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SMA Publications (Tagged: China)

SMA Publication

The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

The report is organized around these three overarching concepts – state interest, perceived threats and opportunities, and international activities. The introduction details a theoretical background for each, and explains how, together, they offer a general framework for understanding the choices and behaviors of states in the international system. The concepts implicit in these two questions are complex and interdependent – requiring bounding choices. To stay within the scope of this project while providing a comprehensive mapping of the problem space, we have chosen to provide a high-level overview and comparison of all four states. For readers seeking a deeper dive into specific aspects of these questions for individual states, the reference section at the end of the report includes links to other SMA work with this level of detail. In this report we focus on how understanding these concepts provides a framework for expanding our understanding of deterrence strategy to account for the multi-domain as well as multi-actor nature of contemporary deterrence.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Deterrence Among Three to Twelve Nuclear Powers: Fundamental Instability and Mitigation Strategy

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike. Additionally, bilateral arms control measures (norms, treaties, protocols, institutions) provide additional stability. The problem with multicountry nuclear deterrence is that there are no levels of armaments that can support stable deterrence relations among three or more adversaries; except in cases when adversaries coalesce into two alliances, in which case the system reduces to bilateral nuclear deterrence. This paper approaches this problem through formal methods and conceptualizes a solution involving an ensemble of military and politico-diplomatic strategies which, when operating as an enhanced international security regime, can mitigate the fundamental instability of the current multicountry nuclear deterrence system.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region

USPACOM requested that the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) team conduct an “Examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends to identify where US interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests particularly in the East China Sea.” More specifically, USPACOM requested an examination of future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identification of where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and other interests, particularly in the East China Sea; and suggestions as to how USPACOM might best leverage opportunities when dealing with China in a “global context.” The project request also included a series of questions (see Appendix A) that, taken together represent two broad concerns.
Year Published:
2015
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SMA Publication

Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region

In pregNSI participated in a large effort focused on identifying areas of strategic risk and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades. A rising China resides within a very dynamic Asia-Pacific region. A long list of Chinese influence and investment activities abroad together with an active military enhancement program indicate that China is positioning itself to pursue national security interests well beyond the Pacific Rim. As Chinese interests and policy objectives broaden to farther reaches of the globe there is greater likelihood that they will run up against key US international interests. The intersection of US and Chinese interests could represent either a source of conflict or opportunity for cooperation. The main question that US policy makers and planners must consider carefully is: Where and which Chinese interests are most likely to conflict with US global interests, and where may there be opportunities for cooperation? The current problem this project addressed is uncertainty about the likely trajectory of increasingly global Chinese national interests abroad and how these relate to key US interests. The primary objective was to provide decision-makers the tools to make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex environment in which they, and their competitors, operate in the Asia-Pacific region, and broaden the horizon of strategic thinking and inform planning.
Year Published:
2015
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SMA Publication

Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict. Twenty-seven experts contributed to this white paper, providing wide-ranging assessments of China’s domestic and international activities in order to assess the future of China and the challenges that these activities may present to US interests. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-four chapters. While this summary presents some of the white paper’s high-level findings, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the experts’ individual contributions, which are worth reading in their entirety.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

China’s Expansion into South Asia, Middle East and Africa

Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the contributors to this question devoted attention to the outsized role economics—and especially the quest for natural resources—plays in the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) relationships in the MENA region. In general, the consequentiality of this factor trends negative when assessed through the lenses of either a) US policy goals or b) global liberal economic norms. Chow, for example, characterizes the failure of the US to more aggressively push back on manipulative PRC trade practices as “carelessness” and “empty rhetoric.” He also sees a direct line between the perceived cave-in on Washington’s part and Beijing feeling empowered to seize the initiative in other areas detrimental to US interest, such as increased militarization and aggressive behavior in disputed territorial areas.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Strategic Risk in the Space Domain

This report summarizes the input of 15 insightful responses contributed by space experts from National Security Space, industry, academia, government, think tanks, and space law and policy communities. This input includes expert contributions from US voices as well as non-US voices from Australia, India, Italy, and the UK. While this summary response presents an overview of key subject matter expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety.
Year Published:
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SMA Publication

Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space

Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn, has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore, there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Strategic Implications of PRC’s Base in Djibouti

There are a number of legitimate reasons that account for China’s decision to break with decades of tradition when it established its first foreign military base in Djibouti in 2009, according to Dr. John Garver, Professor Emeritus at the China Research Center at Georgia Institute of Technology. First, China has a strong economic interest in protecting vital shipping lanes that pass through the nearby Gulf of Aden (Garver, Haddad-Fonda, Payne). Notably, China expanded its maritime security role in the northwest Indian Ocean during the 2008-9 financial crisis in North America and Europe—a time when China’s economic growth seemed “unstoppable” (Garver).
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Int'l Norms Transgressions Magnify Gray Zone Challenges

The current international system presents multiple potential challenges to US interests. In recent years, state actors, especially but not limited to Russia and China, have taken actions that disrupt regional stability and potentially threaten US interests (Bragg, 2016). Many of these challenges are neither “traditional” military actions nor “normal” competition, but rather fall into a class of actions we have come to call “gray” (Votel, 2015). Here we define the concept as: “the purposeful use of single or multiple instruments of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of [proportional response and] large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten the interests of other actors by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.” (Popp and Canna, 2016).
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Geopolitical Visions In Chinese Media

This study analyzed Chinese web media in an effort to uncover key frames and cultural scripts that are likely to shape potential geopolitical relationships in Asia. The team provided an overview of Chinese media and developed individual reports on cultural scripts in media coverage of three key issues: a) China’s relationships with its regional neighbors, b) the geopolitical dimensions of the “China Dream” (中国梦), and c) Chinese discourse around the “New Style Great Power Relations” (新型大国关系). Data was collected from May to October 2014. Over 2,200 media articles were analyzed from 25 different Chinese media sources controlled for ownership, political slant, official versus, and popular media outlets.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone: South China Sea

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message’s emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese government officials during peak times of conflict in the South China Sea from 2002 to 2016. The leading indicators and warnings for the Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments are presented separately, as well as findings regarding how their use of language reflects predominant national concerns.
Year Published:
2017
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SMA Publication

9th Annual SMA Conference - No War/No Peace...

Since the end of the Cold War and with the advent of the new century, new geopolitical realities have emerged that have made classical wars with national military forces pitted against each other far less likely. What we are witnessing are new categories of conflict that cannot be considered full1scale wars in the classical sense but cannot be described as “peace” either. Small1scale conflicts are complemented with intense engagement in the Information and other Spheres. These will almost certainly have great implications in the legal domains as well new forms of alliances. Multiple factors have come into play for these trends to emerge. This is a story of change versus continuity, and the conference focused on what has changed since the collapse of the USSR. As such, there are structural and intellectual challenges that prevent the United States Government (USG) from adapting and thriving is this new environment.
Year Published:
2015
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SMA Publication

A New Info Paradigm? From Genes to ‘Big Data’

We live in an age characterized by the reshaping of society through the presence of information and networks. The proliferation of information technologies from the micro and instantaneous to the insights hidden in “big data” has generated a range of new issues with implications for global transformation and political power shifts, patterns of conflict and warfare, and potential opportunities for enhancing global stability. The time is right for a thorough consideration of the implications of this “age” on US national security issues. How can we best understand the near-term and long-term consequences of these changes? What adaptations to our current intellectual frameworks, intelligence processes, organizational structures, command and control practices and planning approaches may be necessary? In short, how can the United States Government (USG) and its allies recognize the risks as well as the opportunities for enhanced global security presented by fuller realization of the “information age”?
Year Published:
2014
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SMA Publication

7th Annual SMA Conference - What Now, What Next?

The 7th Annual Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Conference was held at Joint Base Andrews from 13-14 November 2013. The conference was focused on global megatrends and their implications in all spheres of national security. It is no exaggeration to state that the world today is a very different place than it was barely 12 years ago when the war against al Qaida and its affiliates began. As we move forward, continuing advances in various spheres such as the sociotechnical world will present both challenges and opportunities. The conference examined these and related themes and highlighted new insights from the social and neurosciences.
Year Published:
2013
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SMA Publication

ViTTa Analysis of Eurasia in the Next 5-25 Years

From July through November 2015, NSI employed its Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to systematically interview 26 subject matter experts in support of a Strategic Multilayer Assessment effort to research and identify drivers of conflict and cooperation in Eurasia in the next 5-25 years. Representatives from the United States European Command (EUCOM) provided 37 questions to guide the interview effort (see Appendix A). This report summarizes SME knowledge and insights on these questions—grouped into nine chapters.
Year Published:
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SMA Publication

Chinese Worldview and Perspectives on Space

Corpora from three sources were examined using semi-automated discourse analysis to gauge the Chinese government’s concerns in the space domain and how these interests are articulated with general political and cultural issues. The sources were releases from the Chinese MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2011 – 2017), stories reported by CPC (Communist Party of China) News (2013 – 2014), and two months of speeches by Chinese president Xi Jinping (2014). The primary findings from the discourse are presented as Chinese perspectives and worldview with respect to the space domain and general themes.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

International Collaboration in U.S. Integrated Deterrence: A Partner Perspective

This non-paper, prepared at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU), investigates the dynamics of deterrence in cooperation with the U.S.1 It is crafted for the SMA audience, providing preliminary insights into collaborative efforts within ID and emphasizing the value of partner contributions.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

CONCESSIONS TO THE LIMITED POWERS: Considerations of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, Asymmetrical Capability, and Extended Deterrence

Quite recently, nuclear strategy scholars Kier Lieber and Daryl Press posited that arms’ tables have turned, citing the asymmetry of limited nuclear powers as a reboot of the United States (US)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical nuclear playbook during the Cold War. Their key message—that “The United States must take seriously the nuclear capabilities and resolve of its foes”—isn’t lost on us: we previously called for the need to begin serious counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) planning for adversarial use of nuclear weapons below the threshold of Armageddon.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Integrated Deterrence Reachback Study

This work was situated within the broader Strategic Multilayer Assessment Strategic Deterrence Frameworks (SDF) study, which incorporated four lines of effort (LOEs) and was initiated at the request of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Chinese Strategic Deterrence Frameworks

China does not have an overarching deterrence framework. However, it is possible to identify the primary objects of Chinese deterrence and describe the Chinese playbook. China’s core strategic aims consist of deterring 1) a nuclear attack; 2) conventional, space, and cyber-attacks; and 3) outside efforts to encourage secession or political unrest. Nuclear deterrence has traditionally taken the approach that a secure second-strike capability is sufficient to prevent an adversary from threatening first use.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis, Drivers of a Pervasive Competition

The Strategic Foresight Analysis 2023 (SFA23) provides a shared understanding of the Evolving Security Environment to 2043, thus establishing the context for Allied futures thinking. Based on this context, the Future Operating Environment 2024 (FOE24) will address the military problem sets for Allied Warfare Development. FOE24 will also serve as a baseline for further conceptual and strategic thinking. The renewed foresight cycle, consisting of SFA23, FOE24 and deployable foresight analytics capacities, will facilitate collective futures thinking within the Alliance, as well as augment individual Ally’s foresight capabilities.
Year Published:
2024
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SMA Publication

Strategic Culture Literature Review

The concept of strategic culture emerges in discussions of both tailored and integrated deterrence. This report examines the concept’s history, current consensus, and enduring debates about what it entails. It also proposes a model of strategic culture as a complex system.
Year Published:
2023
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SMA Publication

A Flexible Framework to Achieve Strategic Objectives in US-China Policy

The United States must adopt a new overarching strategy to guide US-China relations moving forward. Neither the traditional approach of engagement intended to promote democratic ideals, nor more recent confrontational practices, have worked. There is an urgent need for a new strategic framework that embraces Chinese political and economic realities and uses those realities to US advantage to advance US national and international agendas. What is proposed here is an innovative strategic framework utilizing a soft-power deterrence approach to simultaneously engage, challenge, and integrate China. Successfully implementing this strategy demands a flexible rather than reactive US-China policy encompassing short-term (reengagement), medium-term (challenging), and long-term (integrating) approaches that will advance US interests across the spectrum of cooperation, competition, and conflict throughout the coming decade.
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Understanding the Information Environment to Win the Next Conflict Without Firing a Shot

