Even in the event of a military defeat suffered by Russia at the hands of Ukraine, it will continue to pose a formidable adversary to the US for the foreseeable future.

Dr. Graeme Herd at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is conducting multiple workshops and seminars, creating predicted pathways for war in Ukraine, using open-source materials. Dr. Herd identified five potential future pathways for the war in Ukraine, being: Ukrainian victory, Russian victory, protracted conflict, frozen conflict, and negotiated peace.

For fifty years, Freedom House has published its assessment of the state of democracy around the world. Freedom House categorizes countries and territories in to three groups based off a point system: 1) free, 2) partly free, and 3) not free. Dr. Gorokhovskaia mentioned that 2022 saw a continuation of a 17-year democratic slide; however, there were several bright spots for democracy around the world. For instance, during 2022 only one more country that became less democratic (35) than countries became more democratic (34). In comparison, during 2021, 35 more countries became more autocratic (60) than countries that became more democratic (25). Several factors that lessened the global strength of democracies during 2022 included a rash of military coups. For example, Burkina Faso experienced several military coups itself that resulted in the suspension of its constitution. Burkina Faso had the largest point decrease of 23-points during 2022. Columbia experienced the largest growth in democratic strength, increasing by 6 points. Columbia’s increase was due to more fair and competitive political elections than it had experienced in recent years. Individual country reports go into greater detail.

What drives warfighters to make costly sacrifices—including their lives—is a long-standing question that military and civilian leaders have tried to answer. Dr. Atran explained that this question can be studied through two different psychological models: 1) rational choice theory and 2) the devoted actor model. He argued that the devoted actor model is most suitable when assessing why people are willing to make costly sacrifices. When fighters decide that they are ready to freely give their lives, it is rarely a rational decision. Instead, it is a result of their devotion to the values that they hold most sacred. Understanding an individual’s sacred values is contingent on many factors, including how fused that individual’s identity is to that of a group. Individuals whose identities are completely fused with that of a single group are the most likely to give their lives in support of that group’s values.

Ms. Dolzikova discussed how Russia’s civil nuclear sector has largely evaded the sanctions placed on the rest of the Russian economy since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. During her presentation she outlined the drivers of the global dependency on Russia’s civil nuclear supplies, highlighting the challenges and potential approaches to diversification. For more information on this topic, you can read Ms. Dolzikova’s article Catch-235: Western Dependence on Russian Nuclear Supplies is Hard to Shake.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how cooperation between a country’s military and prominent social media influencers can be a useful tool for harnessing narrative control relating to conflicts. Dr. Helmus argued that Ukraine has been out-performing Russia in its ability to create and disseminate effective narratives surrounding the ongoing war. The success of Ukraine’s information operations is in part due to its tactic of leveraging civilian and military influencers who regularly post on social media. These influencers use their platform to share posts that highlight the loss of innocent life during Russian attacks, the resilience of Ukraine’s civilian population, and the success of Ukrainian military operations. These information operations come at virtually no cost to Ukraine because most creators are posting videos on their own volition. Dr. Helmus commented that while researchers have not been able to empirically confirm the positive effects of these social media operations, Ukrainian officials have emphasized their importance on the battlefield. While Ukraine has recently been using its media to great effect, the practice of leveraging influencers on social media is a well-used marketing strategy.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Egle E. Murauskaite (University of Maryland, ICONS) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series. The US has given military support to Ukraine as it defends against a Russian invasion. This support includes arms transfers, training for soldiers, and intelligence sharing during information operations. The US has been able to escalate its military support for Ukraine while also avoiding a direct military response from Russia. Also, the assumption that US arms transfers would increase arms smuggling in the region has been proven false. Instead, human trafficking has increased; however, this is a common war-time phenomenon. The aid that US and allies gave to Ukraine before the war has significantly influenced the conflict’s current state. This aid included peace-time military training of troops from 2014-2020.

China and Russia are frequently considered to have an alliance against the West; however, their actual relationship is one of convenience. China and Russia’s friendship has only been in place for a short time. Historically, the two countries have been rivals, disputing over territories and boundaries. The intensity of these disputes has weakened since the mid-1990s, however, due to the nations’ new political relationship. Their present-day partnership is based on the desire for a multi-polar world that weakens the US’ status as a superpower. However, their vision differs on how this multi-polar world order is comprised. The difference between China’s and Russia’s world view is the role that each other’s political rivals, other than the US, would play.

After the Cold War, despite many warning symbols from Russia (e.g., President Vladimir Putin’s election in 1999, the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014), Germany and the rest of Europe entered a state of complacency regarding a potential Russian threat to Western security, energy, and hard power. Dr. Dorondo explained that successive German chancellors adopted a rosy vision of the nation’s future—a carbon-neutral Germany within a peaceful Europe. In the process, the nuclear power generation sector of Germany’s economy would be phased out, coal would no longer be used, and natural gas production would contribute to a new socioeconomic vision of the future. In part due to the lack of a perceived threat from Russia, German limited its military spending.

Russia’s information operations (IO) are playing a pivotal role in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Dr. Vartonova stated that not all narratives that Russia circulates in the information environment (IE) should be called disinformation because Russia uses truthful information in its IO campaigns as well. For example, Russian media highlighted that the Kremlin has given NATO an offer to end the war in Ukraine. However, it knew that NATO would most likely not accept its treaty. A more appropriate term for this kind of IO is adverse rhetoric. Most of Russian IO is designed for an international audience; however, it had to also convince its domestic audience that it should invade Ukraine. Russia used narratives such as the de-Nazification and de-militarization of Ukraine—among others—to keep the Russian people engaged. Russia has continually changed the dominant Ukraine narrativeto keep the support of the Russian population. Some of these changing narratives include a claim that Ukraine is creating biological weapons, targeting ethnic Slavs.