In our increasingly digital society, military operations and civilian-alike rely heavily on the technological tools that connect us. Social media has become a powerful influence tool to sow discord, sway sentiment, and purport cause for actions that otherwise would be condemned by the international community. Cellular services have become the default mode of communication. And the amount of data collected continues to grow.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

SMA SEEK Results: Expanding US Nuclear Capability & Pessimism About Nuclear Use in the Next 15 Years

In August 2021, many of you participated in SMA’s inaugural Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK) outreach. SEEK is SMA’s new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of our 5000+ person community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on questions of interest. We conducted two surveys as part of this inaugural SEEK—one on deterrence and strategic stability, and a second on perceptions of threats and opportunities among US competitors. Perhaps surprisingly, we found:
Year Published:
2022
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SMA Publication

Evaluating China’s Road to Cyber Super Power

[Q5] How do US escalation management capabilities compare with those of our nuclear-armed competitors? How do relative non-kinetic capabilities (e.g., cyber exploits on infrastructure and information, communication of thresholds and redlines, integrated whole-of-government strategic messaging) contribute to these capabilities?
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Outer Space in the Media Space: How Russian and Chinese News Media Present the Commercialization and Militarization of the Space Domain

This report details Russian and Chinese media presentations of operations and intentions in the space domain to their respective populations. These presentations provide us insight into how members of these nation states understand their government’s intentions and activities in the space domain, the opportunities and challenges their government’s face in approaching those intentions and activities, the alliances and norms necessary for space usage, and which actors are attempting to destabilizing the space domain.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

China’s Historical Plutonium Production

In this paper, we reevaluate China’s production of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) in order to estimate the maximum number of nuclear weapons using WGPu that China could build.† This WGPu was produced in the 801 Reactor at the 404 Plant in Gansu Province (or the 404 Plant reactor) and the 821 Plant reactor in Sichuan Province. Both are graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled production reactors that began operation in late 1966 and late 1973, respectively, and both have been shut down for decades (with the date of termination at issue between different authors). We know of no openly available information indicating that China has resumed WGPu production elsewhere.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Escalatory Attraction of Limited Nuclear Employment For Great Power Competitors of the United States

The United States has entered into a dangerously new era in which, for the first time in our nation’s history, we now face two nuclear-armed great power competitors. Over the past three decades, while the United States has been focused on a variety of other national security challenges, Russia and China have observed the “US way of war” and made immense strides to position themselves to successfully counter that. While having achieved some level of success in closing the gap across a wide spectrum of military capabilities and operational realities, those two nuclear-armed peers have concluded not only that limited nuclear employment might be required in any conflict with the United States, but that this is a domain of conflict and level of escalation affording unique advantage for them since it is an area in which the US has neither the perceived will nor the perceived capabilities to compete. This paper discusses that “escalatory attraction” of limited nuclear employment for our great power competitors.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well.
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Operations in the Information Environment: Course of Action Analysis Exercise

The ICONS Project, a wargaming and simulation organization at the University of Maryland, was asked by the Joint Staff, J39, DDGO, Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office (SMA), to design, execute, and analyze a Table Top Exercise (TTX) in support of the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) research
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

US versus China: Promoting 'Constructive Competition' to Avoid 'Destructive Competition' (Volume II)

It is not an exaggeration to state that China is and will remain a significant challenge to the US on all aspects of national power for the foreseeable future. This situation has been in the making for quite some time. This SMA Perspectives paper will not delve into the historical roots of why the US got to where it is, however. Nor will it dwell on the purely military aspects of the conflict. These are important considerations that are amply discussed elsewhere in numerous scholarly publications. This SMA Perspectives paper is focused on the following question: “How should the US manage the US-China relations so that they stay below the level of conflict and destructive competition?” In this context, the paper distinguishes “constructive competition” from “destructive competition.”
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Experimental Red Teaming to Support Integration of Information in Joint Operations

This report supported SMA’s Integrating Information in Joint Operations (IIJO) project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the IIJO project page.As part of the modeling and simulation phase of the IIJO effort, the Center for Advanced Red
Year Published:
2021
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SMA Publication

Media Reporting on Egypt’s Economy and Bailout Narratives: The Role of Egyptian, Chinese, and Russian Media Narratives in Solving Egypt’s Economic Crisis

This study examined Egyptian, Russian, and Chinese media perspectives of the Egyptian economy to determine to what extent a future economic crisis in Egypt is probable, and identification of which great powers would most likely lead bailout efforts should an economic crisis unfold. To answer these questions, researchers employed a mixed-method approach analyzing over 500 news articles from the past five years from 18 different Egyptian, Chinese, and Russian native language news sites.
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Assessment of Strategic Implications of Population Dynamics in the Central Region—Integration Report: Great Power Competition

At the request of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), SMA initiated a study to understand the strategic implications of destabilizing population dynamics within the Central Region. The effort examined drivers of instability in the region emerging from radicalization, great power competition, state-level instability, and black swan scenarios. This report integrates the research conducted by the teams listed on the front cover in response to USCENTCOM’s questions about great power competition. This report is intended to be a succinct, easily navigable representation of the exceptional work by the collective SMA team. Please click on the links embedded in the report to go directly to the research studies.
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

A "Colder War" Future in the USCENTCOM AOR? Realpolitik Trajectory of Major Powers and Regional Players

This paper addresses potential security concerns in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the next 5-25 years if a strong Chinese-Russian alliance develops. It also offers the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) possible approaches to pre-empt both the formation of a China-Russia Axis and subsequent emergence of a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) periphery.
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Central Region Instability Dynamics

With support from GTRI, GMU worked with Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assess strategic risk to U.S. and partner interests in the Middle East caused by great power competition in the region.
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Sino-Russian Competition: Self-Inflicted Competition in Central Asia?

China and Russia support each other’s political and economic objectives both globally and in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) because, in part, of a strong mutual interest in weakening the United States’ geopolitical influence and power (Solomentseva, 2014; Lons, 2019).
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Assessing Buffers and Drivers of Conflict in the Arab Gulf

Experts contend that the risk of militarization of the dispute between Qatar and the Quartet is low. However, prolonged tension between the two sides has failed attempts at mediation and the underlying issues persist.
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Common Characteristics of "Successful" Deradicalization Programs of the Past

There is no “one size fits all” approach to disengagement and deradicalization—disengagement and deradicalization programs should be tailored to the specific environments and individuals/groups of interest. However, analysis of historical cases of disengagement and deradicalization programs reveals what appear to be several common characteristics of programs that have demonstrated some levels of success: creating a sense of hope and purpose, building a sense of community, providing individual attention and regimented daily schedules, and ensuring sustainable, long-term commitment following completion of the program (i.e., after- care).
Year Published:
2020
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SMA Publication

Leaders of the Chinese Economy: Cognitive and Motivational Analyses

In order to gain a quantified, evidence-based picture of decision-making tendencies of Chinese industrial, technical, economic, and political leaders, the UBC research group assessed the integrative complexity and motivational hierarchy of high-level figures in government and (ostensibly) private enterprise.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

SMA Invited Perspectives Series: SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition

The current National Security, Defense, and Military Strategies identify great power rivalries from Russia and China as two of the main challenges facing the United States for the foreseeable future.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

The Future of Global Competition & Conflict Comparative Analysis: A Media Ecology & Strategic Analysis (MESA) Group Report

This report provides a comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan media narratives regarding visions of the future of global competition, including their instruments of exerting power (DIME), purported vulnerabilities and necessary capabilities, projected allies and adversaries, views on the future of global order (FGO), the US, and EU, as well as the available means by which global competition should be managed.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities

This white paper was prepared as part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment, entitled The Future of Global Competition and Conflict. Twenty-seven experts contributed to this white paper, providing wide-ranging assessments of China’s domestic and international activities in order to assess the future of China and the challenges that these activities may present to US interests. This white paper is divided into five sections and twenty-four chapters. While this summary presents some of the white paper’s high-level findings, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the experts’ individual contributions, which are worth reading in their entirety.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Global Strategy Amidst the Globe’s Cultures: Cultures in Individual Cognition, States and the Global System

How can the US make global strategy in a world both vast and rich with cultural diversity? This matters: the US shaped the global system more than any other power since 1945, and that system hugely benefited the US and much of the globe. Whoever leads the global examine two aspects of this challenge.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

SMA Invited Perspectives Series: The American Psyche in a Newly Competitive Era- Some Initial Reflections

In this invited perspectives paper, Mr. Wyne cautions that the construct of “great-power competition” should not substitute for a coherent national strategy oriented toward desired steady states, and that an excessive focus on competition as an imperative unto itself could lead the United States into errors of overcommitment. Mr. Wyne questions how much policy guidance emerges from oft-stated objectives such as remaining the world’s foremost power or maintaining the current postwar order. The lack of strategic clarity along with the anxiety inherent in preeminence make the United States vulnerable to asymmetric tactics of manipulation. Mr. Wyne concludes by exploring specific aspects of “great-power competition,” including Sino-Russian relations and US-China competition in the Asia-Pacific.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate China Futures Study

The Competitive Zone (or Gray Zone) is “an operational environment ‘churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention.’” Given Russia’s military actions in eastern Ukraine and China’s expansion in the South China Sea, “military and academic communities have attempted to describe conflict in the Gray Zone to create shared understanding and spur discussion on conflict and competition in this space.”
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

China Country Report- An NSI Aggrieved Populations Analysis

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in China were analyzed: 2012 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2011 net wealth centiles compiled by the Chinese government’s Household Finance Survey.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Overcoming “the Silo Effect” in the Department of Defense

Different perspectives and operational goals across services allows for specialized expertise, but also creates a vulnerability for silo creation. At times, these silos can inhibit cooperation, limit mission effectiveness, and leave critical decision points inadequately addressed. There is a need for more deliberate planning and operational execution that cuts across multiple services and perspectives in order to better balance requirements, more efficiently plan, and more holistically address national security challenges. This need applies not only to operational decisions but also in evaluating ongoing programs to determine their continued effectiveness.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

SMA's Future of Global Competition & Conflict (GCC) China Panel Discussion

On 27 February 2019, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA, Joint Staff, J39) office—with the support of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and National Defense University (NDU) – convened a panel discussion on China in support of the SMA Future of Global Competition and Conflict effort. The scope of the day’s event was to assess how the United States Government (USG) should consider China’s power in relation to other states for the purpose of understanding the implications for future geopolitical competition.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Grand Strategy Alternatives

The SMA Future of Great Power Competition & Conflict project is researching how the United States might strategize to defend its global interests. This paper supports the project in deriving some grand strategy alternatives specifically related to China (twelve) and Russia (ten). The development of the alternatives draws on a broader spectrum of international relation’s theories than the restricted neorealist set generally employ. The study’s aims are to encourage the consideration of tangential approaches, suggest different framing mechanisms that could restructure our thinking about managing great power competition, and briefly outline a range of alternative ways to meet the challenges China and Russia pose.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Clash of Strategic Cultures

This paper seeks to describe the cultural and cognitive dissimilarities in how the United States and China pursue strategic competition. The first difference detailed involves how the two societies look at goals and time, as well as how those two factors lead to very different conceptions of strategy. The paper posits that the United States focuses more on a militaristic national security policy while China focuses more on economics and information. Other factors are described that attempt to explain how societal or cultural differences serve to enhance China’s strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Overall, the paper describes a future where China’s model may be more successful in a globalized world, which creates a magnetism for developing countries as well as the corporate sectors of developed countries. The paper concludes by briefly outlining American strengths and how it might use them to create a more effective strategy.
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

Media Narrative Analysis: Iranian, Russian, and Chinese News Coverage of the Future of Afghanistan

This project analyzed Chinese, Russian, and Iranian media narratives concerning interests in, and future prospects of, Afghanistan stability through three phases: Phase I (May-June, 2018; 79 articles), Phase II, (July-August, 2018; 124 articles), Phase III (October-September, 2018; 180 articles). Across these three phases, the analysis revealed consistent narrative patterns regarding the following:
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data promise to help reshape the global order. For decades, most political observers believed that liberal democracy offered the only plausible future pathways for big, industrially sophisticated countries to make their citizens rich. Now, by allowing governments to monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more effectively than ever before, AI offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them—the first since the end of the Cold War. That may help fuel and shape renewed international competition between types of political regimes that are all becoming more “digital.” Just as competition between liberal democratic, fascist, and communist social systems defined much of the twentieth century, how may the struggle between digital liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism define and shape the twenty-first?
Year Published:
2019
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SMA Publication

The Options for Getting to Political Reconciliation in Afghanistan

In August of 2018, United States Central Command asked the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Reachback team, How can the United States best increase the resolve and capability of regional actors to get to political reconciliation in Afghanistan? This report highlights the results of NSI’s Interest-Resolve-Capability (I-R-C)™ analysis of Afghanistan stakeholder dynamics.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Narratives Before & After the 2018 North Korea- United States Summit: An Analysis of Chinese and Russian News Media Coverage of Events on the Korean Peninsula

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation

United States policymakers must prepare to manage escalation in West Pacific confrontations that involve space operations. How can they put themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners and manage escalation in the current strategic environment in space? We raise three key points.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Assessment of Possible Reactions in German-Speaking and East Central Europe and the European Union (GS-ECE/EU) to Possible Strategic Outcomes in U.S.-DPRK Relations

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) does not currently constitute a strategic threat via inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to German-Speaking and East Central Europe (GS-ECE), to the States of the European Union (EU), or to non-EU European States. Proven and potential cyber threats do exist, however, as does the proven threat of traditional espionage.
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Publication

Key Actor Interests in the Asia Pacific – A Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank Report

[Q8] How do key actors in the Asia Pacific (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) define their key national interests / regional objectives in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific? What are seen by each actor to be the major threats to each interest? Are there any redlines associated with these interests?
Year Published:
2018
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SMA Speaker Series (Tagged: China)

SMA Speaker Series

Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part I)

SMA hosted a panel discussion with Mr. Benjamin W. Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), and Dr. Melanie Sisson (Brookings Institution) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series..
November 30, 2021
Benjamin Bahney, Anna Péczeli, and Melanie W. Sisson
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SMA Speaker Series

Outer Space in the Media Space: How Russian and Chinese News Media Present the Commercialization and Militarization of the Space Domain

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University) as part of its SMA Contested Space Operations: Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting (Space) Speaker Series.
May 9, 2018
Dr. Randy Kluver, Dr. Skye Cooley, and Dr. Ethan Stokes
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SMA Speaker Series

China’s Nuclear Modernization and Its Implications

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Tong Zhao (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
February 23, 2022
Tong Zhao
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SMA Speaker Series

Back to the Future: Trajectories, Simulations and Alternative Futures of Great Power Competition

The US and China have been locked in a great power competition (GPC) that will decide who has more political influence among both developing and developed countries.
July 12, 2023
Dr. Mark Abdollahian
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence Among Three to Twelve Nuclear Powers: Fundamental Instability and Mitigation Strategy

The fundamental instability of bilateral nuclear deterrence (Albert Wohlstetter’s “delicate balance of terror”) is mitigated, in part, by each adversary deploying and maintaining weapons systems that are capable of guaranteeing a second-strike after an adversary has launched a first-strike.
June 27, 2024
Dr. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (George Mason University)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Shape of the Future Operating Environment: How Our Adversaries Have Learned to Stop Worrying and Ignore the Bomb

In July of this year, at the request of USSTRATCOM, SMA initiated an effort to address eight questions regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries.
November 11, 2021
Bragg, B
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SMA Speaker Series

U.S. Military Theories of Victory for a War with the People's Republic of China

The United States has not had to seriously consider conflict escalation with a near-peer adversary that could result in a conflict that ends in large-scale destruction since the Cold War.
November 13, 2024
Jacob Heim and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga
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SMA Speaker Series

Climate Change and Food Security in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities

The Indo-Pacific region is home to approximately 60% of the world’s population and contributes 60% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), making it one of the most significant regions to monitor.
October 3, 2024
Ameya Kelkar
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SMA Speaker Series

Future Scenarios for Sino-Russian Military Cooperation Possibilities, Limitations, and Consequences

The level of integration and cooperation between China and Russia in the event of a significant military conflict is often speculated upon, particularly given the rising political tensions in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea.
September 12, 2024
Mark Cozad, Cortez A. Cooper III, and David Woodworth
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SMA Speaker Series

Public Support for Self-Defence in Taiwan: The Current State of Research

Chinese President Xi Jinping has indicated that an invasion of Taiwan by 2027 is a distinct possibility, if not imminent. The concern of a Chinese invasion from the international community intensified following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
August 14, 2024
Dr. Yao-Yuan Yeh, Dr. Fang-Yu Chen, and Dr. Charles Wu
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SMA Speaker Series

How Innovative is China in Nuclear Power?

Analysts have long debated China’s capacity to innovate within its industry and economy. Mr. Ezell presented compelling evidence that China is not only more innovative than most analysts predict, but that its nuclear industry is particularly advanced.
September 10, 2024
Stephen Ezell
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SMA Speaker Series

Foreign Assistance in an Era of Strategic Competition

China is the only modern-day US competitor with both the intent and the capability to challenge the United States politically, militarily, and economically.
May 23, 2024
Daniel Cederberg
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SMA Speaker Series

Access Denied?: Assessing Options for Projecting Airpower into a Contested East Asia

China is striving to limit US military power projection in its home region of East Asia by enhancing its own ability to project air and missile power.
June 25, 2024
Nicholas D. Anderson and Daryl Press
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SMA Speaker Series

Critical Minerals Geopolitics and Security

Minerals are crucial components of advanced weapons systems, playing a pivotal role in military capability and power projection. They are increasingly integrated into new attack platforms, including Virginia-class attack submarines and long-range missiles.
May 16, 2024
Morgan Bazilian and Gregory Wischer
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SMA Speaker Series

Some of the Analysis Behind RAND’s “Inflection Point” Report

Modern threats from developed nations like China are beginning to exceed US capabilities, partly because the US military was predominantly focused on regional adversaries such as Iraq during Desert Storm. Mr. Ochmanek categorized the US approach to military power projection during this period as expeditionary and sequential.
May 22, 2024
David Ochmanek
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SMA Speaker Series

Responses Against China's Coercion in the Indo-Pacific: Developing a Toolkit from the Philippines and Taiwan

China has escalated its aggressive and coercive tactics against smaller and less powerful states as part of its objective to become a regional hegemony.
April 24, 2024
Thomas J. Shattuck and Robin Michael U. Garcia
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SMA Speaker Series

The Qualities that Make Nations Competitive: Chinese and Russian Views

A significant portion of the current literature exploring Great Power Competition (GPC) among the United States, China, and Russia predominantly reflects a Western perspective.
April 23, 2024
Timothy R. Heath, Michael J. Mazarr, and Clint Reach
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SMA Speaker Series

The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter

Dr. O’Neil offers a reframed perspective on economic globalization, highlighting the prominence of increased interregional trade rather than international trade.
April 16, 2024
Shannon K. O’Neil
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SMA Speaker Series

Great Power Economic Competition, the PRC Economic Challenge, and the Prospects of De-Dollarization

According to Dr. Williams, there are two other important strategies employed by China to enhance the yuan’s prominence in the global financial sector involving the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s dominance in the mass production of goods imported by other countries.
February 1, 2024
Dr. Brandon Kirk Williams
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SMA Speaker Series

Upstart: How China Became a Great Power

In her recent book, “Upstart: How China Became a Great Power,” Dr. Mastro delves into the rapid trajectory of China’s rise from global obscurity to great power status.
March 12, 2024
‍Oriana Skylar Mastro
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SMA Speaker Series

China and the Global South: Big Ambitions, Big Challenges

China’s economic slowdown coupled with its ambition to continuously compete with the US both economically and politically is compelling Beijing to intensify its efforts to increase political influence in the Global South. Mr. Schuman, who authored an article on why China will struggle to win over the Global South and how India can aid the US in countering China’s efforts, suggested that China’s ultimate geopolitical goal is to reshape the current political world order.
February 27, 2024
Michael Schuman
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SMA Speaker Series

Deterrence and Space Warfare

The strategy of space warfare is a subset of general warfare strategy; therefore, the ideas of deterrence, compellence, and dissuasion have applicability in the space domain.
January 4, 2024
Dr. John Klein
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SMA Speaker Series

Beijing Rules: How China Weaponized Its Economy to Confront the World

During the last 25 years, China has strengthened its ability to economically coerce governments, companies, multilateral institutions, and individuals, bringing them in line with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) desires. She summarized China’s statecraft as a “clearly communicated set of rewards and punishments based on gatekeeping access to China’s huge markets, capital, and investments.” China uses its influence over markets as a vector for measuring illiberal political will among corporations and governments. China’s economic statecraft is purely political in nature. This means that any government, corporation, or individual who does not abide by the CCP’s guidelines are subject to sanctions. Ms. Allen emphasized that this is a juxtaposition to US and Western statecraft, in which sanctions are used to further multilateral goals of the liberal order.
October 18, 2023
Ms. Bethany Allen (Axios)
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SMA Speaker Series

China's Three Roads to Controlling Taiwan

The increasing political and military tensions between China and Taiwan are frequently discussed in Western media. During these discussions, politicians and pundits point out Taiwan’s strategic importance to the US and China, including US and Chinese strategic options. Mr. Kagan and Mr. Blumenthal discuss these topics and more in their new article “China’s Three Roads to Controlling Taiwan.” Mr. Kagan emphasized that while influencing Taiwan’s future is an important objective for both the US and China, it is not the most important objective for either country in the Asia Pacific region. A more important short-term objective for China is weakening anti-Chinese coalitions and alliances in the region. Furthermore, Chinese president, Xi Jinping, believes that there is plenty of time for China to achieve its objective of reunifying all of what he deems China by the goal date, 2049.
September 27, 2023
Dr. Dan Blumenthal (AEI) & Frederick W. Kagan (AEI); Jack Gaines, Moderator (One CA Podcast)
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SMA Speaker Series

Artificial Intelligence and Global Power

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) has drastically increased in speed and scope. The speed at which AI is being developed is increasing its implications for its use in militaries and economic competition between countries. AI will inevitably play a strong role in the US-China great power competition. Chinese president, Xi Jinping, even stated that technology and science is the main battlefield on which countries fight. Past industrialization has influenced past great power competitions. For example, Great Britain and Germany industrialized more quickly than Russia during the 18th century, surpassing Russia and becoming the two strongest European economies. Dr. Scharre commented that despite China’s rapid development of AI, the US still has a strong scientific lead on its main geopolitical rival and is in a strong position to retain its lead. The competition for AI dominance will likely be decided by four factors: a) data collection, b) hardware and chip development, c) talent retention, and d) institutional strength.
June 28, 2023
Dr. Paul Scharre (CNAS)
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SMA Speaker Series

A Restraint Approach to U.S. China Policy

Although the US-China competition has global economic and political implications, it is still primarily focused on the Asia-Pacific region. If this strategic competition escalates to armed conflict, then it will become incredibly costly to both the US and China. Dr. Swaine presented two future pathways for this rivalry to take that avoid armed conflict. He emphasized that avoiding conflict must involve restraint from both actors, but especially the US. Exercising restraint will help the US achieve several objectives, including a) constructing a new national public narrative on national security, b) reallocating national security resources, c) maximizing cooperation with other nations, and d) augmenting economic openness and stability. Maximizing cooperation among different states, in particular, is becoming increasingly important as the world becomes much more multipolar.
June 1, 2023
Michael Swaine (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft)
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SMA Speaker Series