Russia has lost the strategic initiative in its invasion of Ukraine, allowing for Ukrainian forces to slowly retake occupied territory. Ukraine will likely be able to retake the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, despite Russia’s recent mobilization of soldiers, argued Dr. Kagan. To increase Russian military forces, Putin will likely annex occupied territory and conscript its citizens. The failure of Russian armed forces is putting stress on Putin’s regime, prompting him to make veiled nuclear threats. However, it is unlikely that Russia will use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Putin’s nuclear threats are most likely to place pressure on the West. It is also likely that only a small percent of the crimes against humanity committed by the Russian soldiers in occupied territory are known. These crimes will likely continue to surface as Ukraine reclaims more territory.

The increasing proliferation of smart phones and internet availability is changing the way that digital investigations are occurring, especially in remote areas. While the digital realm has existed since the invention of radio, video and satellite imagery have given digital investigators new tools within the past few decades. New tools and the creation of social media have also resulted in the need for new global standards regarding the collection and handling of digital information for legal purposes. These new standards are encapsulated in the Berkley Protocol. Dr. Koenig explained that the Berkley Protocol—the first international standard used in digital investigation and prosecution—is used to give investigators a starting point regarding the quality standards of information being collected and how to legally go undercover on social media.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was preceded by nearly a decade of Russian propaganda, claiming that Ukraine is Russian and that Ukraine is run by Nazis, and overall, perpetuating the dehumanization of Ukrainians. Journalists—especially Ukraine’s war-time journalists—are playing a crucial role in combating these Russian narratives and setting the groundwork for future legal trials relating to war crimes and sanctions.

The war in Ukraine is one of the most visible conflicts in history, partly because of the prevalence of smartphones in Ukraine (61%). Moreover, 85% of Ukrainians possess an active mobile-broadband subscription, allowing them to share images and photos of the war instantaneously.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. James Goldgeier (Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution; & Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

Commercial drones—which are permitted by governments for civilian use in many countries—are currently being used for military purposes in Ukraine.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Spencer Meredith (National Defense University), Dr. Peter Eltsov (National Defense University), Prof. Carolyne Davidson (National Defense University), and Maj. Gen. Patrick B. Roberson (Commander and Commandant, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Thomas Sherlock (Professor of Political Science, United States Military Academy, West Point) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Thomas Rid (Professor of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University) and Mr. Peter Pomerantsev (Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Spencer Meredith (Professor of National Security Strategy, National Defense University) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Tsiporah Fried (Senior Advisor to the Vice Chairman of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Samuel Charap (Senior Political Scientist, RAND) as part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Erik Herron (Eberly Family Distinguished Professor of Political Science, West Virginia University) with Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley (Professor of Sociology & Faculty Affiliate of the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and the European Studies Center, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.

Mr. Pomerantsev began by highlighting a phrase that he believes relates well to Russia’s concept of information: “The most dangerous idea in information war is the idea of information war itself.” This phrase is particularly applicable to Russia because the Kremlin views all communication as a facet of information warfare, according to Mr. Pomerantsev. The belief that all information is used to manipulate contradicts friendly political discourse between state leaders, feeds into conspiracy theorists’ rationale, and forces governments to securitize any form of communication. Furthermore, Russia’s concept of information leads them to view all of history through the lens of an information battlefield, Mr. Pomerantsev explained. This viewpoint was evident even as far back as the collapse of the Soviet Union, when former KGB agents began writing a revisionist form of history claiming that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of its adoption of Western values, as opposed to political or economic causes. Mr. Pomerantsev concluded his brief set of remarks by emphasizing that the main dilemma facing Western countries is: How do they effectively combat Russia’s disinformation without resorting to the same combative mindset and tactics?

SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Dr. David Dorondo (Western Carolina University), Dr. Arnold Dupuy (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)), Dr. Ion Iftimie (Central European University, Vienna, Austria), Dr. Daniel Nussbaum (NATO Science and Technology Organization’s Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-163 and Naval Postgraduate School), and Mr. Paul Michael Wihbey (Georgetown University and Institute on the Geopolitics of Energy), as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.

“FMSO Review of Selected Operational Environment Watch (OE Watch) Articles”

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Robert Angevine (Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)), Mr. Clark Frye (IDA), and Mr. John Warden (IDA) as a part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Angevine first explained that he and his colleagues conducted this research due both to shared topical interest and the lack of sufficient attention being paid to the lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict. Moreover, they argued that other efforts conducted by the Military Services and others to collect lessons from the conflict in Ukraine are notable, but generally cluster in two categories: geo-political and tactical/technical. Consequently, the current research effort was conducted in order to develop lessons in the broad middle ground, focusing on the operational level.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jessica Liao (North Carolina State University) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Spencer Meredith III (National Defense University) as a part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Meredith first explained that Ukraine is at the epicenter of Russia’s global strategy.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by MAJ Jeffrey Uherka (US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)) as a part of its SMA NDU Speaker Series.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Mark Galeotti (Mayak Intelligence) as a part of its Future of Great Power Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Galeotti discussed how Russian crime has evolved over time.

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Daniel Altman (Georgia State University) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series.