Cold Peace: Avoiding the New Cold War

US and China are considered by many analysts and scholars to be in a second Cold War. Dr. Doyle specified that there are four types of political relationships—hot war, cold war, cold peace, and warm peace. If countries are in a hot war, then they are engaging in open military conflict. If they are in a warm peace, then they have mutual respect for each other and participate in peaceful competition that allows for frequent bilateral cooperation. An example of two actors who are currently in warm peace are the US and EU. Dr. Boyle argued that the US and China should work towards ending their current cold war and entering a stage of cold peace. This cold peace would still lack bilateral US-China cooperation and shared legitimacy, but it would involve no subversive activities, such as industrial espionage.
May 31, 2023
Dr. Michael Doyle (Columbia University)
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SMA Speaker Series

CCP Weapons of Mass Persuasion

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Jackie Deal (President, Long Term Strategy Group) and Ms. Ella Harvey (Public Service Fellow, John’s Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) origin is chronically understudied despite its strategic importance. The competitive strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) today relies on information operations and techniques of cooption and subversion that the CCP learned during its first decade, the 1920s, coupled with approaches to conventional warfare honed soon thereafter. Dr. Deal and Ms. Harvey identified three recurring models or phases of CCP strategy: 1) internal takeover – coopting an adversary by appearing to cooperate or form a partnership with it, finding sympathizers in the nominal partner’s camp, and shaping joint activities in directions favorable to the CCP; 2) preparing for a break – exacerbating divisions within the partner’s camp and inflating the CCP’s capabilities to demoralize the partner in advance of a split; and 3) scripted military confrontation – launching a surprise attack designed to enable the CCP to exploit its superior preparation and positioning relative to the partner.
May 2, 2023
Dr. Jackie Deal (President, Long Term Strategy Group) & Ms. Ella Harvey (Public Service Fellow, John’s Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)
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SMA Speaker Series

The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure: Why Warning Was Not Enough

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Erik Dahl (National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.Scholars and members of the intelligence community have historically caught early warning signs of national security disasters—like the COVID-19 pandemic—however their warnings have not been enough to stop these impending disasters. Several other historic intelligence failures that included warnings from the intelligence communities, including the terrorist attack on 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. However, he acknowledged that some do not consider past failures intelligence failures because intelligence analysts consider it their job to relay information and not suggest policy changes. He considered the COVID-19 pandemic as an intelligence failure because of three main factors: a) a strategic warning that got little traction, b) a lack of specific intelligence on the threat as it developed, and c) an absence of receptive decision makers. Dr. Dahl labeled the COVID-19 pandemic a whole-of-society failure.
April 5, 2023
Dahl, E. (Naval Postgraduate School)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Tai Ming Cheung (Director, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; Professor, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.China has been strengthening its techno-security state with the ultimate ambition of rivaling the US’ global geopolitical influence and military power by 2049 and fully modernizing its military force by 2035. Dr. Cheung defined the techno-security domain as “where national security, technological innovation, military power, and economic development converge.” He pointed out that this is where the US-China great power competition converges and that the US has already competed in a great power competition using its techno-security domain (i.e., in the 1980s against both Russia and Japan). Chinese president, Xi Jinping, was expected to continue his predecessors’ focus on economic development upon taking office; however, he has increasingly bridged the gap between China’s economic growth and facets of national security. President Xi has continued to conflate China’s national economic and security development during his third term in office, beginning to accelerate the modernization of certain parts of China’s armed forces.
March 19, 2023
Dr. Tai Ming Cheung (Director, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; Professor, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego)
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SMA Speaker Series

Sino-Russian Relations: Articulating a World Order

China and Russia are frequently considered to have an alliance against the West; however, their actual relationship is one of convenience. China and Russia’s friendship has only been in place for a short time. Historically, the two countries have been rivals, disputing over territories and boundaries. The intensity of these disputes has weakened since the mid-1990s, however, due to the nations’ new political relationship. Their present-day partnership is based on the desire for a multi-polar world that weakens the US’ status as a superpower. However, their vision differs on how this multi-polar world order is comprised. The difference between China’s and Russia’s world view is the role that each other’s political rivals, other than the US, would play.
March 1, 2023
Garcia, Z. (Associate Professor of Security Studies, Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College); Modlin, K. (Instructor, Western Kentucky University)
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SMA Speaker Series

When Democracy and Security Interests Clash: Hard Choices for US Policymakers

The US government’s objectives of protecting its security interests and promoting democratic ideals abroad sometimes coincide (e.g., Ukraine), while at other times, they appear at odds. The US spends billions of dollars per year on foreign aid to support democratic values and human rights efforts. However, it also gives large amounts of aid and support to countries that have weakening democracies, human rights issues, or full autocracies in the name of national and regional security. The US has encountered this dilemma since the Cold War and the Reagan administration, Mr. Press stated. During this time, the US viewed supporting democratic values as pivotal while also partnering with oppressive autocracies like Chile to combat the USSR. The three major drivers of this dilemma in recent years, according to Mr. Press, include a) the US’s interest in maintaining stability in the MENA region, b) countering violent extremist organizations, and c) managing strategic competition with China.
February 1, 2023
Carothers, T. (Co-director, Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); Press, B. (Non-resident Research Analyst, Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Return of Great Power War: Scenarios of Systemic US-China War

How a war between the US and China over Taiwan’s sovereignty would develop is a frequently debated subject by scholars and military leaders as China continues to deny the island nation’s autonomy. War games are an integral part of how decision makers develop their grand strategy; however, war games are a far cry from actual warfare, Dr. Heath stated. Dr. Heath and his RAND colleagues instead analyzed academic literature and Chinese documents in order to examine how a US-China conflict over Taiwan would occur at both a high and low intensity. The intensity refers to how aggressively China and the US would attack each other’s armed forces inside and outside of the theater. Dr. Heath stated that if any military conflict between the US and China were to occur, it would be a) long lasting, b) multidimensional, and c) transcontinental. Furthermore, regardless of the war’s intensity, the outcome would heavily influence who the global political and economic leader will be.
January 11, 2023
Heath, T. (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

Semiconductors, China, Taiwan, and the US Policy Debate: Intersecting Technological, Economic Security, and Geopolitical Realities

China and Taiwan’s political relationship is highly confrontational; however, China’s dependence on advanced semi-conductors produced in Taiwan acts as a defensive shield for Taiwan. Semi-conductors are one of the most complex technological tools ever created. Dr. Cronin emphasized that the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TMSL) is responsible for most of the current semiconductor industry. Taiwan provides 70% of China’s semi-conductor needs. China has the industrial infrastructure and the capability to mass-produce semi-conductor chips; however, they lack the means to produce the highly advanced chips used in advanced weapons systems. It is believed that most of China’s advanced missiles include Taiwanese semi-conductor chips that were produced under contract with the US. The US owns much of the intellectual property associated with the semiconductor chip industry.
November 9, 2022
Cronin, R. (The Stimson Center)
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SMA Speaker Series

Threat Inflation and the Taiwan Issue: The Need for an Active Denial Strategy, Plus Assurances

The US faces many tough dilemmas on how to build military deterrence measures against China in the Asia-Pacific, protect Taiwan’s sovereignty, and not place Japan or other allies in politically compromising positions. Dr. Swaine commented that building deterrence through overall US military capabilities and the individual armed forces is a multi-faceted issue, involving both military deterrence and credible reassurance measures to avoid inadvertent conflict. Three ideal types of military deterrence approaches identified were: a) punishment, b) control, and c) denial. Dr. Heginbotham mentioned that the DoD’s military strategy has been slowly and consistently shifting toward active denial, but that more remains to be done. Active denial relies on phased operations and divisions of labor with allies among other principles. Effectively utilizing active denial’s principles will include some restructuring and aligning of the armed forces.
November 10, 2022
Swaine, M. (East Asia Program, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft); Heginbotham, E. (Center for International Studies, MIT)
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SMA Speaker Series

Implications of China’s Nuclear Modernization and Expansion

China is modernizing its nuclear forces which is routine for modern nuclear countries; however, the speed and acceleration of China’s modernization is alarming Western leaders and scholars. Ms. Bradley commented that by growing its nuclear forces, China is creating nuclear capabilities to match their geopolitical ambitions, including regional hegemony. As China increases its nuclear capabilities, its adversaries will need to increase their levels of deterrence to maintain the geopolitical status quo. The characteristics of China’s nuclear deterrence can be described as focused, limited, and defensive. Historically, China has maintained a ‘no first strike’ policy. As it increases its nuclear capabilities, this policy may change. Its recent escalation of its nuclear forces represents a change in its nuclear strategy, not its security environment.
November 1, 2022
Bradley, J. (Plans and Policy Directorate, United States Strategic Command)
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SMA Speaker Series

Implications of a Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China

Escalation between China and Taiwan over Taiwan’s sovereignty is increasing, leaving the US and its allies with few options if China blockades Taiwan. While Taiwan nearly monopolizes the production of advanced semiconductor chips, this monopoly does not shield it from Chinese aggression. Dr. Martin argued that its control of advanced semi-conductor production may give it a reason to bargain with China. This reason is partly because Taiwan relies heavily on China for both its exports and imports. Furthermore, China is significantly better positioned economically to outlast Taiwan if it becomes sanctioned for overt aggression.
September 21, 2022
Martin, B. (Senior Policy Researcher & Director of the Institute for Supply Chain Security, RAND); Gunness, K. (Senior Policy Researcher, RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

Voices of China: A Conversation with Matthew Tye

China’s ruling government, led by President Xi Jinping, is becoming increasingly authoritarian and controlling over China’s media environment; however, China’s media and society was not always this restrictive. Mr. Tye’s presentation focused on China’s transition towards authoritarianism, which he witnessed first-hand while living there for nearly a decade. From 2008 to 2012, encountered a sense of optimism overall in China. Foreigners were treated with respect and friendliness, and China’s government relaxed its authoritarian policies in favor of economic growth. Mr. Tye stated that China even began borrowing US brands—like the NBA—for marketing campaigns in major city squares. He also described a strong developmental divide between rural and urban communities throughout China.
September 7, 2022
Tye, M. (Laowhy86 Media)
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SMA Speaker Series

China in Sri Lanka and the Political Economic Crisis

Mr. Abeyagoonasekera began the presentation by stating that China’s loans and investments in Sri Lanka are ultimately creating a debt trap.
August 2, 2022
Abeyagoonasekera, A. (The Millennium Project)
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SMA Speaker Series

Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Dr. Pettyjohn explained that nuclear deterrence is frequently examined in the context of a bilateral competition rather than a multipolar competition between three or more nuclear capable states.
July 26, 2022
Pettyjohn, S. (Senior Fellow & Director of the Defense Program, Center for a New American Security [CNAS])
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SMA Speaker Series

The Real Way to Succeed in a Rivalry: The Societal Foundations of National Competitiveness

A country’s societal dynamism is directly linked to its international competitiveness, according to Dr. Mazarr. There are seven societal characteristics related to a country’s international competitiveness: national ambition and will, unified national identity, shared opportunity, activity, effective government institutions, learning and adapting mentally, and diversity and pluralism.
July 6, 2022
Michael Mazarr
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SMA Speaker Series

The Perfect Imbalance of the Sino-Russian Relationship

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova (Head of the Political Science Doctoral Programme & Director of the China Studies Centre, Riga Stradins University, Latvia) as part of its SMA EUCOM / INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
June 7, 2022
Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova
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SMA Speaker Series

Competition in the Gray Zone: Countering China’s Coercion Against US Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Cristina Garafola (Associate Policy Researcher, RAND) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Series.
May 24, 2022
Cristina Garafola
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SMA Speaker Series

How America Can Seize Its Great-Power Opportunity

Past US foreign security policies primarily focused on adversaries’ capabilities and objectives rather than its own ability to project its desired messages and worldview.
May 4, 2022
Mr. Ali Wyne
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SMA Speaker Series

The Evolving Requirements for Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance in the Indo-Pacific

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Shane Smith (Director, Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy) and Dr. Justin Anderson (Senior Policy Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
April 27, 2022
Dr. Justin Anderson and Dr. Shane Smith
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SMA Speaker Series

Degrees of Separation: Targeted Decoupling and the US-China Relationship

SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Stephanie Segal(Non-resident Senior Associate, Economics Program, CSIS) and Mr. Matthew Reynolds (Research Associate, Economics Program, CSIS) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
March 30, 2022
Stephanie Segal and Matthew Reynolds
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SMA Speaker Series

Special Forces in Great Power Competition

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Jack Watling (Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
March 16, 2022
Dr. Jack Watling
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SMA Speaker Series

Stabilizing Great Power Rivalries

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND) and Dr. Samuel Charap (RAND) as part of its SMA EUCOM/INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
March 3, 2022
Dr. Michael Mazarr and Dr. Samuel Charap
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SMA Speaker Series

China’s Nuclear Modernization and Its Implications

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Tong Zhao (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.
February 25, 2022
Tong Zhoa
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SMA Speaker Series

Integrating Deterrence Across the Gray—Making It More Than Words

SMA hosted a speaker session with Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM), LTC Catherine Crombe (USSOCOM SOCCENT), and LTC Steven Ferenzi (USSOCOM SOCCENT) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
December 8, 2021
Lt. Col. Katie Crombe, Lt.Col. Steve Ferenzi, and Mr. Robert C. Jones
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SMA Speaker Series

The Real and Present Risk of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons on the Battlefield

Russia’s and China’s status as near-peer nuclear competitors with the US is changing the reality of what a military conflict would look like.
January 12, 2022
Dr. Adam Lowther
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SMA Speaker Series

Chinese Illicit Activities Conducted Through Myanmar

Speaker(s): Tower, J. (Country Director, Burma Program, United States Institute of Peace [USIP]); Rotberg, R. (Founding Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy School; President Emeritus, World Peace Foundation); Cooper, S. (National Investigations Journalist, Global News); Gaines, J. (Communication and Policy Advisor, Public Affairs).
December 7, 2021
Jason Tower, Prof. Robert I. Rotberg, Sam Cooper, and MAJ Jack Gaines
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SMA Speaker Series

What is the Real Story of China in Africa?

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Deborah Bräutigam (Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy & Director of the SAIS China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) as part of its SMA AFRICOM/INDOPACOM Speaker Session.
September 15, 2021
Dr. Deborah Bräutigam
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SMA Speaker Series

Global Health Diplomacy in the Time of COVID-19

SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Erik Herron (Eberly Family Distinguished Professor of Political Science, West Virginia University) with Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley (Professor of Sociology & Faculty Affiliate of the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and the European Studies Center, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
August 24, 2021
Dr. Erik Herron and Dr. Cynthia J. Buckley
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SMA Speaker Series

China-US Competition: Measuring Global Influence

Measuring a country’s power has traditionally been done by primarily comparing the military strength of countries on a country level basis. However, Dr. Moyer stated that measuring a country’s true power is more nuanced and should include factors such as its ability to conduct trade and provide foreign aid. Also, the measure of a country’s power relative to another’s should be a bilateral measurement, which relies on quantifiable data. Other important factors include a country’s political will to influence others and the balance in the relationship between countries—this is a dyadic relationship which is affected by a country’s bandwidth for communication and willingness to interact.
August 6, 2021
Mathew Burrows and Collin Meisel
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SMA Speaker Series

The Uyghurs of China: Cultural Genocide in the Name of Counterterrorism

The Uyghur ethnic group comprises less than one percent of China’s overall population. However, the Uyghurs, who are majority Muslim, are viewed by the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) as a potential threat to China’s stability. China has viewed the Uyghurs as a threat to Chinese stability since the Qing Dynasty conquered the region and named it Xinjiang or “new frontier.” The CCP has attempted to justify its suppression of the Uyghur population by linking Uyghur separatist groups to the global war on terror. Dr. Roberts emphasized, however, that Uyghur separatist organizations, including a collection of several groups that have been called The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), either have weak connections to larger terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, or do not have a presence inside of China.
June 17, 2021
Sean R. Roberts
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SMA Speaker Series

China’s Global Media Footprint

Ms. Cook began by stating that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always been an authoritarian regime. However, over the last decade, the CCP has further increased its control of Chinese media, the autonomy of private corporations, and the persecution of minority ethnic and social groups within China. To counter the negative impressions related to its authoritarian government, the CCP has launched a messaging campaign targeting countries around the world. Ms. Cook emphasized that China will target any media market, including small markets. Through these efforts, China tries to influence the narrative in these markets by using four tactics: a) propaganda, b) disinformation campaigns, c) censorship, and d) gaining influence over the information infrastructure in a country. Ms. Cook acknowledged that it is not just China who carries out these activities; some of China’s influence tactics are also used by other countries as part of their own geopolitical interactions with other states. However, she focused on China’s activities specifically for the purpose of this brief.
June 2, 2021
Sarah Cook
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SMA Speaker Series

Disrupting China’s Digital Silk Road

Mr. Hillman explained that China is expanding its influence in both its near and far abroad in a similar manner to past great powers. Included in these attempts to influence China’s influence is its COVID-19 pandemic response, which has accelerated China’s ability to expand its influence over the past year. It has also helped expose several of China’s mistakes, however. Part of China’s influence operation is the Digital Silk Road—a subset of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that is focused on digital infrastructure, submarine optical cable projects, and spatial satellite information passageways. Recently, China’s Digital Silk Road has become increasingly focused on the digital economy, AI, nanotechnology, quantum computing, big data, cloud computing, and smart cities. China is especially focused on increasing influence over other countries’ digital infrastructure because it allows China access to those countries’ data, Mr. Hillman highlighted. An example of this is the South Atlantic Inter Link (SAIL), which connects Cameroon to Brazil. The cable only experiences small amounts of traffic, revealing that Cameroon is getting minimal use of the cable even though it has been saddled with a large amount of debt to China as a result of its construction.
March 31, 2021
Jonathan E. Hillman
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SMA Speaker Series

Realities, Imperatives, & Principles of Great Power Competition (GPC): Today & Into the Biden Administration

Dr. Lynch stated that we are entering a new era of great power competition (GPC) between the US and its systemic rivals, Russia and China. However, he believes that historical examples of past GPC can still provide insights for how the current competition will end. He emphasized that competition occurs on a continuum on which states compete through their militaries, ideologies, political institutions, economies, and the control of information. He then defined a great power as a country that has unusual capabilities which aid in its pursuit of its objectives abroad and force other countries to take its wants and needs into account when forming policy. In historical examples of GPC, there are usually several countries that can be considered as great powers who rarely cooperate with each other. However, instances of outright military conflict are also very rare. Dr. Lynch predicted that what will likely occur between the US and its adversaries is a mixture of cooperation to protect global markets, on which they both rely, and competition to undercut each other politically. He further suggested that a drastic transition of power from the US to either China or Russia is unlikely because a transition of power usually occurs after a major military conflict. A major military conflict will probably not occur for several reasons, including that these countries are unlikely to demean each other’s domestic populations. Demeaning another country’s domestic population was mentioned as the quickest way to accelerate political tensions.
March 18, 2021
Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III
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SMA Speaker Series

Toward an Inclusive & Balanced Regional Order: A New US Strategy in East Asia

SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Dr. Michael Swaine (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft), Dr. Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute), and Ms. Jessica Lee (Quincy Institute) as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.Dr. Swaine began the presentation by summarizing his and his colleagues’ Quincy Institute report findings. He provided insights on key regional dynamics, the strengths and weaknesses of the US’s past East Asian strategy and ultimately an alternative East Asian strategy going forward. He stated that the US’s current strategy is too reliant on the use of the military as a diplomatic tool. Instead, he insisted that there are three regional trends that are occurring which should guide the US’s strategy. These include 1) a shift in regional power that favors China, 2) increasing tensions over regional disputes, and 3) transnational challenges to all countries. Dr. Swaine added that while China is increasing its military capabilities, it will not become a regional hegemonic power. Moreover, he stated that there must be a more realistic approach to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and that threats to political and social stability threaten all countries.
February 12, 2021
Rachel Esplin Odell, Jessica J. Lee, and Michael D. Swaine
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SMA Speaker Series

One Belt, One Movie: China’s Campaign to Cancel America’s Cultural Dominance and Assert New Narratives

SMA hosted a speaker session, presented by Dr. Zachary S. Davis (Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Lab) and Mr. Marshall Monroe (Marshall Monroe Magic, Founder, National Center for Soft Power Strategies), as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series.Dr. Davis began by arguing that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using soft power to try to develop a new narrative to replace the post-war, American-dominated narrative. He then discussed several trends in the CCP’s use of soft power to “cancel” American culture through movies and media. Dr. Davis explained that China looks at areas such as film as part of national power, unlike the US. He contended that China is pursuing an integrated strategy where soft power strategies are meant to accompany the rise of hard power in the country’s concept of its new global role. He stated that his research focuses on China’s accumulation of soft power as a carefully cultivated strategy that has been implemented and is being executed by officials and friends of the regime, with some of the most important friends being business leaders. In his view, the CCP is trying to reshape the narrative by replacing American values with CCP-friendly values.
January 13, 2021
Dr. Zachary S. Davis and Marshall Monroe
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SMA Speaker Series

Artificial Intelligence, COVID, and Global Democratic-authoritarian Competition

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. The panelists included Mr. Paul Nemitz (Principal Advisor, Directorate General for Justice and Consumers at the European Commission), Dr. Nicholas Wright (Georgetown University), Mr. Steven Feldstein (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss (Cornell University).Dr. Wright first set the scene on how artificial intelligence (AI) has been reshaping critical systems globally. He explained that AI has contributed to the rise of digital authoritarianism in China. AI has also added to the digitization of liberal democracies in the US and Europe. Nations that have adopted these different models are competing for influence in the global system, in which there are critical swing states that may embrace one model over the other. In other words, there is global competition among states with competing visions regarding how we can digitize. COVID-19 has made all of this more pressing due to the rapid global movement towards digitization over the past 8 months. Dr. Wright then discussed the benefits of surveillance, highlighting that the use of surveillance technologies has been entirely necessary in order to enable the rich, industrialized world’s social and economic progress over the past two centuries. Furthermore, actors can determine possibilities for utilization of surveillance technologies based on their state’s environment. This leads to a central question: How does one establish democratically-accountable rules and norms that provide as much of the upsides of AI-supported surveillance as possible, without creating technological affordances that could facilitate authoritarian concentrations of power?
November 10, 2020
Speakers: Chen Weiss, J. (Cornell University); Feldstein, S. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); Nemitz, P. (Directorate General for Justice and Consumers at the European Commission); Wright, N. (Georgetown University)
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SMA Speaker Series

The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century

Mr. Hillman’s presentation focused on the findings presented in his new book, entitled The Emperor’s New Road. Mr. Hillman began by stating that China is not only following in the footsteps of other great powers, but it is also falling victim to their mistakes. He then addressed the comparison often made between the BRI and the Marshall plan. He explained that the Marshall plan was much smaller in terms of investment ($140 billion when adjusted for inflation, as compared to the $1 trillion in BRI investments promised by China). Moreover, the Marshall plan was a focused effort with a finite list of activities, a timeline, a set list of participating countries, and a goal of rebuilding economies that had already been developed. The BRI, on the other hand, has much broader participation and a goal of building economies that have not been developed before. Mr. Hillman stressed that those who engage in the BRI are not guaranteed benefits; in fact, despite China’s portrayal of this initiative as being win-win for both parties, investments tend to favor Chinese actors by a significant amount. This has often led participating nations to be disappointed by their involvement. Mr. Hillman used the China-Pakistan economic corridor as an example and stated that a small percentage of what has been announced has actually been completed, despite its portrayal as being the flagship of the BRI.
October 16, 2020
Jonathan Hillman
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SMA Speaker Series

Alternative Futures of Geopolitical Competition in a Post-COVD-19 World (Part II of II)

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series, entitled “Alternative Futures of Geopolitical Competition in a Post-COVID-19 World (Part II of II).” The panelists included Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, PhD (US Air Force AF/AFAC), Ms. Vera Zakem (Technology for Global Security), and Mr. Shannon McGurk (Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability, Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch).
September 17, 2020
McGurk, S., Sotiriadis, J., Zakem, V.
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SMA Speaker Series

China 2050: Preparing for an Ascendant China

SMA hosted a speaker session as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series, entitled “China 2050: Preparing for an Ascendant China.” The speakers included Dr. Andrew Scobell (RAND) and Mr. Cortez Cooper (RAND). Dr. Scobell began his portion of the brief by discussing long-term competition between the US and China, more specifically focusing on China’s “grand strategy” and why studying it can be an effective method in analyzing long-term competition with China. He explained that China views threats from other states, particularly the US, as the biggest risks to its national security. Dr. Scobell then identified four successive grand strategies that China has developed over time—“revolution,” “recovery,” “building comprehensive national power (CNP),” and, in today’s age, “rejuvenation.” He elaborated that China is not only interested in developing its hard power, but its soft power as well. This is because China believes that an effective combination of hard and soft power will be beneficial in advancing its grand strategy. Next, Mr. Cooper discussed the importance of China’s grand strategy—more specifically, the organization of its subgoals in its various areas of national governance. He also presented a series of “alternative futures” that he, Dr. Scobell, and their report coauthors identified. These alternative futures are possible routes through which China’s strategies may adapt in the future and included “triumphant China,” “ascendant China,” “stagnant China,” and “imploding China.” Mr. Cooper stressed the importance of rebalancing and restructuring within China’s grand strategy but elaborated that there are not necessarily any signs of significant reform at this time. He then went on to explain how these possible alternative futures may impact China’s relationship with the US. Mr. Cooper expressed that his outlook was not necessarily optimistic in that regard and suggested that there would be significant collision between the US and China in the face of long-term competition.
September 17, 2020
Andrew Scobell and
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SMA Speaker Series

Spoiler Alert: Managing the Threat of the Islamic State During Great Power Competition

SMA hosted a speaker series with Dr. Craig Whiteside (US Naval War College) and Dr. Haroro Ingram (George Washington University) as a part of its SMA CENTCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Whiteside began by discussing the global influence and resilience of the Islamic State, highlighting its continued presence despite the death of its physical caliphate. He also stated that in the age of great power competition between the US, China, and Russia, many scholars think small ideological competitors will no longer be significant. However, Dr. Whiteside argued that this has not been the case thus far. He explained that the security environment is not bipolar, and the Islamic State is continuing to redefine and shape local conflicts to serve its larger goals. Furthermore, he claimed that the Islamic State will weaponize a change in the international global order, if it is altered from the way we know it today. Dr. Whiteside continued by describing the Islamic State as a transnational enterprise and discussing the global network that stems from this empire. He emphasized that the Islamic State has learned to operate this global enterprise quite effectively over time; it has become well-organized, well-financed, and technologically savvy. However, in contrast, Dr. Whiteside identified two strategic dilemmas that the Islamic State faces. These include itslack of a master plan and most of its operations’ dependency on waiting for the right opportunity to strike. To conclude his remarks, Dr. Whiteside discussed the importance of understanding insurgency doctrine and how it influences the Islamic State’s strategy on three pillars: continual stabs, cumulative attrition, and consolidation/empowerment. Dr. Ingram continued the speaker session by discussing how the Islamic State’s simple strategic principles, operational approaches, and ideological concepts have evolved over time, both in concept and in practice. He argued that understanding these things is the best way to project assessments of the Islamic State into the future and that observing its history helps one develop nuanced understandings of its ideology that may aid these assessments. Dr. Ingram then provided three main ideas to take away from the presentation. He first argued that great power competition matters to the Islamic State, based on its rhetoric, how it thinks of global issues, and how it pursues its goals. Secondly, he suggested that anti-Islamic State efforts are complementary with great power competition when considering global partnerships and allied support. To conclude, Dr. Ingram argued that American leadership matters on the global stage with regards to maintaining pressure on the Islamic State and building global partnerships to counter its influence.
August 27, 2020
Craig A. Whiteside, Ph.D. and Dr. Haroro J. Ingram
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SMA Speaker Series

A New World Order?: The West, China, and Russia Post-COVID

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Raffaello Pantucci (RUSI) and Mr. Keir Giles (Chatham House) as part of its SMA UK MoD Speaker Series. Mr. Giles first discussed how Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the way it perceives the state of its internal affairs indicates that it wants to emerge from the global pandemic as a major player in a less “imbalanced world.” During this crisis, the world has perceived Russia as being relatively quiet; meanwhile, according to Mr. Giles, its disinformation campaign and preparations to interfere in US politics have not ceased behind the scenes. Mr. Giles stated that at the beginning of the pandemic, Russia tried to take advantage of the Western world’s weakness by undermining sanctions and attempting to reach out to other European countries under a false guise of help and alliance. These attempts at soft power failed because they were not executed well. He then asserted that Russia has not experienced the same scale of domestic economic and social failure as much of the rest of the world because public perception in Russia has not changed much since before COVID; Russian citizens’ confidence in the country’s health care system and government was already low. Mr. Giles added that the main challenges that Russia currently faces are the state of its economy, its older demography, and management of its relationship with China. Since Russia did not seize the opportunity to reform its economy and reduce its dependence on energy and raw materials pre-COVID, it remains uncompetitive on a global stage. Furthermore, Russia’s demographic makeup has remained uneven since the fall of the Soviet Union. Mr. Giles claimed that Russia’s denial that these problems exist and its fear of causing social upheaval by addressing them is irresponsible and not realistic. Regardless, he argued that Russia will emerge from the global pandemic opportunistic and ready to take advantage of a world recovering from COVID.
July 31, 2020
Keir Giles
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SMA Speaker Series

Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Ashley Townshend (University of Sydney), Dr. David Santoro (Pacific Forum), and Dr. Brendan Thomas-Noone (University of Sydney) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. Our speakers focused on the US-Australia Indo-Pacific deterrence dialogue, specifically with regards to China and conventional deterrence.
July 28, 2020
David Santoro, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Ashley Townshend
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SMA Speaker Series

The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the US and China

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Matthew Kroenig (Georgetown University) as part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Dr. Kroenig’s brief focused on his book, entitled The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the US and China. During his brief, he contended that the foremost threat the US is facing today is the return of great power rivalry between Russia and China, two autocratic adversaries. However, democracies have balance in long-term great power competition, and although the US system has its shortcomings, its fundamentals are stronger than both Russia’s and China’s, and it is in a good position to maintain its position of leadership in the foreseeable future. He reached this conclusion by first discussing the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of both democracies and autocracies, then moving into seven case studies of democracies versus autocracies from the ancient world to present day, then finally discussing what this means for the US, Russia, and China today. Dr. Kroenig began by examining the sources of international power today to predict whether the transition of power between a declining US and a rising China is likely to continue taking place. He explained that to amass power and influence internationally, a state must be strong economically, diplomatically, and militarily. He elaborated that the domestic political institutions of a country feed directly into these three areas and therefore are the key sources of that country’s strength; the economic, diplomatic, and military facets are simply manifestations of those political institutions. Dr. Kroenig then stated that democracies promote stronger domestic institutions than autocracies do due to their openness to economic growth and innovation, stronger diplomatic alliances and international commitments, and historical military effectiveness. Autocracies spend a large percentage of their resources and effort managing and oppressing their own people and therefore cannot properly allocate attention to actually be competitive on a global scale. Next, Dr. Kroenig cited evidence from global powers throughout history, from the Roman Republic, to the British Empire, to the United States. In Long Cycle Theory of the rise and fall of great powers, leading states of the last 400 years (i.e., the Dutch Republic (1609-1712), the British Empire (1713-1945), and the United States (1945-1986)) have been the most open republics during the time. This fact is remarkable in that in 1945, there were only 12 established democracies at the time. Finally, when looking at the state of great power competition today, Dr. Kroenig asserted that the US, while threatened by China and Russia, has much stronger domestic political institutions that contribute to its economic, diplomatic, and military strength. Russia’s economy is corrupt and highly dependent on natural resources, its alliances are weak and rooted in disinformation, and it spends more on domestic security than an outward facing military. China, while economically strong, is unwilling to make economic reforms; its alliances formed as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)provoke global backlash; and its military has questionable effectiveness. Dr. Kroenig concluded by making the “hard power” case for democracy, emphasizing democracies’ ability to generate wealth and power and outlining the advantages of democracies in long-term great power rivalries.
July 20, 2020
Matthew Kroenig
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SMA Speaker Series

US-China Competition in the 2020s: The Decisive Decade

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Dr. Jonathan Ward (Atlas Organization) as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series. Dr. Ward addressed three primary questions during his brief.
July 21, 2020
Ward, J. (Atlas Organization)
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SMA Speaker Series

SMA's Chinese Strategic Intentions White Paper Panel Discussion- Part III (How the US, Its Allies, and Its Partner Nations Should Manage the Global Challenges Presented by China)

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. The panelists included Mr. Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Mr. Michael Mazarr (RAND), Dr. Robert Spalding III, Brig Gen, USAF (Ret.), and Lt. Col. Christopher D. Forrest (US Air Force HQ AF/A3K (CHECKMATE)). The moderator was Dr. Joseph G. D. Babb (US Army Command and General Staff College).
February 20, 2019
Babb, J. (US Army Command and General Staff College); Cheng, D. (Heritage Foundation); Mazarr, M. (RAND); Spalding, R. (Retired); Forrest, C. (US Air Force HQ AF/A3K (CHECKMATE))
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SMA Speaker Series

Stealth War: How China Took Over While America's Elite Slept

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Robert Spalding III, Brig Gen, USAF (Ret.) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. Dr. Spalding’s brief centered around his recent book, entitled Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept. To begin, he spoke about several sources that influenced his book, including the 2019 US National Security Strategy (NSS), Unrestricted Warfare, and the Tiananmen Papers. He then stated that several years ago, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) realized that China was under attack—culturally—by the US and that China needed globalization in order to protect itself from the US’s influential ideas and principles. The CCP’s ultimate goal, Dr. Spalding stated, was to fuse the ideals of the party with Chinese society writ large so that the terms “China” and the “CCP” would become synonymous. Dr. Spalding then spoke about China’s military, diplomacy, intellectual property (IP), and infrastructure. He stated that the CCP has been able to shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and effectively and efficiently create denied spaces for the US in the region. Furthermore, by deflecting attention and operating behind the scenes, the CCP is often able to stealthily achieve its goals and favorably manipulate global narratives. Dr. Spalding stated that China plans to dominate the global tech economy as well, and it plans to do so via intelligence collection from data and its domination of the 5G market. With regards to infrastructure, China is developing emerging market economies in order to gain access to raw materials and to give these nations the tools needed for digital commerce. To conclude, Dr. Spalding made a series of recommendations on how to deal with this “stealth war” in ways that align with the NSS. He stated that this effort should be focused on protecting, rebuilding, and inspiring. The US must 1) be more thorough in enforcing Chinese companies operating in the US to comply with US standards, 2) reassess its fiscal policy to effectively compete with China, 3) rebuild manufacturing centers that were lost to Chinese companies operating in the US, and 4) convince successful US business leaders who are being tempted by the Chinese economic model that the US’s is still more effective.
February 11, 2020
Dr. Robert S. Spalding III
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SMA Speaker Series

SMA's Chinese Strategic Intentions White Paper Panel Discussion- Part II (Assessing the Durability of the Chinese Regime)

Dr. Beckley began by discussing China’s slowing economic growth and how it is driving China to become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. He stated that China’s “economic miracle” is fading away rapidly. For example, though some economists state that China’s GDP is growing by around 6% annually, Dr. Beckley argued that it is realistically growing by about 3%. Furthermore, even if China was achieving 6% annual growth, GDP growth isn’t necessarily a direct indicator of economic growth. Productivity also factors into economic success, and over the past decade, China’s change in productivity has been negative. Dr. Beckley stated that China has been burning capital in order to achieve its rapid economic growth and starting infrastructure projects that are ultimately unprofitable, which is unsustainable. Next, Dr. Beckley explained that when fast-growing great powers slow down, they tend to crack down on domestic dissent while expanding and becoming more mercantilist abroad. China is indeed tightening its control at home, and it is expanding its economic and military footprint abroad as well. Though this trend makes China appear confident, Dr. Beckley argued that China is becoming more insecure at home, which will eventually lead to the use of more advanced forms of repression. The growth deceleration that usually proceeds is dangerous also, as these countries will search for ways to keep internal opposition at bay. Dr. Beckley cautioned US strategists to watch out for this. Next. Dr. Wright discussed China’s construction of a digital authoritarian regime and questioned its durability. He stated that authoritarian societies in the past have not been able to successfully become rich (and industrialized) and remain authoritarian societies. China, consequently, needs to find a way to distinguish itself from these authoritarian regimes of the past. Dr. Wright then explained what a digital authoritarian regime is. A digital authoritarian regime is a regime that uses AI surveillance tools and sensors in order to monitor and control its population. Self-automated surveillance tools makes authoritarianism cheaper, allowing nations like China to retain its wealth. To conclude, Dr. Wright argued that the Chinese digital authoritarian regime must remain flexible and adaptable in order to survive. It must overcome slowing economic growth and social challenges, namely an urbanizing population and an aging population.
February 13, 2019
Dr. Michael Beckley and Dr. Nicholas Wright
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SMA Speaker Series

SMA's Chinese Strategic Intentions White Paper Panel Discussion- Part I (Chinese Outreach Activities)

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. The panelists included Prof. Anoush Ehteshami (Durham University), Dr. Cynthia Watson (National Defense University), Dr. Thomas Sherlock (United States Military Academy, West Point), and Col E. John Gregory (United States Military Academy, West Point). The moderator was Ms. Nicole (Peterson) Omundson (NSI, Inc.).
February 4, 2019
Anoush Ehteshami, Dr. Cynthia Watson, and Col E. John Gregory
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SMA Speaker Series

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Dean Wilkening (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory) as a part of its SMA STRATCOM Academic Alliance Speaker Series. During his brief, Dr. Wilkening spoke about hypersonic weapons, crisis instability, and arms race instability. He began by defining ‘crisis instability’ as any action that makes escalation (across the nuclear threshold) harder to control and significantly reduces the effectiveness of a major power’s nuclear deterrent. He then defined ‘arms race instability’ as any action that stimulates an action-reaction arms competition. Dr. Wilkening proceeded to introduce hypersonic vehicles into the discussion. He classified ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and hypersonic cruise missiles as hypersonic weapons and highlighted two main missions for US hypersonic weapons: 1) penetrate advanced integrated air defense systems and 2) hold time-critical targets at risk. These uses of hypersonic weapons, however, can lead to arms race instability and/or crisis instability. Dr. Wilkening explained that arms race instability (and inadvertent escalation) could result from Russia and/or China modernizing their land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), investing in alternatives, or launching on warning or under attack. Crisis instability (and inadvertent escalation) could result from a compressed timeline, leading to less careful decision making, misperceptions, misunderstandings, miscommunication, and/or an increased chance for accidental or unauthorized attacks. Nuclear, warhead, and target ambiguity also play a role in making attack assessment difficult when performing hypersonic maneuvers. Lastly, Dr. Wilkening explained that the choice to use “long-range” or “tactical” weapons could lead to false perceptions of escalation. To conclude, Dr. Wilkening discussed how strategic instability can be avoided and presented a series of questions to ponder regarding to hypersonic weapons and strategic stability, including: 1) Will hypersonic weapons lead to offense dominance in strike warfare?; 2) How should the US balance the demands of conventional warfare with the need to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China?; and 3) How much strategic warning is prudent to assume for conflicts with Russia and China?
January 15, 2020
Dean A. Wilkening
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SMA Speaker Series

The Opioid Crisis: China, National Security, and the Undeclared Conflict

During this panel discussion, CAPT (Ret.) L. R. Bremseth discussed the severity of the opioid crisis in the US and posed the following question: Is this chemical warfare being brilliantly and effectively instigated against the US? He also outlined a series of potential explanations as to why the US is currently losing this war. Brig. Gen. Reist then assessed what the role of the military should be, both ideally and constructively, with regards to drug trafficking. He also discussed what the rules of engagement should be and stressed the importance of both extensive surveillance and building an intel picture on the border. To conclude, Prof. Giordano argued that, despite the lack of conventional destructive outcomes that are byproducts of conventional war, non-kinetic engagements have immense potential for multiple levels of disruption. He further explained that non-kinetic engagements provide distinct advantages for the instigator and disadvantages for the recipient, which makes it difficult for the target to defend itself. Thus, according to Prof. Giordano, the US should respond to the opioid crisis by thinking about it in terms of non-kinetic warfare and recognize the importance of identifying similar problems, eliminating those problems, and then determining how it can prevent a similar problem from appearing.
September 6, 2019
James Giordano, L. R. Bremseth, David G. Reist, and Angela von Trytek
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SMA Speaker Series

A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Ms. Elsa Kania (Center for a New American Security (CNAS)) and Mr. Samuel Bendett (CNA) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. Mr. Bendett began by stating that China and Russia have not only expanded their military cooperation, but they are also undertaking more extensive technological cooperation in 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, biotechnology, new media, and the digital economy. He then explained the genesis of this new high-tech partnership. Mr. Bendett stated that as NATO and other western nations distanced themselves from Russia, Russia began looking towards China as a potential partner. Moreover, China appeared to be a logical choice from Russia’s perspective due to its emergence as a key player in the global technological realm and as a focal point for the economic flow of high-tech products. Russia also hoped that it could capitalize on China’s ability to effectively commercialize intellectual products (IP). He then stated that China also benefits greatly from this high-tech partnership. For instance, China recognized that Russian scientific education is among the best in the world; therefore, China began funneling capital into Russian consortiums and universities in return for access to Russia’s highly-skilled scientists and engineers. Ms. Kania proceeded to state that it is evident that China and Russia are seeing interesting convergences in their strengths and weaknesses and that innovation has become one of the key elements in the expansion and strengthening of this relationship. However, from an outsider perspective, it is often difficult to discern which facets of this partnership are real and which are a façade. Moreover, the durability of this relationship is unclear, as this high-tech relationship is still fairly new. Ms. Kania, however, stated that it is likely that Russia and China’s military and high-tech relationships will continue to grow and evolve in the future, which will pose challenges to the US in the scope of great power competition. To conclude, Ms. Kania advised that US decision makers consider 1) greater monitoring and understanding of these nations’ activities in order to avoid being blindsided, 2) identifying and monitoring the ways in which China and Russia could utilize their academic partnerships, 3) working towards gaining a greater situational awareness among allies and partners, and 4) understanding potential targeting of our technologies.
November 15, 2019
Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania
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SMA Speaker Series

Future of Global Competition & Conflict Conclusion of Effort Panel Discussion (Part 2 of 2)

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. The panelists included Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), and Lt Gen (Ret) Dr. Bob Elder (George Mason University). Dr. Cooley first presented Oklahoma State University’s Media Ecology and Strategic Analysis (MESA) Group’s key takeaways from its comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan media. These takeaways included: 1) the future of global competition is a battle for economic security, which is demonstrated through technological innovation, trade agreements, etc.; 2) US actions are leading to a leadership vacuum and growing uncertainty; and 3) informational and cultural strategies are being developed by China, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela in order to to mitigate US/Western influence. Dr. Cooley also presented the MESA Group’s findings specific to Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan media, respectively, as well as a series of potential challenges to US global influence and potential openings for the US to expand and maintain its influence. Next, Lt Gen (Ret) Elder discussed the George Mason University Team’s Timed Influence Net (TIN) model and its application to globally integrated operations planning. He first explained the TIN model’s framework and approach, followed by a discussion of Chinese, Russian, and US strategic goals. He explained that a challenge of globally integrated operations is coordinating global activities and messaging to promote US objectives and disrupt adversary objectives detrimental to the US and its global partners. Based on the TIN model’s results, Lt Gen Elder presented four key planning insights, including how identifying which US and competitor regional objectives are in conflict with one another can help highlight likely areas of competition that could develop into crises and can also be used to develop indicators and warnings for monitoring purposes. Lastly, Dr. Bragg discussed NSI’s global deep dive effort, which maps major power influence and activities. This global deep dive provides a systematic means of exploring China’s and Russia’s activities and interests at various levels of analysis– state, regional, and global. She explained that the deep dive also enables examination of how US, Chinese, and Russian interests and activities intersect to create the potential for cooperation, competition, or conflict. Dr. Bragg summarized the interests and activities data that NSI found for China and Russia, while also highlighting Chinese global activities, Chinese investment in infrastructure and resource extraction, and US and Russian leverage over countries of top importance to China.
November 6, 2019
Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc.); Cooley, S. (Oklahoma State University); Elder, R. (George Mason University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Future of Global Competition & Conflict Conclusion of Effort Panel Discussion (Part 1 of 2)

SMA hosted a panel discussion as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. The panelists included Mr. Jumanne Donahue (US Army TRADOC G2), Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia (UBC)), and Dr. Maorong Jiang (Creighton University). Mr. Donahue first discussed the results of an Athena simulation designed to computationally model three potential China futures over the next 10 years. These potential futures included 1) status quo continuation, 2) state capitalist acceleration, and 3) the lost decade (i.e., a situation in which China declines economically). The team derived four primary conclusions from the simulation: 1) the possibility of regime change in China is virtually nonexistent; 2) China will likely remain stable overall despite any localized disturbances and grievances; 3) Chinese elites are generally satisfied with the status quo of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governance; and 4) the Hong Kong disturbances are ephemeral, and their impact on the rest of China is minimal. Next, Dr. Peter Suedfeld discussed the UBC team’s cognitive and motivational analyses on the leaders of the Chinese economy. The UBC team sought to identify what key aspects of cognition and motivation/interests drive Chinese global activities and strategy. In order to do this, the UBC team scored randomly selected texts based on integrative complexity and motive imagery. These texts included leaders’ discourse from various sectors of the Chinese economy, including the general economy, space, technology, and cyberspace. The UBC team found that 1) the integrative complexity of Chinese leadership was relatively high, 2) the motive imagery scores were also relatively high, 3) cyberspace scores were fairly low, and 4) achievement (i.e., competition, excellence, progress, etc.) appeared to be quite high as well. Dr. Maorong Jiang then presented a flexible framework to achieve strategic objectives in US-China policy. Dr. Jiang explained that there is an urgent need for the US to adopt a new strategic framework that both embraces Chinese political and economic realities and uses those realities to its advantage in order to advance US national and international agendas. This strategic framework also utilizes a soft-power deterrence approach to engage, challenge, and integrate China. He also emphasized that these strategic framework should be implemented with flexibility to ensure adaptability in the face of change. To conclude, Dr. Jiang made recommendations for US strategy towards China over the short-term (1-3 years, focusing on reengaging China), the medium term (3-7 years, focusing on challenging China while sharing responsibility), and the long term (7-10 years, focusing on integrating China to secure a rules-based global order).
October 30, 2019
Dr. Maorong Jiang, Dr. Jumanne Donahue, Peter Suedfeld, Brad Morrison,
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SMA Speaker Series

Geopolitics: Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, Kennan, China, Climate Change, and Current US Strategies

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM J52 Donnovan Group) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Mr. Jones first presented a series of thoughts for the audience’s consideration, which are posted below. He then spoke in detail about several primary theories of geography and geopolitics, including: Alfred Mahan’s “Sea Power” (1890), Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland” (1904), Nicholas Spykman’s “Rimland” (1942), and George Kennan’s “Containment” (1947). Next, Mr. Jones applied these theories to present-day China. He suggested that China’s approach in this era of great power competition is to win the “Heartland” first, then extend into the “Rimland.” China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) demonstrates how it is building the infrastructure necessary for power projection across the world. Moreover, Mr. Jones stated that China believes that it does not need to fight to win; in other words, if China can capture enough markets and ports in Europe and Asia, win enough hearts and minds, and gain enough influence, power and confidence will shift from the US to China. Therefore, US decision makers must think beyond traditional war-focused theories and ask themselves, “How do we win this influence campaign?
September 19, 2019
Robert C. Jones
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SMA Speaker Series

China’s Belt and Road: Myths, Risks, and Responses

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Jonathan Hillman (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. During his brief, Mr. Hillman discussed what China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is, what threats/risks it poses, and what the US can do better as it determines how to respond to this growing effort. He first described the origin of the BRI and explained that there is no official definition of what a BRI project is. Since the scope of the BRI is so vast, many different conclusions can be made about it.
August 28, 2019
Jonathan Hillman
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SMA Speaker Series

Russian and Chinese Activities in Central Asia

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Marlene Laruelle (George Washington University) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. Dr. Laruelle first discussed China’s and Russia’s current roles in Central Asia. China became Central Asia’s main economic partner in 2009. China has invested heavily in the region, and few immediate strings have been attached to this funding, though recipients have incurred massive state debts. China is also assisting regional integration overall, despite the largely bilateral nature of its projects. Russia, on the other hand, does not have a strong economic presence in the region, and it is viewed as an unreliable investor among Central Asian states. However, Russia dominates the security realm in Central Asia, from military equipment to educational training. According to Dr. Laruelle, China and Russia are adopting two conflicting strategies: China is promoting regional interactions (i.e., China is trying to bring Central Asian countries to the table and encourage them to cooperate), while Russia is trying to prevent them. Overall, the economic-security balance between China and Russia (respectively) appears to be effective, according to Dr. Laruelle.
September 18, 2019
Prof. Marlene Laruelle
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SMA Speaker Series

Talking to the Enemy: Explaining Diplomatic Strategy in Conflicts with China

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Georgetown University) as a part of its SMA INDOPACOM Speaker Series. Dr. Mastro first explained the motivation behind her research. The US does not have a good understanding of how to end conflicts or how to bring enemies to the negotiating table, according to Dr. Mastro. Moreover, individuals often have varying views on how to best get an enemy to agree to talks. Therefore, Dr. Mastro sought to answer the following question: After a war breaks out, what factors influence belligerents’ decisions about whether to talk to the enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? She defined diplomatic posture as “a belligerent’s willingness to engage in direct talks with its enemy at a given point in a war,” and explained that there are two types of diplomatic posture: open (where the warring party is willing to talk directly with the enemy in a given period of time unconditionally) and closed (where either the warring party is unwilling to talk directly to the enemy or is unwilling to do so unless preconditions are met). When conducting her research, Dr. Mastro examined every war fought since World War II and recognized that 1) there is a near universal tendency to have a period at the beginning of a war where there is only fighting and no talking; 2) states’ diplomatic posture varies over time and over conflicts; 3) expected strategic costs of conversation determine diplomatic posture; 4) when leaders’ cost valuation is high, they chose closed diplomatic postures; 5) when leaders’ cost valuation is low, they chose open diplomatic postures; and 6) states will only go to the negotiating table when/strategic costs are determined by likelihood of adverse inference and the enemy’s ability to respond given adverse inference. Dr. Mastro also provided a historic case study—China during the Korean War—to bring forth several of the conclusions she derived from her research. To conclude, Dr. Mastro provided a series of recommendations, including that US policymakers and defense planners must 1) rethink the US’s approach to wartime diplomacy, 2) integrate diplomats into contingency planning, and 3) rethink the role of mediators.
September 9, 2019
Oriana Skylar Mastro
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SMA Speaker Series

Hedged Bets or Shared Norms? Sino-Russian Great Power Relations and Public Opinion

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Thomas Sherlock (United States Military Academy at West Point) and Col E. John Gregory (US Army) as a part of its SMA Future of Global Competition and Conflict Speaker Series. In their research, Col Gregory and Dr. Sherlock examined the prospects for the future of the China-Russia relationship by surveying Chinese and Russian youths. They also aimed to determine whether common opinions are a result of political views or merely hedging behaviors.
July 24, 2019
Thomas Sherlock, Ph.D. and E. John Gregory, PhD, JD
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SMA Speaker Series

Reputational Security and Other New Priorities: Rethinking Soft Power for 2030

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Nicholas Cull (University of Southern California) as a part of its SMA Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. To begin, Dr. Cull highlighted a variety of foreign dangers presented when looking out towards 2030. He first explained that, although Russia is presently an irritant and a disrupter, it is not a long-term threat. Rather, China should be the US’s main concern—it has developed a strategy in pursuit of its long-term goals. In addition, Dr. Cull stated that an Indo/Pakistan War is a very real and long-term foreign danger
June 4, 2019
Nicholas J. Cull
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SMA Speaker Series

Network Origins of the Global Economy: East vs. West In a Complex Systems Perspective

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Hilton Root (George Mason University) as a part of its SMA Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. Dr. Root first stated that there is an increased fear of global instability and a diminished confidence in the solutions of the past. Therefore, over the past 10-20 years, experts have started to rethink the grand narrative of political and economic history we have grown to adopt. Furthermore, the rise of the East and its diversion from the West in terms of norms and political organization have also inspired this rethinking. When writing his book, Dr. Root studied the history of regimes and examined five great transitions in history to derive the following conclusion: The global economy is a network of networks.
July 10, 2019
Hilton Root
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SMA Speaker Series

Defending Global Interests

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Ms. Amy Webb (Future Today Institute) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series. Ms. Webb first stated that the US’s free market economy rewards short-term solutions with long-term risk, which can sometimes be problematic. She then spoke about her model, which uses data to listen for weak signals at the fringe, to see patterns, to identify trends, to calculate the ETA of a particular trend, to write scenarios, and to backcast preferred outcomes. Ms. Webb also stressed that there is no way to predict the future when there are so many variables at hand, nor is there a way to determine what geopolitical risks there truly are or what the impact of a technology may be.
June 26, 2019
Amy Webb
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SMA Speaker Series

Making Sense of Contemporary Geopolitics: Historical Analogies and Present Constructs

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Ali Wyne (RAND) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. Dr. Wyne first stated that neither historical analogies, nor present constructs that try to characterize modern geopolitical situations, help us navigate the muddied waters of modern geopolitics and great power competition. He then discussed two analogies that experts often use: the “1930s redux” and the “new Cold War.” Observers generally cite three concerns when invoking the 1930s: 1) democratic stagnation, 2) the prospect of de-globalization, and 3) the return of great-power competition. In the present day though, democracy and globalization are far more entrenched than they were in the 1930s.
June 20, 2019
Ali Wyne
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SMA Speaker Series

Becoming Peerless in a Peer-to-Peer Competition Environment

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. David Walton (National Defense University) as a part of its SMA NDU Speaker Series. For the conclusion of the SOF Paradigm in Great Power series, Dr. Walton encouraged listeners to think about commonly discussed issues but in new ways. In Dr. Walton’s words, this presentation was designed to provide “a cross-functional and multi-disciplinary approach to strategic and critical thinking,” to build “a foundational understanding of the common denominator issues that strategic leaders face, and to ground “the discussion in practical approaches to building analytical frameworks, evaluating information, and prioritizing solutions.” During the brief, Dr. Walton stated that the US is emerging from a period of strategic atrophy. The US’s competitive military advantage has been eroding, and it faces increased global disorder, reflecting a decline in the long-standing, rules-based international order. He stated that the US must return to a Cold War-type strategy in order to succeed in this era of competition.
June 10, 2019
David Walton
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SMA Speaker Series

China's Vision of Victory: Chinese Global Strategy and What It Means for America

In this talk, Dr. Ward discussed Chinese long-term strategy. For China, the South China Sea is only the beginning.
May 30, 2019
Dr. Jonathan D.T. Ward
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SMA Speaker Series

Grappling with the Rise of China: A New Model for Thinking about Sino-American Relations

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Dale Copeland (University of Virginia) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series. During his presentation, Dr. Copeland stated that he would move beyond the two schools of thought that dominate great power thinking (containment theory and engagement theory) by proposing an alternative, which he called stabilization theory.
May 17, 2019
Copeland, D. (University of Virginia)
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SMA Speaker Series

Conceptualizing Strategic Competition—Historical and Theoretical Perspectives

SMA hosted speaker session presented by Mr. Michael Mazarr (RAND) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
May 14, 2019
Mazarr, M. (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

Assessing Recent Russia-China-US Security Dialogues

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Richard Weitz (Hudson Institute) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
May 9, 2019
Weitz, R. (Hudson Institute)
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SMA Speaker Series

A Good Neighbor of Bad Governance: China’s Energy and Mining Development in Southeast Asia

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Jessica Liao (North Carolina State University) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
April 12, 2019
Liao, J. (North Carolina State University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Understanding China's AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Gregory Allen (Center for a New American Security (CNAS)) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
April 30, 2019
Allen, G. (Center for a New American Security (CNAS))
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SMA Speaker Series

Systemic Shift and the Middle East

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Anoush Ehteshami (Durham University) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
April 25, 2019
Ehteshami, A. (Durham University)
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SMA Speaker Series

Geopolitics and the Future of Money: CryptoConcerns

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Girish Nandakumar (USSOCOM Donovan Group) as a part of its SMA General Speaker Series.
April 17, 2019
Nandakumar, G. (USSOCOM Donovan Group)
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SMA Speaker Series

Adversarial Competition in the 21st Century

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by LTC David Doran (US Army), LTC Steven Meek (US Army), and Lt Col Bryan Bailey (US Air Force) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
April 10, 2019
Bailey, B. (US Air Force); Doran, D. (US Army); Meek, S. (US Army)
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SMA Speaker Series

Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue: Different Challenges, Different Responses

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Howard J. Shatz (RAND), Mr. James Dobbins (RAND), and Mr. Ali Wyne (RAND) as a part of its SMA Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
April 2, 2019
Shatz, H. (RAND); Dobbins, J. (RAND); Wyne, A. (RAND)
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SMA Speaker Series

Soft Power 2.0, China Style- STORY WARS

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Mr. Marshall Monroe (Marshall Monroe MAGIC / Magic Canyon Institute) as a part of its Future of Global Competition & Conflict Speaker Series.
March 20, 2019
Monroe, M. (Marshall Monroe MAGIC)
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NSI Publications (Tagged: China)

NSI Publication

International Transgressions Magnify Gray Zone Challenges

The current international system presents multiple potential challenges to US interests. In recent years, state actors, especially but not limited to Russia and China, have taken actions that disrupt regional stability and potentially threaten US interests (Bragg, 2016).
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

Discourse Insights into Future US-China Relations

The future of the US-China relationship seems increasingly uncertain, to say the least. Increased tensions between the two international powers were seemingly ignited when US President Donald Trump (President-elect at the time) engaged in a telephone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on 2 December 2016
Year Published:
2017
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NSI Publication

SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion

Please join SMA for its second SMA Perspectives Virtual Discussion: a two-hour companion event to our recently released SMA Perspectives volume, US versus China: Promoting “Constructive Competition” to Avoid “Destructive Competition.”
Year Published:
2021
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NSI Publication

Russian and Chinese Influence in Iran: Sources and Future Trends

Among all the experts interviewed for this report, there was a general consensus that relations between Iran and both Russia and China are driven by pragmatic considerations. Many described the Iran-Russia and Iran- China relationships as primarily transactional, with each having something concrete the other needs to meet their domestic economic growth and development needs.
Year Published:
2020
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